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This publication is a compilation of the presentations at a conference on 
the electrical effects associated with the accidental release of carbon fibers. 
This conference was held at the NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 
on December 4 and 5, 1979. 
A coordinated Federal Government action plan was announced in January 1978 
to study the potential problems arising from the projected increased use of 
carbon-fiber composite materials in civilian applications. The primary concern 
was the electrical hazard associated with carbon fibers released from burning 
of carbon-fiber composites such as might occur in crash fires of air or ground 
vehicles containing carbon composites and disposal of carbon composite waste or 
worn-out parts. The Federal Government action plan outlined in NASA Technical 
Memorandum 7818, "Carbon Fiber Study" dated May 1978, assigned responsibility 
for various elements of the study to appropriate federal agencies. As its 
part of this plan, NASA Langley Research Center has assessed the risks asso- 
ciated with the accidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft and the 
need for protection of civil aircraft from accidentally released fibers. The 
results of the NASA assessment were presented at the conference. In addition, 
other government agencies with significant studies underway reported on the 
status of their efforts. 
The NASA findings should be considered preliminary inasmuch as the verifi- 
cation test analysis was not complete at the time of the conference. A final 
report on the NASA risk assessment work will be submitted to the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy in early summer 1980. 
Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this report does not con- 
stitute an official endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either 
expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Carbon and graphite fibers have high strength and stiffness and are light- 
weight, making them very attractive for use in structural composite applica- 
tions. The fibers also have high electrical conductivity such that, when free 
carbon fibers settle on electrical contacts, they can cause equipment mal- 
functions or damage. As long as the fibers are embedded in the matrix of a 
composite material, they pose no hazard. However, when the composite is burned 
such as may occur in a crash-fire accident, fibers can be released from the 
matrix, become airborne, and disseminate over large areas, creating a potential 
hazard to electrical and electronic equipment. 
Because future applications of carbon based fiber composites were expected to 
be large, a Federal study of the potential hazard associated with their use 
was initiated in 1977 under the direction of the President's Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (Ref. 1). Since NASA has had heavy involvement 
in carbon fiber composite research and in the development of applications 
of the composites for use in civil aircraft, NASA was assigned tasks to de- 
velop alternate materials, to quantify risks to the nation associated with 
accidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft and to assess the 
need for protection of civil aircraft from accidentally released fibers. 
The Graphite Fibers Risk Analysis Program Office of the NASA Langley Research 
Center has completed the latter two of the above NASA tasks. The results 
of the work on the tasks were presented at a briefing for industry and govern- 
ment on December 4 & 5, 1979. The briefing which is documented herein, also 
included a status report of the work done by some of the other government 
agencies involved in the carbon fiber studies. 
An interim report on the NASA work was presented approximately a year prior 
to this conference and is documented in Reference 2. A final report on the 
NASA Langley Research Center work is scheduled for publication in early 
summer, 1980. 
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WELCOME AND PROGRAM SUMMARY 
R. R. Heldenfels 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Welcome to the Langley Research Center. We are pleased 
that you are here for this briefing on the risks associated with 
the accidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft. 
This is the second formal report on our risk assessment 
activities. A similar meeting was held here on October 31- 
November 1, 1978, reference 1. At that meeting, we presented a 
status report on our program and our first comprehensive 
assessment of the risk. Since then, we have collected much 
additional data and refined our analyses. The result is that our 
estimate of the public risk from using carbon fibers on current 
and future civil aircraft in the United States is very small by 
any standard and can be considered negligible by some. Conse- 
quently, we plan to complete this risk assessment activity in 
the next few months with the publication of all of our data 
analyses. Today we will present those data and analyses and the 
conclusions we have drawn from them. In addition, similar 
activities by other government agencies will be described 
tomorrow. We will appreciate hearing your comments on the 
validity of our conclusions and whether any significant factors 
have been overlooked in our studies. 
As you are aware, carbon-based fibers, often referred to 
interchangeably as graphite or carbon fibers, have high 
strength and stiffness that make them very attractive as the 
fibrous component of a composite material. Such composites are 
being used in an increasing number of applications because of 
their performance and cost benefits. The current and projected 
applications include sporting goods, automobiles, aircraft, and 
spacecraft in both the civil and military sectors. NASA, in 
particular, has conducted and sponsored extensive research and 
development to support the application of composite materials in 
civil aircraft. This NASA activity has emphasized carbon-fiber 
composites and it has been oriented primarily toward commercial 
transport applications. Significant use of carbon-fiber composites 
is planned in the new commercial transports now being sold. 
However, because of their high electrical conductivity, 
free carbon fibers that may get into electrical equipment can 
settle on or across electrical contacts or circuits and cause 
equipment malfunctions or damage. Plants that manufacture or 
process carbon fibers have experienced such problems but have 
solved them easily by protection or modifying the equipment 
involved. As long as carbon fibers are part of a composite 
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material (imbedded in a matrix), they pose no known hazard. 
They become an electrical hazard when individual fibers are 
released from the ccurlposite in a crash-fire accident. 
Figure 1 is a photograph of a few carbon fibers released 
from a fire. Note particularly the 1 mm length scale. 
Individual carbon fibers are very small (0.008 mm in diameter) 
and are very hard to see with the naked eye. They are not 
easy to detect and people could be unaware of their presence 
around electrical equipment. 
A logical question is how much equipment damage has actually 
resulted from the accidental release of carbon fibers? The 
answer is very little to date. The problem was highlighted 
initially by the Fostoria, Ohio incident in which significant 
electrical power distribution failures resulted when bundles 
of unused, long, untwisted fibers were placed in an incinerator 
and these long, unburned fibers that had never been in a com- 
posite were subsequently dispersed over a large area. A few 
military aircraft crash fires have released carbon fibers from 
composite structures, but no damage to electrical equipment has ' 
been specifically traced to these or similar vehicle accidents. 
The Fostoria incident, which dispersed very long fibers, is 
not representative of the accidental release of very short fibers 
from aircraft accidents. It is the only known incident in which 
accidentally released carbon fibers have caused any damage. 
However, the risk of accidental release will increase 
with the expected increased use of carbon fiber in both civil 
aircraft and other applications. Current estimates of future 
use of carbon fiber composites will be presented tomorrow. 
Because future applications were expected to be large (several 
million kilograms per year by 19901, a federal study of this 
potential hazard was conducted in 1977 under the direction of 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive 
Office of the President. 
The result of that study was reported in a press release 
issued by the Department of Commerce on January 20, 1978, along 
with a NASA publication on the observed effects of carbon/ 
graphite fibers (reference 2). The federal action plan 
developed is described in another NASA publication (reference 3). 
Briefly, that plan assigned responsibilities to those agencies 
concerned with the civil use of composites in a general or 
specific sense. Responsibilities assigned to NASA (figure 2) 
were as follows: 
1. Risk assessment and studies of protection of civil 
aircraft to be conducted at Langley. 
2. Materials modifications and alternate materials research 
to be conducted at five NASA Centers. 
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3. Management support of OSTP provided by NASA Headquarters. 
This meeting will not be concerned with the details of the 
NASA materials modification program. That program has identified 
ways to reduce the release of electrically conductive fibers in 
a variety of ways and some of these modifications may be used 
for other purposes in future composite materials. This program 
will end in 1980, too, because estimated risk is so small. 
Responsibilities that were assigned to some of the other 
government agencies are listed on figure 3. These agencies will 
report on their work tomorrow in the areas of market surveys, 
household equipment, surface transportation, power systems, 
monitoring equipment and disposal. 
The session today will report the results of the risk 
assessment activities conducted here at Langley with significant 
support from many organizations in government, industry, and 
universities. A number of laboratories in the Department of 
Defense have made major contributions to our program. We have 
examined in detail the risk from commercial transport aircraft 
as a source of released fibers and made an adequate assessment 
of the risk from general aviation as an additional source. 
The question we have addressed (figure 4) is: Is the 
potential damage that may be created by the release of carbon 
fiber from civil aircraft accidents significant compared to (1) 
other costs of such accidents and to (2) the benefits that accrue 
from the use of composite materials in aircraft construction? 
The answer to both is no! 
To get this answer we have used risk analysis methods and 
experimental data on the signfificant elements of those analyses. 
We have a series of risk assessments that define the probability 
of various degrees of damage from current and projected 
applications of composite materials in civil aircraft. This is 
a very complex problem. It involves the probability of 
occurrence of many things, such as the number and location of 
accidents, the amount of carbon fiber on the aircraft, how much 
fiber is released, how the fibers are disseminated, how far 
they go, what kind of equipment is in the area where the fibers 
are deposited, the effect of these fibers on that equipment, 
and the cost of equipment repair and replacement. We will 
describe the tests we have conducted to acquire the data needed 
and the analyses we have made to define the probability of 
various levels of risk. 
An improtant consideration in our study is the character of 
the carbon-fiber hazard compared to other potential hazards. 
The carbon-fiber hazard is almost exclusively a source of 
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potential property damage. 
We regularly experience man-caused and natural events (such 
as fires,- explosions, earthquakes, hurricanes and tornadoes) 
that produce numerous fatalities and injuries each year along 
with many millions of dollars of property damage. The equipment 
and property damage from accidental release of carbon fiber will 
be small in comparison and fatalities or injuries will be 
extremely rare. Any loss of life or injuries that may result 
from release of carbon fibers will be a secondary consequence 
of an equipment failure. Our results indicate that fatalities 
are extremely unlikely and that there is no known health 
hazard from accidental release in civil aircraft accidents. 
In other words, exposure of people to airborne carbon fibers is 
not expected to harm them. 
Before we give you the details of our tests and analyses 
today, I will summarize what we have learned, figure 5. These 
conclusions apply to the use of carbon-fiber composites on 
civil aircraft in the United States. 
1. The problem is complex and much data is required to 
define its many facets, but we have acquired enough information 
to understand and scope the risks involved. 
2. The amount of fibers released from civil aircraft 
fires is much lower than originally estimated. This is a 
major contribution to the low risk. 
3. Equipment is much less vulnerable than originally 
estimated. This is another major factor in our low risk results. 
In many cases we found that malfunctions during a test can be 
eliminated by using a vacuum cleaner to remove the fibers. 
We learned that much electrical and electronic equipment is 
well protected from adverse environments, including carbon 
fibers, and technology is available to provide any level of 
protection that may be required. 
4. Potential equipment damage from carbon fibers 
accidentally released from civil (commercial and general 
aviation) aircraft accidents is negligible today and is 
expected to be of very small magnitude in the future when carbon 
fiber composites are used extensively on civil aircraft. Our 
best estimates of the situation 15 years hence is that the 
expected value of equipment damage will be less than a 
fraction of one percent of the total cost of an aircraft 
accident. 
5. Identified vehicle crash-fire accidents to date that 
involved carbon-fiber composites caused no damage attributable 
to the carbon fibers released from the accident. 
4 
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6. Released carbon fibers do not directly contribute to 
fatalities and do not constitute a known health hazard. 
7. The potential cost of accidental release of carbon 
fibers from future civil aircraft is inconsequential compared 
to the benefits, such as cost and energy savings, that accrue 
from the use of these composites. 
8. We have sufficient data and analyses in hand to wrap 
up our investigation and publish the results in the next few 
months. 
Our data, results, and conclusions will be presented in 
detail at this briefing so that you can judge for yourself 
the validity of our conclusions. Please tell us if you see 
any place where we have been unduly optimistic or pessimistic. 
In conclusion, we have undertaken the difficult and 
complex task of assessing the risks associated with the use 
of carbon-fiber composites on civil aircraft. We have 
collected the requisite data, made appropriate analyses, and 
concluded that the risk is small and inconsequential. We plan 
to finish this project, as scheduled, with appropriate 
publications in a few months. If you have any relevant comments, 
suggestions or advice on this matter, please let us hear them 
before the conference is over. We appreciate your attendance 
and hope that you find the information presented useful in 
planning your future applications of carbon-fiber composites. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
REFERENCES 
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Figure l.- Carbon fibers released in a fire. 
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o RISK ASSESSMENT/AIRCRAFT PROTECTION 
* LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER 
o MATERIALS MODIFICATION AND ALTERNATE MATERIALS 
* AMES RESEARCH CENTER 
* JET PROPULSION LABORATORY 
* LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER 
* LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER 
* MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
o OSTP MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 
* NASA HEADQUARTERS 
Figure 2.- Carbon fiber action plan - NASA responsibilities. 
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
o INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 
o MARKET SURVEY 
o DATA BASE MAINTENANCE 
o COMMERCIAL & HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
o SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
o AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORTING 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
o POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, SYSTEMS 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
o MONITORING EQUIPMENT 
o ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY 
o DISPOSAL 
Figure 3.- Carbon fiber action plan - selected agency responsibilities. 
QUEST ION: IS THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE SIGNIFICANT 
COMPARED TO : 
o OTHER COSTS OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS? 
o BENEFITS FROM CARBON FIBER USED IN 
CIVIL AIRCRAFT? 
Figure 4.- Risk of carbon fiber release from civil aircraft. 
CONCLUSIONS 
o SUFFICIENT DATA AVAILABLE TO UNDERSTAND AND SCOPE PROBLEM 
o FIBER RELEASED FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT FIRES IS LESS THAN ORIGINAL ESTIMATES 
o EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY MUCH LESS THAN ORIGINAL ESTIMATES 
o POTENTIAL EQUIPMENT DAMAGE VERY SMALL COMPARED TO OTHER COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS 
o NO DAMAGE FROM ANY VEHICLE ACCIDENT TO DATE 
o NEGLIGIBLE RISK OF FATALITIES OR HEALTH HAZARDS 
o POTENTIAL COST OF DAMAGE SMALL COMPARED TO BENEFITS OF USE 
o PUBLICATION OF DATA, ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS TO COMPLETE STUDY IN A 
FEW MONTHS 
Figure 5.- Risk of carbon fiber release from civil aircraft - conclusions. 
70 
APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE HAZARD 
Robert J. Huston 
NASA Langley Research Center 
This paper is intended to provide an overview of the NASA approach to the as- 
sessment of the carbon fiber hazard. The objective of this overview is to 
place the later papers on the development of the data and analysis in the per- 
spective of the entire program. I would like to point out that the first ob- 
jective of the NASA program has been limited to the risk associated with ac- 
cidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft having composite struc- 
tures, that is, the potential risk to the civil sector including the general 
population (Figure 1). Our second objective was to assess the need for pro- 
tection for civil aircraft from carbon fitiers. We have identified an accident 
scenario for evaluation that involves crashes of civil aircraft, which in the 
case of large air-transport aircraft, usually occur near large airports (Figure 
2). In this scenario, a burning aircraft containing carbon composites releases 
smoke, soot and carbon fibers to be wafted downwind from the fire and, depending 
upon the wind direction, have the potential of adversely impacting on transpor- 
tation, manufacturing, and public service facilities as well as the home owner, 
commercial facilities and the power distribution systems. Another dimension of 
this potential hazard can be illustrated by the flow of analysis required to 
assess the risk (Figure 3). These are the elements that are involved in de- 
termining the risk that is associated with accidental release of carbon fiber. 
The subsequent papers (Figure 4) are generally organized along the lines of dis- 
cussing each of these elements. The next four papers will discuss one or more 
of these elements either as isolated elements or combined elements. The next 
paper will provide a technical bridge between the laboratory and experiment evi- 
dence and the real world we are attempting to analyze. Finally, the eighth and 
ninth papers will show how the data and real world are combined mathematically 
in terms of a dollar cost impact on the U.S. economy. Dollars were chosen as 
the understandable common denominator measure of risk. As such it allows the 
addition of the costs of the failure of a single home television set with the 
cost of the failure of an industrial process control computer. The dollar 
value is more rationally understood than a statement that two electronic items 
failed. 
Considering each element in turn, our third paper, presented by Dr. Bell, will 
discuss the source of the carbon fiber (Figure 5). Because carbon composites 
are not in widespread use today the first question we had to address is what 
is the future growth of carbon composites? We attack this problem by looking 
at the potential for various applications in the civil aircraft fleet. We 
found that general aviation, at this point in time, has only a single aircraft 
in production that uses carbon composite. That aircraft, a helicopter using 
less than 50 kg of carbon fiber, has only been in production a short time and 
current orders are only now approaching the 300 level. There is one airplane 
under construction and another in a preproduction stage which utilizes carbon 
composites. The viability of these two ventures is not yet proven. Both of 
these aircraft are turbine powered executive aircraft with a limited 
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potential for mass, marketitig. The remainder of the general aviation industry 
appears to be unprepared, for financial and technical reasons unrelated to the 
carbon fiber hazard, to begin to apply carbon composite technology to their 
designs. Therefore, we had to look at an industry that does not appear to be 
ready to adapt carbon composite applications and project the usage that they 
could have if they were encouraged to do so. I should point out that, for 
our purposes, general aviation is defined as all United States aircraft minus 
the air transport aircraft. That includes rotocraft, executive jet transports 
and the two seat trainer usually misnamed the "cub." We assumed a 30 percent 
a year growth in carbon fiber usage and projected the usage shown in Figure 6. 
Based on that projection, in about the 1993 time frame we would be looking at 
in excess of a million kilograms of carbon composite being flown in the general 
aviation fleet. Actually, that is a small amount of carbon fiber per aircraft 
in a very large fleet of aircraft. 
In the air-transport area we took a different approach. We had the assistance 
of the major air-transport aircraft manufacturers in the United States. We 
analyzed the capability of these individual companies, considered their plans 
and the possibilities in which they could introduce carbon composites,and from 
that determined the date of various applications of carbon composites on their 
production aircraft for the next 15 year time period. Combining that infor- 
mation with an FAA study of the size of the air-transport fleet that is antic- 
ipated to be required over the next 15 years, we were able to develop the pro- 
jection of carbon fiber usage on air-transport aircraft illustrated in Figure 
6. The details of the 1993 estimate of air-transport fleet usage are illus- 
trated in Figure 7. The carbon fiber usage is given as a function of the per- 
cent of the fleet exceeding a given level. We see that about 73 percent of 
the 1993 fleet would have some amount of carbon composite, even though it's a 
small amount, and one half percent of the fleet might have as much as 10,954 
kilograms of carbon on the aircraft. It was this estimate of the carbon fiber 
usage that has been used in the analysis by Dr. Pocinki et al. (Reference 1) 
and Dr. Fiksel et al. (Reference 2). 
In addition to the carbon fiber use projection, we have had to analyze the 
accident experience. The crash fire frequency is fairly easily obtained from 
the records of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). However, that 
data is not completely adequate to determine the degree of damage involved. 
Many accidents that are listed as fire accidents in the NTSB data did not in- 
volve significant damage to the aircraft. In order to understand this area 
quite well, we had Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas analyze all of the jet trans- 
port accidents that have occurred since the jet transport was introduced. We 
were able to determine the magnitude of the fire damage for these accidents 
and determine the percentage of the various components consumed in the fire 
(Figure 8). The examples shown in the figure illustrate the damage to com- 
ponents exposures to fire as a function of the percent of accidents with fire. 
The rudder, for example, tends to be the least damaged component. Very rarely 
is a rudder totally destroyed and in most accidents it is only partially con- 
sumed. The components that are most heavily damaged are the fuselage or wing- 
body fairing. All other components tend to fall between the two extremes of 
the rudder and the fuselage. 
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We found that the fire dynamics and fire chemistry were not a well-understood 
subject. We found that we had to develop a suitable theory and obtain an ex- 
perimental verification of that theory. We asked the Ames Research Center, 
which has been working in fire studies for a number of years, to take responsi- 
bility for development of a suitable theory and to obtain an experimental 
verification of the theory. As a part of that effort a series of tests were 
done at the NASA White Sands, New Mexico facility. Figure 9 shows one of these 
tests where a large pool fire was started and measurements were made in the 
fire at a number of elevations in the fire plume to determine fire temperatures, 
velocities, fuel-air ratios and other such elements that are important to 
understanding the potential for carbon fiber release. We used this kind of in- 
formation to predict, for example, the percentage of released fiber that would 
.be burned up in a fire plume. 
Finally, we have had to quantify the composite fiber release characteristics. 
Dr. Bell's paper (Reference 3) discusses this in considerable detail, but let 
me just introduce this subject by this illustration of a sample specimen in a 
test chamber (Figure 10). This is a 6.35 cm by 15.24 cm (2 l/2 in. by 6 in.), 
32-ply specimen in a radiant and gas-fired furnace. The illustration shows 
that the specimen has had layers of fiber and epoxy removed as it was gradu- 
ally eroded away in the fire. In this particular series of tests, performed 
by AVCO, we found that as this charcoal glowing effect developed we could 
record with a camera the fibers being burned or oxidized away. 
Considering the next elements in the flow of analysis, Dr. Elber will be dis- 
cussing the areas of dissemination, redissemination and transfer function 
(Figure ll)(Reference 4). We had to relate the existing pollution dissemination 
models to carbon fiber transport. Dr. Trethewey at the Army Dugway Proving 
Ground had previously completed most of the experimental and theoretical work 
in this area and assisted us with what additional help we needed. In addition, 
we had to quantify the post release redissemination of carbon fiber. We 
again went to Dr. Trethewey at Dugway for an experimental study. Dr. Elber 
will discuss and interpret the results of that experiment. We have to quantify 
the potential for carbon fiber to be transported into buildings and into 
equipment. To do this, we had to develop test methods and acquire data in 
buildina and eauipment transfer functions. Most of our data in this area was 
generat:d by the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory at Aberdeen or by the 
Bionetics Corporation using the Langley Fiber Chamber. 
Our next element in the flow of analysis, equipment vulnerability, will be 
covered by Israel Taback in Reference 5. Once fibers have been transported 
through the atmosphere and into enclosures, we have to analyze the electrica 1 
effects on various equipment. In fact, we also have to identify the various 
types of equipment that we must consider in our analysis, and by our choice 
of an accident scenario, we have to consider a fairly wide range of equipmen t - 
ranging all the way from consumer products that occur in the home to aircraft 
components (Figure 12). Once we have identified a suitable sample, we need 
to conduct fiber exposure tests on these components and then analyze the re- 
sults. We have at Langley a carbon fiber test chamber and we have been using 
similar facilities at the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory (Figure 13). 
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Basically, we place test specimens in an enclosed chamber. We run raw virgin 
fiber thr0ugh.a chopper, cutting the long length of fiber into prescribed 
short lengths of fiber, aspirate the fiber into the room and let it settle 
as it would in a normal atmospheric environment. Through monitoring, we de- 
termine the condition or the health of the equipment being exposed to fiber 
and through monitoring of the fiber concentrations and exposures, we determine 
the level of exposure at which failures can occur. A number of duplicate 
tests are required to obtain an adequate statistical sample of the failure 
rate. This method is used to develop data from which we can generalize for 
the equipment considered in the risk assessment. I should also point out that 
we have had to consider "failures" other than equipment malfunctions and 
Israel Taback will discuss, for example, the potential for shock hazard from 
some comon, everyday equipment that you might have around your home, like a 
toaster. In addition to the fiber chamber test data we have utilized circuit 
analysis and a fiber simulator to investigate the susceptibility of equipment 
to fiber exposure. The National Bureau of Standards, in meeting their own 
responsibilities to the national carbon fiber program and to assist NASA in 
gathering data, has conducted extensive analysis on consumer products. 
Next, in order to integrate some of the test activities and to verify the 
small scale tests we chose to do some large scale experiments (Figure 14). 
The objectives of the large scale experiments were to verify that the small 
chamber tests do adequately predict the fiber release characteristics and, 
also, to verify that the vulnerability of the equipment that we have been 
testing in the chamber with virgin fibers properly represents the vulnerability 
of equipment exposed to fire release fibers. One of these experiments that we 
performed was a large scale fire release of carbon fiber (Reference 6). 
Figure 15 is a photograph taken from about three miles away from the fire at 
the Dugway Proving Ground where we burned a variety of composite structural 
specimens containing from 32 to 50 kilograms of carbon. Through a wide range 
of monitoring devices and samplers, we were able to determine the fiber flux 
from the burning composite and the downwind depositions. One of the devices 
that we used to monitor the carbon fiber flux is a large Jacob’s ladder, a 305 
meter square rope grid carrying several hundred passive and active fiber 
collectors, that is supported by the two balloons shown in Figure 15. The 
Jacob’s ladder is placed so that the fire plume intersects the ladder so that 
we can measure the flux all across that fire plume. 
In addition to the outdoor tests, we have performed a large scale burn in 
a chamber. Figure 16 shows the Dahlgren shock tube. It has been converted to 
use as a fire facility to release carbon fibers from composites. We built a 
fire midway in its length and, through the use of exit fans on the large end, 
drew the fire efflux and carbon fibers through the tube across electrical 
equipment. The equipment exposed had been previously tested with virgin 
fibers and had known failure characteristics. Sufficient carbon composite 
was burned to release enough carbon fibers to deliberately fail the equipment. 
It would not be adequate to expose the equipment to carbon fiber levels that 
would not assure failure because that would prove nothing. We had to over- 
expose the equipment sufficiently to deliberately fail it. We were successful 
and Dick Pride will discuss that test in detail. It should be pointed out 
that there was no possibility of spilling of carbon fiber from the open end of 
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the tube because we used a water curtain at the end which we found quite ef- 
fectively filtered out carbon fibers. 
The seventh paper of the conference (Reference 7) will present the results of 
a series of surveys used to provide a variety of information necessary for 
assessing the public risk'due to accidentally released carbon fibers. As 
such, the surveys become a bridge between the technical and laboratory data 
gathered on carbon fiber release, penetration, and vulnerability effects and 
the economic impact of these factors. The surveys were completed as a team 
effort. The surveys are not the results of one company or one organizational 
study. A. D. Little and ORI, which performed the risk calculations, found it 
necessary to tie the data available in census information to real installations. 
We used ORI, A. D. Little and the Bionetics Corporation, as well as our 
Langley staff, to survey a variety of installations that ranged all the way 
from public facilities, utilities, commercial to industrial facilities. 
This report was prepared by Ansel Butterfield of the Bionetics Corporation. 
In each installation the teams searched for the data that we needed to tie 
together our modeling problem (Figure 17). We had to acquire economic data 
and we had to search for the sensitivity areas that might involve life critical 
and emergency services. In addition we had to evaluate the protection afforded 
in-place operating equipment. Of course, the purpose of all this was to in- 
corporate the survey result into our analysis model so that we would have a 
better tie between the theoretical calculations and the real economic environ- 
ment that we are trying to simulate. 
The next two papers will present the results of two studies performed inde- 
pendently by OR1 Incorporated and A. D. Little Incorporated (References 1 
and 2). One advantage offered by performing two independent studies is that 
different technical approaches, both considered a priori credible, may be 
compared. If either approach is faulty, for whatever reason, significant 
differences in the final analysis result will occur. For this introduction, 
I will emphasize the similarities in the basic approach used by both groups, 
though A. D. Little will present the results of a completely different approach 
for comparison (Figure 18). The basic approach is to simulate a single ac- 
cident in the scenarios under question and compute the probabilities that are 
associated with the accident location and condition, determine the release 
characteristics, that is how much fiber is released, and compute the dispersion 
of that fiber through the atmosphere. The simulation is based on real 
localities where we can determine the type of equipment that would be exposed. 
Based on the level of exposure and the failure rate of the exposed equipment, 
the computation then determines the.economic consequence. Now doing this 
calculation once gives you a sample answer but it does not address the total 
probability'to the entire country. And so, therefore, we must repeat this 
simulation sufficient times to obtain a statistically significant answer. 
Now the approaches of the individual contractors are different, in detail, 
particularly with regard to assessing the economic consequence, but basically 
they follow this overall approach. In one case the simulation is performed 
for the nine major traffic airports in the United States and is extrapolated 
to the nation as a whole. In the other case, the simulation is performed 
for the 26 airports with the highest traffic volume and then extrapolated to 
the Unites States as a whole. 
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Finally, in the tenth paper, this author will attempt to put the NASA study 
results in perspective (Reference 8). A number of conservative assumptions 
will be pointed out as well as areas where we think we have some limitations 
on the assessment. There have been a number of implied assumptions that you 
may not have recognized and some conclusions that we have not put into the 
main discussion that will be shared in this discussion. 
Finally, the various participants in the NASA risk assessment program are 
listed in Figure 19. Alongside of each name is the principal contribution 
of the organization to the NASA program. The NASA Graphite Fiber Risk 
Analysis Program Office is grateful to the individuals of these organi- 
zations that contributed to the various papers presented at this conference. 
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0 QUANTIFY RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF CARBON FIBERS FROM CIVIL 
AIRCRAFT HAVING COMPOSITE STRUCTURES 
# ASSESS THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED CARBON 
FIBER 
Figure l.- Carbon fiber hazard risk assessment - program objectives. 
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Figure 2.- The carbon fiber hazard potential. 
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Figure 3.- Risk analysis flow. 
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COMPOSITES IN COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION USE DR, JOSEPH FIKSEL 
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PERSPECTIVE R, J, HUSTON 
Figure 4.- Carbon fiber hazard - NASA assessment of the risk from the 
accidential release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft. 
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PROJECT CF USAGE OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS 
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CRASH/FIRE FREQUENCY 
CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE 
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Figure 5.- Source. 
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Figure 6.- Civil aircraft CF usage projection. 
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Figure 7.- Air transport fleet CF usage. 
NASA CR - 159030 
FA IRING 
0 ‘- I I 
50 100 
% OF ACCIDENTS WITH 
FIRE 
Figure 8.- Frequency of fire damage for 88 accidents (examples). 
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Figure 9.- Fire plume model verification tests at 
White Sands, New Mexico. 
Figure 10.- Test specimen. 
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RELATE EXISTING POLLUTION DISSEMINATION MODELS TO CF TRANSPORT 
QUANTIFY POST RELEASE REDISSEMINATION OF CARBON FIBER 
QUANTIFY BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFER FUNCTIONS AND PENTRATION FACTORS 
Figure ll.- Dissemination, redissemination, transfer function. 
IDENTIFY AND TEST REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF EQUIPMENT 
CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
INDUSTRY 
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AIRCRAFT 
ANALYZE TEST RESULTS AND GENERALIZE FOR THE RISK ANALYSIS 
Figure 12.- Vulnerability. 
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Figure 13.- Langley carbon fiber test chamber. 
VERIFY THAT FIBER RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS ARE ADEQUATELY 
ESTIMATED BY SMALL-SCALE TEST RESULTS 
VERIFY VULNERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT O FIRE RELEASED FIBERS 
Figure 14.- Large-scale experiments. 
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IN-PLACE OPERATING EQUIPMENT 
0 INCORPORATE SURVEY RESULTS IN ANALYSIS MODELS 
Figure 17.- Survey of facilities. 
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0 COMPUTE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND PROBABILITIES 
0 DETERMINE CARtiON FIBER RELEASE CONDITIONS 
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0 ENUMERATE XPOSED EQUIPMENT 
# DETERMIi1E EXPECTED LOSSES 
REPEAT SIPIULATIOIJ SUFFICIENT TIMES TO OBTAIN STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ANSWER 
Figure 18.- Risk computation - overall approach. 
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Figure 19.- NASA carbon fibers risk assessment - program participants. 
27 

RELEASE OF CARBON FIBERS FROM BURNING COMPOSITES 
Vernon L. Bell 
NASA Langley Research Center 
The first of the elements in our plan to work the carbon fiber 
risk analysis is the source of the fiber itself. At the first 
conference a little more than a year ago, our knowledge of just 
how much fiber might be released from the crash and ensuing fire 
of a composite-carrying airplane was rather shaky, at best. As 
noted in Figure 1, we did have some quantitative results, mostly 
using the Navy-developed test involving the burning of composite 
pieces followed by the explosive destruction of the burned com- 
posite residue, but the results of that test using portions of 
737 spoilers and DC-10 rudders varied widely from specimen to 
specimen. However, we did come up with weighted averages for all 
tests of 12% and 10% single fiber release, respectively, for the 
spoiler and rudder. Nevertheless, no one was at all satisfied 
with the burn plus explosive test sequence as a valid scenario 
for the events to be expected in the crash of a commercial air- 
liner. We were just beginning to acquire some results, courtesy 
of NASA-Ames' Redwood City contract test facility, which suggested 
that single fiber release might be much, much lower for more re- 
alistic means of disturbing the burned composite residue. We 
also knew that the forms of fibers which were released were varied, 
but we decided to concentrate on single fibers as the most likely 
form of fiber to constitute a long distance threat, if indeed a 
threat could exist. We had also just begun to find out that the 
fire-generated fibers were much shorter than had earlier been 
supposed, a finding which was a bright spot on the horizon of 
vulnerability. And then, too, we had begun to suspect that the 
oft-quoted "indestructibility" of graphite fibers was not nec- 
essarily true for the carbon fibers in most common use today. We 
believed that an undetermined amount of the fibers could be com- 
pletely consumed in real life fires. Based on the earliest re- 
lease data, O.R.I. (one of the contractors performing the risk 
analysis) was using 20% as the amount of single fiber from air- 
craft crash fires. A.D. Little was using two numbers: 5% for 
fires without explosions and 25% for fires with subsequent ex- 
plosions. 
Figure 2 lists the principal test facilities for the generation 
of the fiber release data which is given in this report. 
The lion's share of the laboratory work was done in the Navy's 
Dahlgren environmental chamber, with added support from the 
Scientific Services, Inc. facility at Redwood City, California, 
under the sponsorship of NASA's Ames Research Center. An ex- 
cellent study of the fundamentals of composite fires was perform- 
ed in AVCO's fire test facility. Of the three demonstration 
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test activities, I have only reported on that which TRW's Defense 
and Space Systems Group conducted for the Air Force at the Naval 
Surface Weapons Center, China Lake, California since NASA Langley 
sponsored the data reduction and analysis from those tests. Dick 
Pride will discuss the results from the Navy's shock tube fire 
facility at Dahlgren and the Army's Dugway Proving Ground. 
Before showing the fiber release data, a word of explanation is in 
order regarding how we have measured and calculated most of the 
single fiber release (Figure 3). The data I shall present was 
acquired, for the most part, by passive instrumentation means, 
especially by the settling of fibers onto 15.2 x 22.9 cm 
(6 x 9 in.) sheets of transparent films coated with a very sticky 
adhesive. Sometimes fibers in a horizontal airflow mode are 
trapped by encountering cylinders made by rolling up sticky Mylar 
film. A third general technique traps fibers in a horizontal flow 
mode onto a bridal veil filter, usually with about 1 mm or less 
mesh size, coated with a sticky substance. After the deposited or 
trapped fibers are counted and a mean length determined, a total 
number of fibers given off is calculated based on the area sampled. 
From that total number, the mean length, and the density of carbon 
fibers, a total weight of single fibers released is computed. A 
percentage of the total carbon fiber initially present (not burned 
away) can then be calculated. So the number which I will generally 
present to you will be the weight percent of single fibers re- 
leased, based on the initial weight originally present in the 
composite. The risk analyses to be presented later use that 
weight percent to determine the single fibers of a spectrum of 
lengths which can be predicted to be released from commercial air- 
craft crashes. 
With that introduction behind us, I would now like to present the 
total results of our very comprehensive carbon fiber release test 
program which has been conducted over the past couple of years. 
I will then go into the detail of each separate piece of that pro- 
gram, which I hope will leave you convinced that we have a pretty 
good handle on how much potentially hazardous carbon fiber can be 
expected to be released from the total representation of an air- 
craft crash fire. I will first present the data in terms of the 
amount of fiber which could be released from fires, then give some 
characteristics of fire-released fibers, and finally tell you how 
we have utilized the data. 
As I mentioned earlier, most of our early data came from a burn 
plus subsequent explosive destruction of the fibrous residue. 
The explosive destruction of the residual burned composite natu- 
rally leads to a large release of fiber. In some of our tests, 
the amount of explosive, 56.7 g (2 oz), was equal to the amount of 
carbon fiber present in the sample, simply because the explosive 
was held constant for each test, regardless of the specimen size 
or configuration. Although there may be crash/fire situations 
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involving military aircraft where a 226.8 kg (500 lb) bomb can act 
on 500 lb of carbon fiber in the plane, the whole idea of the ex- 
plosive is admittedly unacceptable for the civilian aircraft test 
situation. Nevertheless, we acquired that sort of data and we 
are using it as the upper limit for fiber release possibilities. 
So let me show you the results of the burn/explosion test on 
some prototype aircraft parts in Figure 4. As you can see, simple 
flat plates tested under the same conditions as the parts gave 
very low fiber release, as did an experimental turbine fan blade 
with polyimide resin from NASA's Lewis Research Center. A 5% re- 
lease resulted from a honeycomb panel using Nomex honeycomb core 
between two-ply skins of carbon/epoxy tape, with an outer ply of 
glass fabric. (I'll have more to say about this piece of struc- 
ture later). And then lastly, we have the DC-10 rudder and 737 
spoiler test results which were mentioned previously. The re- 
sults shown here reflect the refinements in Dugway's statistical 
counting procedure, leading to the present fiber release numbers 
of 4.1 and 5.5% for the rudder and spoiler tests. 
Some data has been presented in Figure 5 which reflects the other 
extreme for fiber release: that given off when composites or 
fiber materials are burned quiescently without intentional dis- 
turbance of the fibrous residues. The specimens were burned for 
20 minutes with the propane burner used in the Navy's Dahlgren 
Chamber. The amounts of single fibers released from three par- 
ticular 737 spoiler pieces are at least three orders of magnitude 
less than the amounts which were released from the very same 
specimens which were burned and then exploded. The same vast 
difference between burn alone and burn plus explosion was found 
for the fiberglass/carbon/Nomex honeycomb paneling material which 
I mentioned earlier. Also shown in this figure are the low re- 
lease amounts obtained by simply burning 0.45 kg. (l-pound) spools 
of virgin T-300 and HMS carbon fiber. Interesting, but not al- 
together unexpected, was the observation that after the flame 
was extinguished following the 20-minute burn period, the mass of 
T-300 fiber continued to glow for more than 90 minutes, resulting 
in over 90% mass loss of the fiber by oxidation. Such was not 
the case for the more "graphitized" HMS fiber which had virtually 
no mass loss. Since carbon fiber is generally manufactured, trans- 
ported, and utilized on spools, this data should alleviate con- 
siderably any fears concerning warehouse, truck, and industrial 
fires involving virgin fiber. 
The fiber release numbers for the NASA flat plates in the last 
figure came from a series of tests which were meant to determine 
the effects of composite configuration, both thickness and lay-up 
method, on fiber release. The results of that study shown in 
Figure 6 were somewhat confusing to us, since for both the burn 
only and the burn/explode tests, the 3.2 millimeter (l/8 inch) 
thick plates gave off much greater amounts of single fiber than 
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did the thinner and thicker specimens. However, these test 
specimens which were fabricated in-house at Langley, had been 
analyzed and QC'd very thoroughly by Robert Jewell. When we ex- 
amined that back-up data, it was found that all of the test panels, 
except for the 3.2 mm (l/8 inch) cross-plied panel, had respect- 
able resin contents of 30-35%. But the l/8 inch cross-plied panel 
had a resin content of only 26 percent, and the C-scan analysis 
showed it to be porous. We believe that the lack of sufficient 
resin to thoroughly saturate the bundles of fibers could well have 
led to the abnormally high single fiber release values for the 
l/8 inch specimens, since the usual fiber-holding char from the 
epoxy resin would be lacking in the porous portions of the com- 
posite plates. So for the first time, we suggest that the qual- 
ity of composites could have a significant effect upon fiber re- 
lease. Yet, it is probably safe to say that the stringent qual- 
ity control procedures exercised in the manufacture of aircraft 
composite parts would prevent such poor quality parts from being 
used. 
One particular test series conducted by the Navy's chamber test 
facility employed conditions which I feel could be the most ex- 
treme to be expected in a fire situation which might act upon com- 
posite parts in a crashed commercial airliner. These results, 
shown in Figure 7, were obtained by burning standard flat plates 
for 20 minutes with a propane burner, with airflow both during 
and after the completion of the burn, and also with the instan- 
taneous release of pressurized air directed at the burned com- 
posite fibrous residue. Incidentally, the materials used in the 
entire Dahlgren study of the effects of various types of disturb- 
ances on fiber release were carried out using 0.15 x 0.15 m 
(6" x 6") specimens from 0.00336 meter (0.132 inch) thick plates 
of crossplied AS/3501-6 composites, all cut from two 0.61 m x 
1.22 m (2 ft. x 4 ft.) high quality panels. So we felt extremely 
confident of the constancy of the tests up through the completion 
of the act of burning the specimens. The first two bars in Figure 
7 show that very small amounts of single fiber were released when 
a 5 m/set (10 knot) flow of air was directed at the horizontal 
edge of the plate, either during the 20-minute burn (first bar) 
or for 10 minutes following the 20-minute burn. The third bar 
shows very little release of single fibers when a 15 m/set (30- 
knot) flow of air was directed against the edge of the specimen 
during its 20-minute burn period. However, the reason for that 
result was that the 30 knot airflow simply overwhelmed the pro- 
pane flame and cooled the specimen to such an extent that very 
little resin was consumed. So the only reliable high airflow 
test was the one shownby the fourth bar, where a 30knot flow 
of air was directed at a 20-minute pre-burned specimen. As you 
can see, single fiber release was relatively high and 30 knots 
of inflowing air is not unreasonable for a large pool fire. The 
last three bars show the amounts of fiber released when pressur- 
ized quantities of air were released instanteously at 20-minute 
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pre-burned composite residues. The resulting velocities of air, 
from 135 to 470 knots, could realistically simulate such events 
from raging firestorms to exploding fuel tanks. 
The forms of disturbance involved in fiber release testing have 
been roughly broken into those considered to be external in 
nature, including the forces caused by explosives, air blasts 
and airflow, and impacts; and others considered to be internal 
in nature. One series of tests conducted at Dahlgren was an 
extremely thorough evaluation of the amounts of fiber released 
when the burned composite residue was impacted with various 
shapes and weights of pendulum heads at the end of a swinging 
pendulum, which has been depicted in Figure 8. Duplicate tests 
involving each of the five pendulum heads impacting the com- 
posite residue at four different angles of impact were run. 
The results shown here, which prove that the amounts of single 
fiber released in this manner were consistently low, seem to 
minimize such concerns as portions of aircraft structure collaps- 
ing onto burning or burned composite parts. 
Another type of test which also addressed the possibility of 
fiber release by means of an external impact was the drop impact 
test developed and used by Scientific Services, Inc. (SSI) at 
Redwood City, California under a contract from the NASA Ames 
alternate materials program. This facility, which I described 
a year ago, utilized a projectile of various weights falling 
from different heights onto a burned composite plate in a chamber 
which enabled a complete collection of single fibers and other 
fibrous fragments. The results in Figure 9 show that all drop 
weights and heights gave extremely small amounts of single fibers 
when the projectile was dropped onto burned crossplied composite 
specimens, and perhaps slightly higher amounts from woven com- 
posite plates. However, the use of woven carbon fabrics in the 
fabrication of the specimens clearly led to a marked reduction 
in the total amounts of fiber fragments since the projectile 
punched a clean hole through the burned composite residue, com- 
pared to the massive shattering caused to the crossplied panels. 
Figure 10 shows the results of what I have called disruption of 
the composites by forces internal to the burned fibrous residue. 
The burned residues from the standard 20-minute burn periods were 
flexed to destruction and twisted as means of simulating some 
other possible events that could happen in the midst of an air- 
craft crash fire. The specimens were also vibrated at 30 cycles 
per second, and simply dropped from a 2.44 meter (8 foot) height. 
It is apparent that these disruptive forces released amounts of 
single carbon fibers equally as small and smaller than did the 
mechanical and drop impact tests. So we feel that the entire 
series of impact tests conducted at the Navy's Dahlgren chamber 
test facility should go a long way toward defining and testing 
most of the likely forms of disruption to the burned carbon 
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fiber composites. 
A carbon fiber release study, complementary to those which I 
have just described, was performed in the AVCO fire test facility. 
This facility utilized a chamber using natural gas as the fuel, 
but it was particularly attractive for simulating the burning of 
composites in jet fuel fires since it had a realistic combination 
of radiant and convective heat fluxes. This versatile test 
facility was used to study a number of different fire variables, 
some of which have been shown in Figure 11. Variation of the 
fuel to air ratios from lean to rich, holding other fire proper- 
ties constant, did not seem to have a marked effect upon the 
amounts of single fibers released, although it did have a con- 
siderable impact on the amount of fibers oxidized by the fire. 
However, the effect of edge restraint in reducing the amounts of 
fiber released was clearly demonstrated, since according to the 
results shown here, nearly ten times as much fiber was released 
from a specimen with three edges exposed to the flame as evolved 
from a specimen which was mounted in a metal frame. That could 
be a significant factor in release of fiber from shattered com- 
posite parts in a crashed aircraft. Although the AVCO facility 
used an airflow of up to 8 meters/second (15 knots), pulses of 
argon directed at the burning composite plates were used to 
simulate turbulent forces in a raging fire, and the results in 
this chart show that such gas pulses did, indeed, increase the 
amount of released fibers. Movies of the AVCO tests give a 
strong impression that the argon pulses give the fire the turbu- 
lence which is typical of pretty healthy fuel fires. 
At this point, I will summarize in Figure 12, in a very general 
way, what we have found about the effects of disturbance of 
burned fibrous residue from the standpoint of importance in 
causing single fibers to be given off. The explosive disruption 
is still generally conceded to be the extreme, but near sub- 
sonic blasts of air are almost as severe. And as I have already 
shown, the severity of disturbance diminishes rapidly with lesser 
air velocities, impacts, internal disturbances, and finally, 
simple burning. 
I would now like to leave the broad subject of amount of fiber 
release and tell you what we have found out about the physical 
characteristics of the fibers which have been released. Last 
year at this time we had some results from the SSI Redwood City 
tests, and some TRW measurements from the Air Force outdoor tests, 
and as I mentioned previously, those results indicated that 
fire-released fibers were generally much shorter than had been 
expected, with average lengths of l-3 millimeters. All of the 
single fiber release data I have presented thus far has been for 
fibers over 1 millimeter in length. A general spectrum of fiber 
lengths over 1 millimeter in length has been given in Figure 13, 
and that general spectrum has been confirmed by just about all 
34 
the composite fire testing that has been done, including that by 
TRW at China Lake and their Capistrano Test Site, SSI at Redwood 
City, AVCO, and the Navy in the Dahlgren chamber and shock tube, 
with the variations being encompassed in the shaded portions of 
the bars. I hasten to add that I said "just about all" and I 
will describe the exceptions to you soon. The predominance of 
fibers shorter than 3 mm in length has a marked effect upon the 
susceptibility of electrical equipment to the fibers, as will be 
pointed out in Mr. Taback's presentation on vulnerability of 
equipment. 
A consideration of all the lengths of carbon fibers generated in 
fires is quite interesting. Such a study has been made by Dr. 
Ben Sussholz of TRW. The results have been shown in Figure 14. 
Dr. Sussholz counted and measured carbon fibers from several 
different tests down to 5 micrometers in length, so that should 
give you an appreciation for what a monumental task it was. Re- 
sults of three of the tests have been shown in this figure. The 
first one, from a burn plus explosion test conducted by TRW, shows 
that more than 98 weight percent of the fibers detected and 
counted were less than 1 millimeter in length. At a meeting of 
carbon fiber representatives earlier this year, I presented that 
number and some skepticism concerning the validity of it was ex- 
pressed. Consequently, I reviewed the data and realized that 
CTS-3 was an unusually severe explosion since twice the usual 
amount of C-4 explosive was used and it was placed both above and 
below the burned composite. Obviously, it really powdered up the 
fiber. However, CTS-1 was a test closely duplicating the normal 
burn plus explosive tests conducted at the Navy's Dahlgren chamber, 
and the results of that test, shown in the center, still indicate 
the great majority of fibers were less than one millimeter long, 
and probably electrically innocuous. Even the simple burning of 
a 737 spoiler specimen, with no subsequent disturbance of the 
fibrous residue, resulted in almost three-quarters of the fibers 
being under 1 millimeter. This substantiates a general feeling 
that the most widely used carbon fibers, such as T-300, AS, etc. 
have some sort of flaws in the fiber which promote the burn-through 
of the fiber at very short intervals. 
I mentioned that just about all of the testing has resulted in 
carbon fibers which were less than 3 mm in length. However, 
recent tests in the Navy's chamber at Dahlgren have given us a 
striking exception. One of the materials subjected to a burn 
plus explode sequence, the results for which were shown earlier 
(Figures 4 and 5), was a 9.5 mm (3/8 in.) thick panel composed 
of a Nomex honeycomb core bonded on both sides to a skin-con- 
sisting of a single ply of glass fabric and two plies of carbon 
fiber tape, with the glass being on the outside of the panel. 
When this panel was burn-tested in several ways, the results were 
as shown in Figure 15. A simple burning of the panel for 20 min 
with no intentional disturbance resulted in very few fibers, 
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calculated at no more than 0.01% of the amount of carbon fiber 
initially present in the panel. When a post-burn current of air 
at 15 meters/second (30 knots) was directed at the burned fiber 
residue for 10 minutes, one percent of the mass of carbon fibers 
was released but with a mean length of nearly 10 millimeters. 
The 20 minute burn plus explosive destruction reported before 
gave a significantly larger efflux of fibers, a little over 5 
percent, and they were of a mean length a little longer than those 
from the burn alone. Then when a sample was burned for 20 minutes 
and the residue was impacted with a single blast of air at 244 
meters/set (470 knots), the result was not only a high amount of 
release in terms of mass (8 weight percent), but the mean fiber 
lengths were 5.7 millimeters, or more than twice the mean for the 
burn alone. In both the airflow and airblast tests, there were 
some very long single fibers, running up to 40 and 50 millimeters. 
There was something very unique from the standpoint of not only 
the amount of fiber release (in terms of mass) from this partic- 
ular test specimen, but also from the standpoint of the physical 
dimensions of the fibers. On the other hand, due to the longer 
lengths in those two tests, less fibers were actually released 
from the airblast test than from the burn/explode test, but they 
were just a great deal longer. These anomalous results may or 
may not be significant from the standpoint of the effect on elec- 
trical equipment. I believe this will be brought up by Mr. Taback 
in his presentation on vulnerability. 
Throughout the source release testing program, we have wanted to 
get an idea of just how readily carbon fibers can be oxidized 
completely, since that fiber which burns up cannot be electrically 
hazardous. However, the temperatures considered to be represen- 
tative of fuel fires, from 1150-1365 K (1600-2000°F), are so high 
and the rate of carbon fiber oxidation in air at those tempera- 
tures is so fast that it has been extremely tough to try to study 
the process in the laboratory. Nevertheless, Mr. George Sykes 
of NASA Langley has made a good try at studying fiber oxidation 
at high temperatures with thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), and 
some of the results of that study are shown in Figure 16. Of 
course a large fuel fire involves not one temperature but a 
range of temperatures and a mixture of mostly radiative and 
convective heat fluxes. In this case, he settled on 1250 K as 
a good middle ground temperature, (which was also the highest 
temperature his equipment could reach), and heated the virgin 
fibers up to that temperature from room temperature at a rate 
of 375 K per minute, meaning it took almost 3 minutes to reach 
1250 K. At that point, the analysis became isothermal and 
weight loss was computed from that point. In addition to tem- 
perature variations in a real fire, there are also wide varia- 
tions in the oxygen content of the fire, and the extent of fiber 
oxidation will be highly dependent on the oxygen present. There- 
fore, he performed the isothermal TGAs for four possible oxygen 
levels, and the results shown in the figure give an idea of just 
36 
how rapidly AS carbon fibers could be completely oxidized away. 
With no oxygen present (nitrogen atmosphere), the fibers will 
last a long time at 1250 K. At the other extreme, in air the 
complete oxidation can occur in less than a minute. These data, 
while not answering directly our difficult question of "How much 
carbon fiber will be burned up in a fire?", were extremely useful 
for a theoretical fire modeling effort by Science Applications, 
Inc. (SAI), which I will describe shortly. 
Whereas the Langley study was conducted by the thermogravimetric 
analysis of virgin fibers, another oxidation study was done by 
AVCO Corporation. In this case they used actual fibrous residue 
from single plies of burned out composites in their combined 
radiative-convective fire facility. The results of their study, 
given in Figure 17, led to two plots of fiber mass loss with time 
using two types of fires, fuel rich and fuel lean. As expected, 
mass loss is much faster with the fuel lean or air rich fire than 
for the fuel rich fire. For comparison, although the AVCO study 
was done at only 1145 K, the air curve from the Langley TGA study 
is overlaid for comparison and the rate of fiber weight loss 
closely approximates the rate of mass loss for the AVCO fuel lean 
fire, as it should. 
One of the early studies in this program into the oxidation of 
carbon fibers was performed by the TRW Defense and Space Systems 
Group during their reduction and analysis of the results of the 
Air Force's China Lake outdoor fire tests. Some of their early 
studies which included thermogravimetric lab work as well as 
analysis of the outdoor composite burn tests resulted in the 
important conclusions shown in Figure 18. The reduction of the 
fiber diameters of such burned composites as the 737 spoilers 
represented a tremendous loss of fiber mass, and that oxidation 
as manifested by fiber diameter reduction was observed for other 
thin composites. As will be shown in the next figure, high 
quality, thick composites seem to show less fiber oxidation, per- 
haps because of the reduced specific surface area in thick com- 
posites. And lastly, TRW believed that the very process of com- 
bining virgin carbon fibers with resins into a composite and 
burning away the resin left certain unspecified residues on the 
fibers which catalyzed the oxidation of the fibers. Although we 
could not confirm that observation at Langley by TGA studies, the 
phenomenon may still be valid since an investigation at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory showed that certain metallic species could 
indeed cause a drastic conversion of virgin carbon fibers to 
combustible fibers. 
A manifestation of fiber oxidation in fires involving composites 
is the release of carbon fibers with reduced diameters. When 
the fiber collection data from TRW's Capistrano test series and 
the China Lake outdoor burn tests were studied, they revealed 
another important change in the fire-generated fibers from the 
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unburned fibers originally in the composites. TRW found that the 
fibers resulting from relatively thick (6.4 mm or l/4 inch) com- 
posite plates used in the Capistrano test (as well as in Navy 
burn plus explosion tests at Dahlgren) had roughly the same diam- 
eters as the initial fibers used to make up the composites. For 
example, Figure 19 shows that the post-test fibers from the CTS-3 
test, depicted by the solid bars, have been reduced in diameter 
only a minor amount compared to the diameter spectrum of the pre- 
test fibers shown by the dotted line bars. Test CTS-3 involved 
burning a one square foot composite plate with a propane burner, 
followed by the destruction of the residue with 4 ounces of C-4 
explosive. However, fibers which resulted from the burning of 
representative aircraft parts in jet fuel pool fires at China 
Lake were drastically reduced in diameter, as demonstrated by the 
results for the 737 spoiler fibers given in the figure. Generally, 
it seems that large pool fires acting on relatively thin com- 
posites lead to a substantial oxidation of the fibers to lower 
diameters, while use of propane burners for combustion of com- 
posites do not. However, poor quality, porous, resin-starved 
composites burned with relatively small, low-radiative gas fires 
can still produce fibers with markedly reduced diameters. 
Other factors of the fire can also result in a significant re- 
duction in fiber diameter, indicating oxidative conditions. Fig- 
ure 20 shows the large amount of oxidation that occurred when two 
3.2 mm (l/8 in.) thick composite specimens (AF-4 and AF-6) 
were burned in propane fires in the Dahlgren facility, immediately 
after the cessation of which a 15-meter per second (30 knot) air- 
flow was applied to the still-smouldering residue fiber mats. 
The large extent of fiber oxidation is obvious from the fact that 
most of the fibers measured from both tests were less than 4 
microns in diameter, compared to the usual 6-8 micron diameter 
for the virgin fibers. An important ramification of fiber diam- 
eter reduction will be addressed later in this presentation. 
At the beginning of this fiber release test program, we were dis- 
appointed to find such a paucity of information about the nature 
of the kinds of fires which would be involved in commercial air- 
craft crashes. Some analytical fire modeling for methane fires 
had been done, but those fires were poor substitutes for the 
"smoky" fires created by jet fuels. Even so, experimental veri- 
fication of existing codes was lacking. Mr. Joe Mansfield of 
NASA's Ames Research Center accepted the challenge to provide 
the sort of jet fuel fire and fire plume background which would 
enable the prediction of both the amount of fiber which could 
come out of a large jet fuel fire and how they would behave in 
the resulting fire plume, up to the region where the plume and 
fibers begin to form a downwind dissemination pattern. Also 
needed was a knowledge of those characteristics which could allow 
for the prediction of fiber consumption in the fire. The result 
was a comprehensive analytical program, with a mathematical 
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model developed by Science Applications, Inc., to determine the 
characteristics of large liquid fuel fires, including the spatial 
variations of such factors as the flame velocity, temperature, 
soot concentration, etc., as well as the manner' and extent to 
which carbon fibers released in the lower regions of the fire are 
transported and consumed within the fire. Because of the shortage 
of actual data with which to test the mathematical model, an 
experimental test program involving fire temperature, velocity 
and chemistry measurements was conducted at the NASA White Sands 
facility by means of JP-4 pool fires (Figure 21), with pool diam- 
eters of 7.62 meters (25 feet) and 15.24 meters (50 feet). 
Typical of the results of this excellent analytical-experimental 
program are those shown in the next two figures. 
The isothermal contours shown in Figure 22 indicate there was a 
small but extremely hot region in the center of the flame. How- 
ever, there is a rather large region in the center with tempera- 
tures still hot enough (1400-1500 K) to burn up carbon fibers, 
if sufficient air was present. The plot at the right indicates 
that the fiber consumption model predicted up to 15-16% oxidation 
of single fibers released in the fire for both 7.6 and 10.7 
meter (25 and 35 foot) fires, with consumption nearly complete 
at a height of 20-30 meters above the fire. 
In Figure 23, the original SAI model predicted excessive fire 
temperatures. When the experimental fire chemistry sampling 
showed the coexistence of both fuel and oxidizer in the center 
of the flame, the fluctuating chemistry model shown was developed 
to account for the "unmixedness" of the fires, although that 
model gave temperatures still somewhat higher than the experimen- 
tal test data from White Sands. The oxygen mass fraction sampling 
data at the right shows that the oxygen content of the 15 meter 
fire was considerably greater than predicted by the models. This 
was expected to lead to a higher than originally expected con- 
sumption of carbon fibers in jet fuel pool fires. 
In addition to the electrical hazards, there has been an un- 
certainty about the possible health hazards of carbon fibers. 
Under the Intergovernment Action Plan, the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was charged with the re- 
sponsibility of studying the health issues of carbon fibers. How- 
ever, since NASA has done the lion's share of the testing leading 
to fiber release, we have tried to be alert to the formation and 
dissemination of fibers which could in any way provide information 
of value to NIOSH. In addition to our interest in the fire-in- 
duced oxidation of carbon fibers as a means of getting rid of 
them, the partial oxidation of the fibers shown in two previous 
figures can lead to fibers with sufficiently small diameters to 
make them respirable to humans. For guidance in what dimensions 
for fibers and what exposure levels should be of concern, we can 
look at the standards for a known fiber health hazard. Those for 
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asbestos control have been shown in Figure 24. The concentration 
and exposure levels considered to be hazardous according to 1976 
OSHA standards should be kept in mind throughout this conference 
when expected carbon fiber levels are mentioned. 
Dr. Wolf Elber of NASA Langley performed a study with a scanning 
electron microscope of fibers which were collected on a square 
0.6 mm stainless steel mesh from the sooty exhaust of burned 
composites in the Navy's shock tube fire facility at Dahlgren. 
He was able to separate nearly 600 fibers from the soot by a 
settling procedure in water containing detergent. The accounting 
of the fiber lengths versus diameters is given in Figure 25. 
According to the guidelines for asbestos fibers, those fibers in 
the shaded lower left hand region of the figure would be of such 
small size as to possibly be respirable, and in this case totals 
37 out of 576, or about 6-l/2% of all the fibers. To put the 
quantity into the proper perspective, on a weight basis those 
fibers with the small diameters were less than one-quarter per- 
cent of all carbon fibers isolated and measured. 
Similar results were obtained by Dr. Ben Sussholz of TRW who 
counted and measured the small diameter fibers from the two 
Dahlgren burn plus airflow experiments AF-4 and AF-6 (Figure 
20). However, it still has to be shown whether or not there is 
anything at all hazardous about carbon fibers from a health 
standpoint. 
Our present knowledge to that effect is summarized in Figure 26. 
As just indicated, we have found only a few carbon fibers in our 
test programs which were possibly of respirable size. Only one 
study involving the response of animals to carbon fibers is 
known. In that one, guinea pigs were exposed to 2.g13 lo6 fibers/ 
cubic meter for 100 hours, or a total exposure of 10 fiber- 
sec/m3. Only 5 carbon fibers were found in the lungs of the 
autopsied animals and only one fiber was intracellular. There 
was no indication of macrophage formation, which would be sug- 
gestive of an antagonistic response of the animals to harmful 
foreign matter. As far as humans are concerned, it is known 
that many carbon materials have been implanted without indication 
of problems, so it seems fairly certain that carbon is innocuous 
to humans from a chemical standpoint. As Mr. Pride will tell 
YOU, NIOSH personnel have been involved in our large scale com- 
posite fire tests at Dugway Proving Ground and we feel certain 
they are the proper researchers to follow the carbon fiber health 
issue. 
To return to the principal objective of our carbon fiber release 
testing program, the next figure (Figure 27) indicates, in a 
general way, the overall mass balance to be expected when a com- 
posite burns up in a fire. At the right-hand side of the ledger, 
the greatest share of the fiber originally in the composite will 
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end up as some form of fibrous residue at the site of the fire 
and/or as oxidation products, such as water vapor, carbon oxides, 
and soot. However, some of the thin, single ply strips of burned 
composites will be transported for relatively short distances, 
i.e., up to a mile or so. On the other hand, we expect that 
from 5 to 17-18% of the total mass of carbon fiber initially 
present in the composite will be released as single fibers, with 
no more than 1 to 3%% being of concern from an electrical stand- 
point. (The origin of those 1 and 32% limits will be shown in 
Figure 28). And lastly, something under 0.05% at most will be 
given off as single fibers of such dimensions to be considered 
respirable. 
A very general summary of a great many of the carbon fiber fire 
release tests has been given in Figure 28. The tests have run 
the gamut from simple, quiet burning of composites, an event 
which undoubtedly would occur to some extent in the fire involving 
a crashed commercial airliner, all the way to fires followed 
by ordinance-based explosions and pressurized gas explosions. 
Most of the participants in the actual risk analyses adjudged 
1% to be an appropriate weight sercent release of carbon fiber 
for all non-explosive fires, while 3+% was chosen as the release 
number to be applied in the case of all fires with subsequent 
explosions. (Those two numbers are represented by the two hori- 
zontal dashed lines in the figure). We feel those numbers are 
extremely conservative, meaning they still represent somewhat 
higher amounts of single fibers being released than are felt 
would actually occur. 
The application of the large mass of data which has been herein 
presented is given in Figure 29. 
First, a study of commercial air transport accident records led 
to an opinion that 85% of the accidents with fires resulted in 
fires only, while 15% of the accidents had fires with explosions 
sometime after the onset of fire. More precisely, only 5% of the 
crashes with fires had explosions after 3 minutes of fire, which 
was considered to be the minimum time to completely consume the 
epoxy resins in the composite parts which could have been present. 
Second, a release number of 1% single fibers was chosen for air- 
craft fires without accompanying explosions, while 3-l/2% of the 
total available carbon fiber in the burned composite parts was 
chosen as single fiber release for those fires with explosions. 
And lastly, for every kilogram of carbon fibers released from a 
burning composite, there will be 5 billion fibers, having an 
exponential distribution of lengths with a 2 millimeter mean 
length. In addition, although the diameter of carbon fibers has 
a relatively minor effect on the electrical properties, the five 
billion fibers per kilogram were considered to have their original 
diameters of about 8 microns. So, as the bottom line of this 
program, the data shown here represents the source of carbon 
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fibers to be used in the final carbon fiber risk analysis. 
An acknowledgement of the excellent contributions to the source 
release program is in order. Dr. Kenneth R. Musselman and Mr. 
Ted Babinsky directed and conducted the entire test program in 
the Navy's Dahlgren environmental chamber, the magnitude of which 
is apparent from the data just presented. Dr. Ben Sussholz of 
TRW provided a wealth of data from the China Lake tests, and 
deserves special praise for his timeless efforts in counting, 
measuring, and analyzing fiber sizes. The overwhelming job of 
counting the fibers from hundreds of tests was accomplished for 
us by Mr. John Trethewey's group at the Army's Dugway Proving 
Ground as a pathfinding effort, and later by various individuals 
with the Bionetics Corporation. Mr. Joseph Mansfield provided 
invaluable assistance to this program not only by the contribu- 
tions of Scientific Service, Inc., but also, and especially, by 
his planning and direction of the pioneering fire plume modeling 
and experimental work performed by Science Applications, Inc. 
and NASA White Sands personnel. Mr. J. Glenn Alexander of the 
AVCO Corporation provided an excellent study on the fire param- 
eters in the burning of composites, while Mr. George Sykes 
of NASA Langley contributed a valuable, necessary and long over- 
due study of the fundamental thermal properties of carbon fibers. 
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o AMOUNTS - DISTURBANCE APPARENTLY NEEDED FOR RELEASE 
o BURN/EXPLODE TESTS: 737 SPOILER - S!NGLE TESTS: 6-40X; AVE.: 12% 
DC-10 RUDDER - SINGLE TESTS: 7-15x; AVE.: 10% 
0 BURN/DROP IMPACT TESTS: < O,l% SINGLE FIBERS (FLAT PLATES) 
o FIBER FORMS - SINGLE FIBERS, LINT OR CLUSTERS, THIN STRIPS 
o FIBER SIZES - FIBERS FROM 
o OXIDIZABILITY - AS, T300, 
o RISK ANALYSIS - 
FIRES ARE VERY SHORT i < 3 MM) 
CELION TYPES BURN EASIER THAN HIGH MODULUS FIBERS 
o 0, R, I,: 20% SINGLE FIBER 
o A, D, LITTLE: 5% SINGLE FIBER (FIRE WITH SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE) 
25% SINGLE FIBER (FIRE PLUS EXPLOSION) 
Figure l.- Knowledge of fiber release: November, 1978. 
LABORATORY TESTS 
0 NAVY/DAHLGREN (VA) CHAMBER 
0 NASA/AMES - SSI/REDWOOD CITY, CA 
@ AVCO CORPJLOWELL, MA 
DEMONSTRATION TESTS 
0 NAVY/DAHLGREN SHOCK TUBE 
0 NASA/LANGLEY - ARMY/DUGWAY, UT 
. AIR FORCE - TRW AT NWC/CHINA LAKE, CA 
Figure 2.- Test facilities for fiber release. 
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0 RELEASED FIBERS IN FALLING MODE: 
I SETTLE ONTO STICKY DEPOSITION PAPERS 
0 RELEASED FIBERS IN HORIZONTAL FLOW MODE: 
0 ARE TRAPPED BY STICKY PAPER CYLINDERS 
0 ARE TRAPPED BY STICKY MESH FILTERS 
0 RELEASED FIBERS COUNTED VIA OPTICAL MICROSCOPIC TECHNIQUES 
0 DIRECT COUNT OF REPRESENTATIVE REGIONS 
0 BUFFON NEEDLE DROP PROBABILITY METHOD 
I ONLY FIBERS GREATER THAN 1 MM USED FOR FIBER RELEASE 
0 WEIGHT PERCENT OF FIBERS BASED ON AMOUNT OF FIBER PRESENT IN AFFECTED COMPOSITES 
Figure 3.- Determination of fiber release data. 
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Figure 4.- Single fiber release from prototype composite aircraft parts 
exposed to fire plus explosives (Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure 5.- Release of single fibers from propane fire vs. burn/explosive 
test (Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure 6.- Effects of composite configuration on single fiber release 
(Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure 7.- Effects of low and high airflow on single fiber release 
(Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure 8.- Effects of Pendulum impact on single fiber release 
(Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure 9.- Single carbon fibers and composite fragments from fire plus drop 
impact tests (NASA-Ames/Redwood City facility). 
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Figure lO.- Effects of internal disturbances on single fiber release 
(Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
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Figure ll.- Effects of fire variables on total fiber release 
(AVCO fire test facility). 
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Figure 12.- Summary of effects of disturbance on fiber release 
from burned composites. 
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Figure 13.- Spectrum of single fibers over one millimeter long. 
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Figure 14.- Distribution of all lengths of single fibers. 
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honeycomb panel (Navy/Dahlgren chamber). 
TIME, SECONDS 
Figure 16.- Iso-thermogravimetric analyses of "AS" carbon fibers 
at 1250 K (1800 OF). 
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Figure 17.- Oxidative mass loss of single ply mats of carbon fibers 
(AVCO fire test facility). 
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REDUCTION IN FIBER DIAMETER 
@ EQUALLY LARGE OXIDATIVE MASS LOSS SHOWN FOR OTHER LtlIly COMPOSITE PARTS 
(BARRELS, COCKPIT) 
0 MUCH LOWER OXIDATIVE MASS LOSSES NOTED FOR THICK COMPOSITE PANELS 
0 RESIDUES FROM COMBUSTION OF MATRIX RESINS MAY CATALYZE OXIDATION OF CARBON FIBERS 
(NOT CONFIRMED BY NASA STUDIES> 
Figure 18.- Carbon fiber oxidation studies. 
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Figure 19.- Comparison of pre- and post-test diameters. 
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Figure 20.- Reduced fiber diameters from burn plus airflow tests. 
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Figure 21.- Fire plume model verification tests (White Sands, New Mexico). 
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Figure 22.- Results from fire experiments and modeling. 
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Figure 23.- Results from fire experiments and modeling. 
(OSHA - 19761 ASBESTOS FIBERS BRE CONSIDEBEIl HA7ARDOUS IF: 
0 DIAMETERS <3,5 pm; LENGTHS >5,0Hm 
0 ASPECT RATIO: 3:l < L/D < 1O:l 
0 8-HR T, W, A, CONCENTRATIONS >2 x lo6 FIBERS/M3 (E = 5,6 x 101'FIBER-SEC) 
M3 
0 CONCENTRATION, ANYTIME IS >107 FIBERS/M3 
Figure 24.- Health hazards of asbestos fibers. 
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Figure 25.- Distribution of fiber lengths and diameters from JP-1 fuel fire. 
KNOWIEDGE OF CARBON FIBER HFAITH EFFFCTS: 
0 SMALL AMOUNTS OF FIRE-GENERATED CF HAVE DIMENSIONS COMPARABLE TO 
HAZARDOUS ASBESTOS 
0 A SINGLE STUDY OF ANIMALS SHOWED NO SHORT-TERM RISK AFTER MASSIVE DOSES OF 
CARBON FIBER 
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@ FEW CARBON FIBERS IN LUNGS: ONLY ONE WAS INTRACELLULAR 
8 LONG TERM RESULTS UNKNOWN 
Figure 26.- Present knowledge of carbon fiber health risk. 
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Figure 27.- Mass balance for carbon fibers from burned composites 
(percent of initial fiber mass). 
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Figure 28.- Summary of all fiber release tests. 
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0 COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RECORDS INDICATE: 
0 85% OF ACCIDENTS WITH FIRES HAVE NO EXPLOSIONS 
0 15% OF ACCIDENTS WITH FIRES DO HAVE EXPLOSIONS 
@ OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF CF IN COMPOSITE PARTS EXPOSED TO FIRE: 
0 1% WILL BE RELEASED FROM FIRES ALONE 
0 3-l/2% WILL BE RELEASED FROM FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS 
8 FOR EVERY KILOGRAM OF CF RELEASED: 
0 5 x log SINGLE FIBERS WILL BE RELEASED 
0 EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF FIBER LENGTH WITH MEAN OF 2 MILLIMETERS 
0 FIBER DIAMETERS SAME AS ORIGINAL (8flM> 
Figure 29.- Recommended accidential carbon fiber release 
for risk analysis computations. 
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DISSEMINATION, RESUSPENSION, AND FILTRATION 
OF CARBON FIBERS 
Wolf Elber 
NASA Langley Research Center 
INTRODUCTION ---- 
The carbon fiber study has been structured like other atmospheric pollution 
problems. The source produces the material, in this case carbon fibers; the 
atmosphere transports and distributes them; and at the end of the chain the 
fibers produce effects, in this case the disruption of electrical devices. 
Both the source and the effects elements of this study had to be generated 
specifically for this problem; whereas the transportation element could be 
mostly adapted from other pollution studies. 
For the fire plume aspect of transportation, the smoke stack models were used 
for the determination of the height at which the plume becomes neutrally 
buoyant. However, the differences between an uncontained open fire plume 
and an industrial smoke stack are large enough to have required some model 
verification testing. This work was performed at the White Sands Missile 
Range. 
Many models exist for the cloud transport phase of the problem. These models 
have a large empirical data base from pollution work with gases such as sulphur 
dioxide from industrial sources, with liquid droplets from aeria7 spraying, and 
with solid particles such as fly ash from smoke stacks. Those models are only 
sensitive to the still air fall velocity of the individual particles, and have 
been adopted into the risk assessment studies because they have proven 
successful in work for the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Resuspension of particles was found to be a less developed much more complex 
science which had developed around the need to understand soil erosion in some 
states and long term radioactive pollution in other states. However, what 
appeared applicable to round soil particles did not appear to be valid for our 
high aspect ratio fibers. A special series of tests was therefore conducted to 
monitor the resuspension of fibers from a desert land patch with a known 
deposition of fibers. The results of those tests led to the conclusion that 
resuspension was a minor problem and that the risk assessment should be based 
on the first-time source. 
Filtration of fibers and the their entry into buildings is a subject for which 
models existed and only specific filter tests had to be performed. The transfer 
function models are essentially micro-dissemination models assuming perfect 
mixing of the atmosphere within the buildings. 
Many organizations‘were involved in assembling the methodology which prescribes 
the path for the fibers from the source to the vulnerable equipment. This 
presentation contains a brief outline of the methodology used and the data 
developed for the four main topic areas: Fire Plume, Dissemination, 
Resuspension , and Filtration. 
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MEASURES OF FIBER POLLUTION 
Typically a vulnerable e7ectric instrument may blow cooling air over the 
electric circuits, and blow the fibers across contact pairs. The rate at 
which fibers might strike a contact pair and cause a failure is therefore 
proportional to the concentration of fibers in the air. In this presentation 
the symb 
9 
1 C is used for concentration. Its units are fibers/unit volume of 
air (f/m ). The total risk of failure of an instrument is proportional to the 
exposure E, which is defined as the time-integral of the fiber concentration, 
E= JCdt f-s/m3 
or if the concentration C is constant for a time t, the exposure is the 
product of time and concentration 
E=Cxt f-s/m3 
For most instruments the risk of failure is only a function of the exposure E, 
and it has therefore become the main measure of carbon fiber pollution. 
Most detectors of fibers deposit the fibers on a surface, and the deposition 
density D is the number of fibers per unit area (f/m2). 
The deposition density is related to the exposure through the deposition 
velocity 
D=ExV f/m2 
where v is the flow velocity of the air for filter type collectors or the 
fibers' free fall velocity V, for flat surfaces. 
METEOROLOGY FOR DISSEMINATION 
The strength of the sun's heating of the ground has the greatest influence on 
the turbulence of the atmosphere and on the dispersion of particles. 
The sketches in Figure 1 show a smoke stack in three weather conditions. In 
sunny weather with low winds the radiation from the sun first heats the ground. 
Some of the heat is conducted to the lower few meters of the air. This stack 
is unstable, and the heat is distributed vertically by convection, until the 
atmosphere is layered at the dry adiabatic lapse rate to the height of the 
inversion. Typically during the heating portion of the day the temperature 
distribution changes from State I to State II. The convection patterns are 
responsible for very rapid mixing of the smoke plume in the atmosphere. 
At the other end of the scale, with no solar heating the earth radiates out 
heat and cools. When the atmosphere is stably layered, the bottom layers will 
loose heat to the ground by conduction forming a stronger inversion. This 
atmosphere sustains no turbulence and smoke plumes mix extremely slowly. These 
conditions lead to the highest pollutant exposures downwind. 
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Between the two extremes there is the neutrally buoyant atmosphere with little 
or no heat flux. These conditions usually occur after the passage of fronts 
in strong winds under overcast skies. The turbulent mixing under such condi- 
tions is due to the turbulence accompanying the wind. The mixing is faster 
than in stable weather, but slower than in unstable weather. 
For dissemination analysis stability indices have been developed. The 
Pasquill-Gifford stability classes for the three main weather conditions are 
shown in Figure 1. Cloud spread angles have been empirically determined for 
each of these classes. 
PLUME MODELLING 
Figure 2 shows a schematic view of a smoke cloud rising from the site of a 
large pool fire. When the gases are hot and buoyant the fire plume is 
extremely turbulant and mixes rapidly with ambient air until it reaches 
neutral buoyancy. The thermal buoyancy in that phase dominates the spread 
and rise of the c7ouds, and special fire plume models have been developed to 
predict the height and the spread of the fire plume to the point at which it 
becomes neutrally buoyant, that is the "stabilization point". 
Beyond the stabilization point the meteorology determines the spread of the 
drifting smoke cloud. The Gaussian dissemination models have been developed 
to predict the exposure patterns downwind. The fire plume models and the 
dissemination models are matched together at the stabilization point. 
FIRE PLUME MODELS ------_ 
The fire plume models are based on material contained in a paper by 
G. A. Briggs (1970) presented at the Second International Clean Air 
Congress. 
Although the model was developed for smoke plumes from industrial exhaust 
stacks, it provides good estimates of the stabilization parameters for the 
concentrated liquid-fuel pool fires of interest here. 
The model is sensitive to the stability of the atmosphere and the logic 
changes between stable and unstable atmospheres. 
In stable temperatures for instance the stabilization height is given as 
Where F is the total heat flux, u is the wind velocity and s is the 
potential temperature gradient. 
The size of the cloud is determined by the entrainment of air and in most 
cases the diameter grows linearly with height so that 
D= 0.6 Ii 
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DISSEMINATION MODELLING 
The most appropriate dissemination models for a risk assessment are the 
Gaussian Dissemination Models. 
In these models the material is given the Gaussian bell-shaped distribution 
shown in Figure 3. As the cloud drifts downwind it grows in diameter 
depending on the instability of the atmosphere. The growth angles have been 
determined empirically from many observations of smoke plumes. 
As the cloud grows and drifts downwind it will begin to intercept both the 
ground and the inversion as shown in Figure 4. Inasmuch as the growth is 
dependent on the turbulence in the layer between the ground and the inversion, 
the models are refined not to allow the cloud to grow through the inversion, 
but to reflect back the pollutant into the layer between ground and inversion. 
At the same time particles will deposit on the ground at a rate dependent on 
particle concentration and their fall velocity. Empirical data show that 
reflection of 70% of the particles from the ground provides exposure patterns 
consistent with the fall velocity of the particles. 
Figure 5 shows two typical exposure patterns. The lines of constant exposure 
are termed "isopleths". In the stable atmosphere the spread of the cloud 
is narrow, but high exposure levels may persist for up to 700 km. In the 
unstable atmosphere the spread of the cloud is wide, but does not persist for 
the same distances. 
The deposition rate anywhere in the affected area is dependant on the concen- 
tration and the fall velocity 
The total deposition at one point is 
D = vs~C dt = vsx E 
and the total deposition over the entire area is 
or 
s D d/l =u,EdO s 
N = vc EdA r 
where N is the total number of particles in the pollutant cloud. This 
equation indicates that the fire and meteorological conditions only affect the 
distribution of the exposures, the total area coverage however is determined 
by the amount of material in the source. 
If the material could be uniformly distributed at exposure levels E over 
an area A , then we have the simole relation 
N ’ = vs EA 
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Figure 6 is a parametric plot of the area covered to an exposure E as a 
function of the mass of single fibers in the source. As an example, the 
worst case analyzed in the risk assessment represented a source of 375 kg of 
single fibers. The plot show5 that this amount of fibers could cover a whole 
city to an exposure of 5 X 10 , or five city b7ocks to an exposure of 708. 
The damage potential from such a release will be discussed in the next 
presentation. 
RESUSPENSION OF CARBON FIBERS 
Carbon fibers deposited on a surface may be resuspended by a disturbance such 
as wind or traffic. This phenomenon was investigated to determine if 
resuspension could represent a significant contribution to the carbon fiber 
risk. 
Figure 7 shows the logic diagram for the type of surface on which fibers are 
first deposited. Fibers deposited on water will sink and cannot be 
resuspended. Fibers deposited in vegetated surfaces will fall so deep that 
the winds required to resuspend the particles cannot reach the particles. 
But fibers deposited on flat hard surfaces could be resuspended. One test 
series was conducted to monitor the resuspension of fibers from a desert 
surface. From an original source of 23 kg scattered over an area of 60 X 80 m 
The daily downwind fiber flux is plotted in Figure 8. The data was collected 
for three years. The vertical and horizontal distributions were not defined, 
but on the assumption that the flux was uniform over a downwind area of 
1000 m2, we can calculate a total flux of 0.1 kg of 4 mm fibers or less than 
0.4% of the available total source. At the same time the average length of the 
captured fibers changed from an initial mean length of 7 mm to a final mean 
length of 1 mm, while the source material left on the ground clearly retains 
the initial lengths of 7 mm. The fragmentation indicates that the fibers 
released are broken from the clumps of source fibers, most probably by the 
saltation of'sand particles. 
Because the fraction of fibers resuspended is small, because only special areas 
are suitable for resuspension, 
process of resuspension, 
and because fibers appear to be fragmented in the 
the phenomenon of resuspension was not considered 
further in the risk assessment. 
TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
The transfer function of a building or instrument enclosure is the ratio of 
internal fiber exposure to external fiber exposure. 
Filtration, airflow, and settlement velocity are the parameters controlling 
the transfer function. 
Filter tests have been carried out at the Ballistics Research Laboratories to 
define the filter transmission factors as a function of fiber length for many 
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comon filter media. Figure 9 shows the results of such tests on a typical 
window-screen and a furnace filter. Both filters are more effective against 
long fibers than against short fibers. As a result the mean fiber length as 
we71 as the number of fibers are reduced by the filter. 
Figure 9 shows an initial exponential fiber length distribution, and the 
distribution after filtration. 
to 1" 
The mean fiber length has changed from L"= 2 mm 
= 0.9 mm, and the transfer function for fibers longer than 7 in is 0.73. 
Such analytical refinements have not been introduced into the risk assessment. 
Instead, the contractors have used the fi7ter factors appropriate for the 2 mm 
mean spectrum length and have assumed that the transmitted spectrum remains 
exponential. 
The Bionetics Corporation has tested filtration equipment from commercial 
aircraft. Both water separaters and air cleaners have very low transmission 
factors, but also cause severe fiber fragmentation. In a separate test the 
fragmentation of fibers was evaluated by passing 3 mm fibers through a curved 
duct. Figure 70 shows a schematic of the test apparatus together with the 
test results. At low flow speeds most fibers travel through the curved tube 
intact, but at fiber speeds of 17 m/s and higher virtually all fibers were 
fragmented into lengths less than 7 mm. 
Aircraft ventilation air drawn from the compressor stages of the turbines 
typically would undergo many turns and much higher speeds. We have therefore 
assumed that fibers longer than 1 mm would be fragmented into lengths smaller 
than 7 mm in aircraft engines. 
Models for the analysis of transfer functions have been available from previous 
studies. The transfer function for an enclosure can be shown to be the ratio 
of fiber inflow rate to the fiber loss rate. 
The inflow rate is given by the airflow rate times 
The fiber loss rate is made up of outflow losses, 
filter, and losses due to fiber deposition. 
filter transmission factor. 
losses in the recirculation 
Figure It shows the transfer function calculations for a 200 m2 residence with 
open windows protected by wire screens. The calcu lations show that even with 
open windows transfer functions as low as 0.07 are to be expected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The elements of the fiber transport chain have been studied. The mathematical 
models had been established for other pollution problems and were found to be 
appropriate for the carbon fiber problem. 
A particular study was made to establish the possibility of resuspension. The 
data showed that resuspension cannot be a major contributing factor to the risk. 
Filtration and fragmentation tests were run to provide the necessary data base 
for transfer function calculations. The data showed that filters are much 
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more effective than assumed in the preliminary study and that in high velocity 
air handling systems significant fiber fragmentation will change the fiber 
spectrum to shorter mean lengths. 
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Figure l.- Dissemination meteorology with Pasquill-Gifford stability 
classes A, C, and F. 
Figure 2.- Characteristic smoke plume development. 
Figure 3.- Gaussian distribution of pollutant 
in a drifting cloud. 
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Figure 4.- Pollutant cloud growth with reflection from 
inversion and ground. 
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o RESUSPENSION POSSIBLE FROM FEW AREAS, 
Figure 7.- Resuspension logic chart. 
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Figure' 8.- Resuspension data. 
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Figure lO.- Fragmentation data. 
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Figure 11 .- Transfer of carbon fibers into buildings. 
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EVALUATION OF EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY 
AND POTENTIAL SHOCK HAZARDS 
Israel Taback 
The Bionetics Corporation 
Since the last report on this subject made on October 31, 1978, additional 
data has been collected on equipment which may be affected by graphite fibers 
released from aircraft accidents and on evaluating the significance of the 
shock hazard on consumer equipment. As outlined in Figure 1, this paper will 
describe the vulnerability tests, provide some illustrations of specific test 
results and discuss the parameters which affect vulnerability. The shock haz- 
ard for a hypothetical set of accidents will also be computed and evaluated. 
Figure 2 lists some of the conditions which bounded the parameters of the 
tests made in the Langley Research Center and Aberdeen Proving Ground test 
chambers. In general the tests were conducted with moderate graphitization 
fibers such as T-300, lengths were between 1 and 10 millimeters and with the 
equipment under test operating. Exposures were limited to values of 108 fiber 
seconds per meter 3, both for practical reasons of test duration, and because 
at this level very small national damage costs would be encountered. Limited 
tests were done with equipment either nonoperating or with simulated environ- 
ments subsequent to fiber exposure, except for avionics equipment, in which 
expected flight environments were simulated. 
Figures 3 and 4 list the results secured. Many pieces of equipment did not 
fail within the test limits under exposure to graphite fibers or when tested 
with a fiber simulator probe. The latter technique was used in devices where- 
in the number of electrical nodes were limited and could be easily sampled 
manually. 
Some of the parameters which affect vulnerability are shown in the following 
figures. Figure 5 shows the effect of fiber length on two pieces of equipment. 
The power amplifier shows a consistent trend with length. In the range of 
average fire-emitted fiber lengths (2 to 4 mm) the exposure required for fail- 
ure are 
E = 4 x lo6 (l/R) 
This inverse trend with length is typical of equipment not protected with a 
case and/or filter. The ATC transponder has a nontypical response which is 
caused by the type of openings in the case. These are holes, approximately 
3 mm in diameter. The transfer function for fibers through these openings 
varies inversely with fiber length for lengths equal to or larger than the 
holes so that there is a relative invulnerability to fibers longer than 3 
Mn. This size of opening is common in many types of avionics equipment as it 
provides adequate ventilation with sufficient electrical shielding. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the results secured with military specification type open 
terminal strips which are typical of those used in industrial 440V connections. 
Sustained arcs could only be secured under the conditions of three phase sup- 
ply and with currents larger than 400 peak amperes. Equipment limitations 
were such that the maximum current was limited to 1500 amperes peak. It is 
believed that only sustained arcs provide a possibility of significant damage. 
The high levels of exposure required for these terminal strips, when coupled 
with the low transfer function which exists in most NEMA electrical enclosures, 
indicates that there is no serious industrial problem. When cooling air is 
forced through specific special case designs,each must be individually eval- 
uated to determine whether a serious hazard exists. For the terminals shown 
the barrier strips insure that single fibers cannot individually bridge con- 
tacts. The alleviating effect of this will be covered later in this paper. 
In our experiments local damage to screwheads occurred and eventually fuses or 
breakers opened, and it is believed that similar experience would be encoun- 
tered in any protected industrial circuit. 
A number of representative results have been correlated in Figure 7. As was 
indicated by the previous listing, most consumer goods, 1lOV equipment and 
most avionics were found to be not vulnerable. The most vulnerable equipment, 
not reported herein, was equipment of 1950-1960 vintage, generally of high 
impedance and tested with high modulus fibers. At the time these tests were 
performed it was not known what the range of fire-emitted lengths would be. 
The test results which were secured over a range of fiber length, and which 
are typical of those used in the NASA risk analysis, are diagrammed in the 
remainder of the chart. There were no experimental points for any apparatus 
below the solid boundary line. The equation for this boundary is: 
F = 2 x lo7 (l/a)2 
This lower boundary is formed primarily by fan-cooled, nonfiltered equipment 
and by open terminal strips. For these there is no protection provided by the 
equipment case, or the forced airflow greatly enhances the number of fibers 
available to produce damage inside the case. All other failures are located 
to the right of this boundary. The demonstrated lower vulnerability is caused 
by case protection, the width of contact spacing, the invulnerability of spe- 
cific types of circuitry or combinations of these factors. It should be em- 
phasized that most of this testing was done with T-300 or equivalent fibers 
such as are now employed in aircraft construction. A partial tabulation of 
many of the tests is given in Table 1. Where no failures are shown the r 
values are the maximum values to which the equipment was subjected. 
Fiber resistivity also potentially can affect equipment sensitivity. Figure 8 
shows the result of probing the same amplifier with a fiber simulator which 
duplicates the contact resistance and burnout characteristics of a fiber. In 
the range of 3 to 7 mm contact gap lengths there were approximately 35 
failure nodes with T-300, and about one tenth that number with DE-114. DE-114 
is an experimental fiber produced primarily for its high resistivity. The 
actual average .exposures to failure are shown on Figure 9. There is somewhat 
over one order of magnitude change in vulnerability shown in the tests done 
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with fiber on the test amplifier in the test chamber. 
the results secured by the probe. 
This agrees well with 
Two other pieces of equipment were also 
tested with fibers of differing resistivity. 
these more complicated circuits; 
No probe testing was done on 
shown. 
however, the effect of resistivity is clearly 
The relative slopes are greatly dependent on the separations of nodes 
and on the specific fiber resistivity. The large variation in the vulner- 
ability of the color TV and transponder was not expected for the less than 
3:1 ratio of resistances of the fiber types. Insufficient work has been done 
to be able to predict the slope of the vulnerability curve against fiber re- 
sistance for various classes of equipment. 
In order to determine whether fire-released fibers would affect equipment in 
a manner similar to those used for chamber testing a series of tests was run 
at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. These tests will be 
discussed in detail in a later talk. Figure 10 diagrams the results of these 
tests. Six amplifiers were exposed to soot alone, as a control, to determine 
whether failures would occur, or affect the vulnerability of the equipment. 
Two amplifiers failed, one during soot exposure and one subsequently. A de- 
tailed examination of the failed equipment could not determine whether the 
cause was soot or not. The remaining four amplifiers were evaluated in the 
Aberdeen test chamber. The average exposure to failure was 0.8 x lo6 for 
these tests. The change, if any, from the average exposure determined previ- 
ously with 3 mm fibers, 2 x 106, is considered insignificant and is probably 
caused by normal statistical spread, 
In a repeat test wherein graphite composite was burned at Dahlgren six ampli- 
fiers were again exposed. 
exposure of 5 x 106. 
All of the amplifiers failed subsequent to an 
At this exposure (measured by an electrical grid which 
detected 2 mm and longer fibers) it would be predicted that 6 failures would 
occur as shown on Figure 11. It may be concluded that the fire-released fibers 
have at least the same damage potential as the fibers used for chamber testing. 
Figure 12 further substantiates this point. Resistivity measurements were 
made of fibers released from fires at Dahlgren and during full-scale fire 
tests made at Dugway. This was accomplished with a wire-grid instrument 
wherein the voltage-current characteristics of each fiber that intersected the 
grid was determined. A continuous measurement was made of each fiber until 
fiber burnout occurred. The resistivity, when compared to the average re- 
sistance of virgin cut fiber, is essentially unchanged. Other data presented 
at this meeting indicates that measured diameters of fibers are smaller than 
pre-fire diameter. The data shows that there is a high correlation between 
fire-induced diameter reduction and small fiber length so that the wire grid 
would not detect most of the fibers of smaller diameters and short lengths. 
The long high-resistance tail on the distribution plot indicates that a small 
number of decreased diameter fibers may have been encountered. 
Figure 13 outlines the test flow for commercial avionics. In this test series 
it was important to ascertain whether the flight environment subsequen't to 
graphite fiber exposure could introduce failures by redistribution of trapped 
fibers. Each device was subjected to an exploratory vulnerability test to 
determine if detailed testing was warranted. Three exposures to E = 3 x 107, 
without intermediate cleaning, and with simulated environment after each 
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exposure were used. I 
the exposure to 9 x 10 F 
the equipment did not fail, testing was terminated as 
was sufficient indication of invulnerability. If a 
failure occurred at any fiber length,four tests were run as indicated with no 
cleaning between the tests which were made at increasing levels of exposure. 
The results of this sequence are shown on Figure 14. It is interesting to 
note that for this equipment, tested under simulated landing shocks and 100 
db of white acoustic noise, that five of the fifteen failures occurred during 
simulated environment. The average exposures to failure for this equipment 
as used in the NASA risk analysis included the effect of environment as demon- 
strated in these tests. 
A limited number of tests, not reported herein, attempted to simulate the 
post-exposure experience of turning ground-based equipment on and off, and of 
moving the equipment. In no case were failures encountered subsequent to the 
fiber exposure period in the test chamber. 
One other facet of aviation risk was investigated analytically to determine if 
a sufficient hazard exists to require some precautionary action. The effect 
of a graphite fiber cloud on existing and proposed terminal landing aids was 
evaluated. Figure 15 outlines the results secured on the 300 MHz glide slope 
equipment now in use and on the planned 5 GHz microwave landing systems (MLS) 
scanning antenna systems which will be deployed as per present FAA planning. 
There is no effect of concern on the glide slope equipment as attenuation 
effects are negligible, nor is there any problem with differential attentuation 
of the beams from the two antennas used in this system. For the MLS there is 
appreciable attenuation of the beam only in the very conservative case of the 
beam traveling through the entire length of the fire-ejected plume into the 
aircraft antenna. Even in this worst case the specified capability for the 
system insures that the range is not below 17 kilometers, which is still 
adequate. If the signal strength is below acceptable limits in the aircraft 
for any cause the pilot is warned by a display flag and will disregard the 
display until signal strength is adequate. It is most probable that during 
normal controlled operations the aircraft would be diverted or delayed if 
the fire plume really occupied the direct landing environment of the airport. 
The ground based equipment which generates the ILS and MLS signals is well 
protected, both by air-conditioned building enclosures and by specific fil- 
tering of cooling air entering the equipment racks so that there is no concern 
with interfering with the ground based equipment. 
The shock hazard potential of graphite fibers has been investigated for a 
large number of consumer electrical items. A detailed report on method and 
results will be presented tomorrow by the National Bureau of Standards. Data 
extracted from their report is presented herein in order to approximately 
evaluate the magnitude of the danger nationally, Figure 16 lists all of the 
items considered a potential hazard by the NBS and subsequently tested in the 
BRL test chambers. Six items were tested. The toaster, because of the number 
in use, and the highest vulnerability to case shorts was selected for detailed 
testing. It is believed that there is no appreciable national risk compared 
to the toaster from the other five items. Figure 17 presents the results of 
the tests made on 6 toasters over a fiber length range of 1 to 12 mm. While 
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the absolute values are different for each unit, the curve shapes are all 
similar and follow a characteristic inverse E vs length relationship. For the 
smaller length fibers such as may be released from a fire the equation 
F = 5 x IO8 (l/a)3 
provides a good fit to all of the data. 
To provide a sample computation for the national risk the shorting probability 
versus exposure relationship must be ascertained, Figure 18 shows these re- 
lationships for toaster #6 for each of three fiber lengths. While the 3 mn 
and 10 mm experimental points follow an exponential failure curve, as would 
be expected when bridging can be accomplished by a single fiber, the experi- 
mental points for the 7 mm fibers are an indication that multiple fibers are 
required to produce a short. Similar results were secured for other lengths 
in other toasters, particularly for the shorter fiber lengths. The use of 
simple exponential failure laws for these cases will overestimate the risk 
for low exposures. It is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the over- 
estimate without taking large numbers of data points to better define the 
damage curves at low exposures. Because of this, and because the computation 
will always produce conservative answers the exponential failure law has been 
applied throughout the risk analysis and will be used for the shock hazard 
approximation. 
In order to integrate the effects of a fiber spectrum so that equipment vul- 
nerability in a fire can be evaluated it is necessary to summate the damage 
potential for all lengths. Figures 19 and 20 indicate the two methods by 
which this can be accomplished. In the detailed stepwise integration method 
it is necessary to find the exposure at each length and divide by the E, the 
average E for damage for that length. An overall summation across the length 
spectrum then provides an expression for the probability of damage; for a 
normalized quantity of fibers 
PD = 1 - e- o J 
F(R)dR 
r 
If the length spectrum and damage relationships can be expressed as simple 
exponentials or power laws it is possible to derive analytic expressions for 
the overall integrals as shown in Figure 20. Dr. W. Elber has derived closed 
form relationships which express these integrals for various exponents of the 
damage curve and for various values of the gverage fiber length, Ra. For the 
case shown where E is proportional to (l/R) he has shown that an equivalent 
E can be used which is the E that occurs at&? Ra. For the case where r varies 
as (l/R)3 the equivalent E occurs at R= 1.8 Ra. This relationship is used in 
this paper and has been used to simplify the national risk analyses which will 
be presented in later papers. For most of the fire data to date average fiber 
lengths have been about 2 millimeters, so that computations presented herein 
will be based upon the E values which have been secured with 3 mm test fibers. 
An increase of average length to 3 mm would increase the E estimate by a factor 
of three, and the overall risk estimate by a factor of two (because of the 
smaller number of fibers per unit mass release). 
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The sample computation is shown in Figure 21. The assumptions are that 1000 
kilograms of fiber are involved in each of 5 fire related accidents per year, 
that 1% of the mass is released and could enter homes having average transfer- 
functions of .Ol. The population and toaster density, 330 per square kilo- 
meter is typical of a densely populated city and all of the fibers are assumed 
to land in that area. The results of tests performed on six toasters, re- 
ported in detail in CR 159147 show that the E for 3 mm fibers for the average 
toaster is 2 x lo7 fiber seconds/meter3. The tests also indicated that, in 
only 16 of 25 tests did the voltage to the case exceed 60 volts. In addition, 
when the toaster was energized, in only 3 of 25 tests was the fiber retained 
long enough to allow a measurement of current carrying capability. In these 
measurements the maximum current carried was 10 milliamps. When this data 
is substituted in the equation shown, the computed probability of a potentia 1 
hazard is 0.38/year. This is not a large hazard (Figure 22) and is probably 
excessively conservative in that it ignores the multi-fiber failure relation 
ship, and the statistics connected with the distribution of user resistance 
to ground. Finally the currents which were maintained below 10 milliamps 
could produce shock sensations and secondary injury but could not themselves 
be more than an annoyance. 
The last figure (Figure 23) outlines the conclusions drawn from the data pre- 
sented. The data collected and analyzed has been used in the NASA National 
Risk Analysis which will be presented in a following paper. While the data is 
restricted to T-300 or similar fibers it is believed that structural materials 
would have similar properties. Extensions of these data to other fibers having 
different resistances or fall rates is not warranted. 
The characteristics of fire-released fibers have been measured, both by direct 
measurement in fire plumes and indirectly by exposing equipment to a fire 
plume. The damage potential to electrical equipment does not change materially 
because of the fire. 
The failure rates for avionics equipment are influenced by post exposure 
environmental conditions, These effects have been taken into account in the 
national risk estimate. 
There is a negligible shock hazard in a small number of home appliances. The 
national risk is small and can in no case result in a hazard to life with the 
test fibers used. 
A final word about repairs. In almost all cases failures were cleared by 
simple vacuuming of the equipment. Where damage to components occurred it was 
not caused by the limited energy-dissipation characteristics of the fiber, but 
rather by upsetting a control circuit, or in the case of three phase arcs, by 
initiating an energy release almost independent of the fiber characteristics. 
For other than 3 phase industrial,equipment, where downtime costs may predominate, 
the major cost encountered would be those costs associated with examining and 
cleaning rather than replacing components in the equipment. 
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o VULNERABILITY 
o FACTORS AFFECTING VULNERABILITY 
o SHOCK HAZARD EVALUATION 
o CONCLUSIONS 
Figure l.- Vulnerability of equipment and shock hazards. 
TEST CONDITIONS 
A> T-300 OR EQUIVALENT FIBERS 
B> LENGTHS FROM 1 TO 10 MILLIMETERS 
C> LOW-TURBULENCE ROOM OR SIMULATED VENTILATION 
D> EQUIPMENT OPERATING 
El MAXIMUM TEST EXPOSURES = lo* 
F> FOR AVIONICS ONLY - POST EXPOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL SIMULATION 
Figure 2.- Equipment vulnerability and shock hazards. 
87 
. .- - .._ ----- -~~ 
WITH NO FAILURES 
o TELECOMMUNICATOR 
o BLACK 8 WHITE TELEVISION 
e ASR 3 
o CALCULATOR 
o CALCULATOR & PRINTER 
o TAPE RECORDER 
o ELECTRIC MOTORS (6) 110 V, 
o THERMOSTATS (2)
o CASH REGISTERS 
o PORTABLE HEATER 
o AM/FM RADIO 
o HOME MUSIC SYSTEM 
o CLOCK RADIO 
o 10 BAND RADIO 
o CAR RADIO 
o TOASTERS 
o ILS RECEIVER 
o DME 
o SMOKE ALARMS 
o IRONS 
l TOASTER OVEN 
o FOOD MIXER 
WITH FAILURES 
o MISC, EQUIPMENT, 
-HIGH MODULUS FIBERS 
- RESTRICTED LENGTHS 
o COMPUTER 
o COLOR TELEVISION 
m DIGITAL VOLTMETER 
o ATC TRANSPONDER 
l VHF TRANSCEIVER 
o FLIGHT DIRECTOR 
o CONNECTOR BLOCKS 
l QUICK DISCONNECTS 
o RELAYS 
o GENERIC CIRCUITS 
o POWER AMPLIFIER 
o MICROWAVE OVEN 
Figure 3.- Equipment tested in chamber. 
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m NO SIGNIFICANT FAILURES 
o REFRIGERATORS 
l FREEZERS 
l RANGES 
l DISHWASHERS 
o CLOTHES WASHER 
o CLOTHES DRYER 
o VACUUM CLEANERS 
o IRONS 
o FRY PANS 
l BED COVERS 
e COFFEE MAKERS 
o PERCOLATORS 
a FOOD MIXERS 
m CAN OPENERS 
l PORTABLE HEATERS 
WITH FAILURES 
NONE 
Figure 4.- Appliances tested with fiber simulator. 
DYNACO POWER 
10 -- 
FIBER ATC TRANSPONDER 
LENGTH, MM (CONVECTION COOLED, 0,375 CM (0,125 INI) 
5 PERFORATED -- CASE, GY 70 FIBER) 
0 c 
105 106 107 108 
AVERAGE XPOSURE, ?, FIBER-SECS/M3 
Figure 5.- Fiber length effect on equipment vulnerability. 
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INDUSTRIAL POWER, 440 V,, 60 HZ 
I 
TRANSFORMER SUPPLY, 400 A < I<1500 A, THREE PHASE 
FIBER 
LENGTH 
MM 
3 -- 
HORIZONTAL 
TYPE RATING C 
- - -39 TB 600 V, 30 A 14,-jMM 
38 TB 600 V, 20 A 11,l MM 
l- 1 I I I I I 
105 106 107 108 
AVERAGE XPOSURE, c F-S, FOR SUSTAINED ARC 
M3 
NO SUSTAINED ARCS WITH SINGLE PHASE, TRANSFORMER SUPPLY, 44OV, 60HZ 
Figure 6.- Exposures for sustained arcs. 
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10 
FIBER 
LENGTH 
MM 3 
1 
‘A Q \ 
1950-1960 EQU‘IPMENT ; 
HIGH IMPEDANCE\ 1 
I HIGH POWER DISSIP\ATION Q A TV TV 
I iIGH MODULUS FIBERS R 
C 
T 
B TEST 
LIMIT 
TR 
B 
TV 
OPEN TERMINAL STRIPS 
FORM LOWER BOUNDARY 
4 
=-A .A - 
104 105 106 107 
AVERAGE XPOSURE,, i, E 
M3 
T 
108 
- 
Figure 7.- Correlation of vulnerability with fiber length. 
60 f 
T B TV T 
NUMBER 
OF 
FAILURE 
PRODUCING 
BRIDGEABLE 30-- 
GAPS 
3TO7MM 
20-- 
0 FIBER SIMULATOR 
TEST DATA 
RESISTANCE (OHMS) 
Figure 8.- Effect of fiber resistivity on Dynaco power amplifier. 
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105 1 
-. ._ ..- 
FIBER 
RESISTANCE 
OHMS/CM lo4 
FIBER 
-DE 114 
103 ! 
106 107 108 
AVERAGE EXPOSURE, E, F-S (3 MM FIBERS) 
M3 
Figure 9.- Fiber resistance effect on equipment vulnerability. 
6- 
5 -- m-s 
4 -- 
NO, OF AMPLIFIERS 3-- 
SURVIVING 
2 -- 
1 -- 
0 I 
SOOTY FIRE EXPOSURE TRANSPORT CHAMBER TEST 
(WARM SMOKE) DELAY 
o SIX AMPLIFIERS ENTERED TEST 
o FIVE SURVIVED SMOKE o SMOKE EXPOSURE MAY HAVE 
e FOUR SURVIVED TURN-ON v INCREASED BACKGROUND 
o MEAN E FOR AMPLIFIERS, SOOTY = 0,8 X lo6 FAILURE RATE 
o MEAN E FOR AMPLIFIERS, CLEAN = 2 X 10b 
Figure lO.- Effect of soot exposure on Dynaco amplifiers. 
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1 I------- 
i 
r, 3 MM = 2 X lo6 
IN CHAMBER TESTS. 
'FAILURE 
0.5 - 
ACTUAL EXPOSURE 
g-AND NUMBER OF 
FAILURES 
4 
0,5 x 107 
EXPOSURE, F_Ts 
M3 
Figure ll.- Vulnerability of amplifiers to fire-released fiber. 
0 VIRGIN CUT FIBERS (T-300) 
(54 SAMPLES> 
0 DAHLGREN SHOCK TUBE TEST (9-79) 
(251 SAMPLES) 
D DUGWAY TESTS (lo-791 
(28 SAMPLES) 
RESISTANCE/2 MM LENGTH, KILO-OHMS 
Figure 12.- Fire-released fiber resistivity. 
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\YFS , 1, X 1D5 /-~ILUKC~ I-~~biil tNVIRONME 
Figure 13.- Test method for avionics. 
CLEAN, REPAIR 
A 
YES 
REPEAT EXPOSURE AND 
FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT TO 
3 X lo7 IN m STEPS 
+- EVALUATION TESTS---j 
ITEM 
ILS RECEIVER 
FAILED WITH FAILED FAILED 
FIBER EXPLORATORY NO DURING POST 
LENGTH TEST FAILURE EXPOSURE EXPOSURE 
1 NO 
3 NO 
10 NO 
ATC TRANSPONDER 1 YES 2 2 
3 YES 3 1 
10 YES 4 
DME 1 NO 
3 YES 4 
10 NO 
FLIGHT DIRECTOR 1 NO 
3 YES 1 1 2 
10 YES 2 2 
VHF TRANSCEIVER 1 NO 
3 YES 4 
10 NO 
13 iii r 
Figure 14.- Vulnerability of avionic equipment. 
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ASSUMPTIONS: o 1000 KG FIRE 
o 0,Ol RELEASE, 3 MM FIBERS 
l PLUME CROSS-SECTION - 1OOM X 1OOM 
o BEAM INTERCEPTS TOTAL LENGTH OF PLUME 
EFFECTS: 
SYSTEM 
I,L,S, 
(GLIDE-SLOPE) 
FREQUENCY ATTENUATION EFFECT 
330 MHZ On05 DB NEGLIGIBLE 
M,L,S, 5 GHZ 5 DB 45% RANGE DECREASE 
(SCANNING BEAM) (MIN, SPEC, RANGE = 37 KM> 
Figure 15.- Graphite fiber effects on landing aids. 
FIBER LENGTH, MM 
TOASTER 
TOASTER OVEN 
FOOD MIXER 
HEATER 
IRON 
MICROWAVE OVEN 
(6) 
(2) 
(2) 
3 - L 10 - 
2 x 107 2 x 106 8 X lo5 
NONE 5 x 107 2 x 107 
7 x 107 NONE 3 x 107 
2 x 107 8 X lo6 6 X lo6 
NONE 1 x 107 6 X lo6 
1 x 108 3 x 107 5 x 107 
TOASTER IS THE GREATEST RISK 
BECAUSE OF NUMBER IN USE AND VULNERABILITY 
Figure 16.- Average exposures required to produce short to case. 
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Q TOASTER NUMBER 1 
108 -- b TOASTER NUMBER 2 
A TOASTER NUMBER 3 
0 TOASTER NUMBER 4 
0 TOASTER NUMBER 5 
10' -- q TOASTER NUMBER 6 
EXPOSURE 
F-S 
F 0 
106 -- 
-I- O 
105 - 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
FIBER LENGTH - MM 
Figure 17.- Average exposure required for short to case of six toasters. 
10 
9 
8 
7 
CUMULATIVE 6 
FAILURES s 
A 3 MM 
0 7 MM 
q l2 MM 
6 i 2 3 
EXPOSURE/AVERAGE EXPOSURE - E/i 
A 
Figure 18.- Cumulative failure versus exposure toaster no. 6. 
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-6 ILo t 
Pj) = l- 
Figure 19.- Fiber length spectrum evaluation, detail integration- 
1) ALL FIBERS OF LENGTH Qa 
2) EQUIVALENT EFFECTIVE :; 
: AT .lil = fl TIMES AVERAGE LENGTH 
= .- 
3) pD = 1-e WE 
Figure 20.- Fiber length spectrum evaluation, analytical. 
FIBER LENGTHJ, MM 
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ASSUMPTIONS 
EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
1000 KG IN EACH OF 5 ACCIDENTS/YEAR 
,Ol FIRE RELEASE RATE 
330 TOASTERS/KM* 
TRANSFER FUNCTION, ,Ol 
E = 2 X 107, 3 MM FIBERS 
VOLTAGE>60 V IN 16 OF 25 TESTS 
FIBER RETENTION IN 3 OF 25 TESTS 
IMAX 5 10 MA 
p~;PO;P'AL = 
. 
T;W:ERS] [Pp60] [PR 
'[t#iT IAL = 0,38/YEAR 
Figure 21.- Potential for shock from toaster. 
NOT A LARGE HAZARD, ESTIMATE IS CONSERVATIVE: 
o MULTI-FIBER FAILURE STATISTICS 
o DISTRIBUTION OF USER RESISTANCE TO GROUND 
o CURRENT CAPABILITY IS NOT LETHAL 
Figure 22.- Shock hazard evaluation. 
1, A DATA BASE HAS BEEN COLLECTED FOR USE IN RISK ANALYSIS ON THE 
VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL AND AVIONIC EQUIPMENT 
TO T-300 FIBERS, 
2, FIRE-RELEASE EXPERIMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT FIBER RESISTIVITY IS 
UNCHANGED AND DAMAGE POTENTIAL IS APPROXIMATELY THAT OF VIRGIN 
FIBER, 
3, POST EXPOSURE AVIONICS VULNERABILITY HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED 
AND WILL BE USED IN THE RISK ANALYSIS, 
4, THERE IS A NEGLIGIBLE SHOCK HAZARD FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF HOME 
APPLIANCES, THE HAZARD WILL BE OVER-ESTIMATED BY USING SINGLE 
FIBER DAMAGE MODELS, 
Figure 23.- Conclusions. 
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LARGE-SCALE FIBER RELEASE AND EQUIPMENT EXPOSURE EXPERIMENTS 
R. A. Pride 
NASA Langley Research Center 
The large-scale testing is a very recent part of the risk analysis program as 
far as getting the field work completed. The final test was performed less 
than one week ago and data from all of these tests is just beginning to be 
available. About a year ago at the last conference (reference 1) only very 
preliminary plans for this large-scale test program could be discussed, so 
a lot has happened in this past year which is the basis for this paper. The 
large-scale testing has been accomplished with two sets of tests as shown in 
figure 1. Outdoor tests have been run at the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, 
Utah which were looking both for a better definition of the source, i.e., the 
amount of fiber released, in a full scale fire, and also its dissemination 
away from the fire. In the test planning using laboratory test results as a 
basis, the conclusion was reached that there was almost no chance of getting 
a sufficient level of exposure in downwind dissemination from any kind of 
large-scale outdoor test that could be performed within the limits of the 
national budget that would have any reasonable likelihood of failing elec- 
tronic equipment. Therefore, a second set of tests were designed. for 
equipment vulnerability to fire released fibers to be run in a shock tube at 
the U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. There was a 
possibility that some transfer function work also might be done in the shock 
tube, however, as the planning and preliminary testing progressed, the effort 
was concentrated on vulnerability entirely. 
Dahlgren Shock Tube Tests 
Figure 2 is an aerial photograph of the 0.8 km long shock tube which was 
modified near the mid-length to burn carbon fiber composites in a jet fuel 
fire. The fire-released fibers, combustion products and heated air were 
transported through the tube by exhaust fans installed in the large end. An 
exposure area for equipment vulnerability testing was developed near the 
large end so that reasonable mixing and cooling could occur in the air stream 
prior to passing by the equipment under test. A water curtain filtered 
the carbon fibers and much of the soot out of the air before it was 
exhausted out of the tube. 
Fifty-four fire tests were run to develop and validate a technique for 
getting maximum dissemination of fire-released single fibers down to the 
equipment exposure area for the vulnerability testing. The technique which 
was developed included a rotating basket (figure 3) that was suspended in 
the fire in such a manner that the composite material in the basket was 
turrbled continuously throughout the duration of the fire. The composite 
material was cut into strips approximately 1 to 2 cm wide by 15 to 20 cm long 
which were delaminated to thicknesses of about four plies of composite prior 
to being placed in the basket. With this technique and burning and tumbling 
until no composite remained in the basket, a mass of single fibers equal to 
0.5 percent of the initial fiber mass was released and transported to the 
exposure area. As a result, in test 53, fiber exposures were obtained which 
101 
were great enough to be capable of producing equipment failures, 
Figure 4 lists the principal fire test parameters for test 53 in the shock tube. 
A half percent fiber release was obtained, but that was because the duration 
of the fire was about 200 minutes; the fire was burning in a 1.2 m square fire 
pan with commercial jet A fuel; temperatures were controlled around the speci- 
men basket in the range of 950 to l,OOOo C. The shock tube tests were trying 
to simulate the fire parameters that Joe Mansfield had initially identified in 
the large-scale outdoor fire modelling that he was doing. The composite mass 
was totally consumed after 134 minutes of burning, much longer than the average 
aircraft accident fire. But this test was run that long in order to get the 
maximum dissemination of fibers down the tube. At the exposure area, the 
fibers were all carried by air being moved through the tube; the plume was con- 
strained by the inside walls of the tube and could not expand the way it would 
normally. Measured air velocities were about 0.7 m/s. Air temperature moving 
past the equipment was about 300 C - just about a five degree rise over ambient 
which was well within operational temperature limits for the equipment. 
The amount of fibers being disseminated in this particular test was measured 
by various types of instrumentation (figure 5). Sticky papers were used both 
laid flat for fiber deposition and in the form of sticky cylinders which pro- 
vide a measure of exposure. Fibers were collected with a Peterson aerodynamic 
sampler which will be discussed later in more detail in connection with the 
Dugway tests. The high voltage grid was described by Taback in the Equipment 
Vulnerability paper (ref. 2). A light-emitting detector (LED) was one of 
the instruments that was modified for use at Dugway from an earlier design used 
at China Lake last year (ref. 3). The modified design was operated in the 
shock tube for a check on its ability to sense fibers in a sooty atmosphere. 
Two NIOSH Millipore filters were injected into the airstream for short periods 
of time to sample that environment for the possibility of short fibers. A 
total of 228 instrumentation pieces were operated to detect carbon fibers. 
Figure 6 presents some of the results from that instrumentation for the sticky 
papers. The buildup in fiber exposure as determined from the sticky cylinders 
is plotted as a function of composite burn time. Each set of cylinders was 
inserted in the tube for a 15 minute interval and then removed and a new set 
was inserted. Fibers collected on these cylinders gave an indication on an 
incremental basis of the buildup in fiber exposure with burn time that can be 
seen to be approximately linear up to a value of about 8 x 105 fiber-s/m3. 
This is much greater than the exposure obtained from sampling by sticky 
cylinders that were in the entire time (continuous). This is an indication 
that the environment was probably saturating these continuous samplers and, 
therefore, a low count of exposure was obtained. The horizontal surface 
deposition stickies located on the floor of the tube indicated a much greater 
exposure at the end of the test than either form of sticky cylinder. This also 
would indicate a saturation of both forms of sticky cylinder instrumentation. 
A similar plot of fiber exposure is shown in figure 7 for the high voltage 
grid, which because of its ability to sense fiber hits in real time is able to 
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provide a measure of exposure with time. Again a linear rate of fiber release 
is observed with the only difference from the previous data being exposures 
three times as great at the end of test as from any of the stickies. A 
verification of exposure from the high voltage grid is provided by the 
cumulative sample that was collected in the Peterson sampler and was not 
subject to saturation. A good correlatioy is shown t the 150 minute end 
point. Peak exposures on the order of 10 fiber-s/m 9 were determined at the 
end of the test. 
Figure 8 shows the fiber length distribution that came out of this test. 
Fibers collected in the Peterson sampler were sized for length and the results 
are shown by the solid bars. Fibers were sized on the sticky papers and 
they're shown by the dashed bars. An exponential expression was fitted to 
this data and the agreement appears reasonable except at the short fiber 
lengths less than 1.5 mm where the sampler collection efficiency becomes poor. 
The average fiber length for fibers that are greater than one millimeter in 
length (the ones that are of interest for vulnerability) is two millimeters in 
this test. 
Six Dynaco amplifiers were installed in the shock tube and exposed to the same 
environment as the various sampler instruments. Figure 9 is a plot of their 
failure occurrences with burn time. Four failed in the first ten minutes, then 
exposure continued for another fifteen minutes to about twenty-five minutes 
total before the next one failed and finally the last one failed at about 
forty minutes total exposure. The total composite burn time was on the order 
of 150 minutes so failures of these amplifiers occurred in less than half of 
the time required to get the composite completely disseminated. If the time 
axis is changed to fiber exposure using figure 7 data, and if the failure 
scale is non-dimensionalized in terms of probability of failure, the results 
are shown in figure 10. The experimental data, just like it was before but 
now in terms of iber expos 
less than 4 X 10 i Y 
re, 
fiber-s/m . 
show all units fail in an exposure of sli ht1.y 
These failure data can be fitted very nice Y with ? 
a probabi1it.y of failure calculation based on chamber test Parameters as . 
described in reference 2. 
Dugway Outdoor Tests 
Figure 11 presents the kinds of test parameters that were used in the design 
of the outdoor fire tests conducted at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. The size 
and duration of the fire and the quantity of fuel burned, were basically sized 
by examining what seemed to be representative in commercial aircraft accidents 
of the fuel-fed fires occur,ring in this country over the last ten years 
(ref.4 ). Forty-five kg or more of composite material was burned in each 
fire. This was made up of carbon-epoxy aircraft components that were supplied 
by the commercial aircraft manufacturers from test programs and also by two 
military aircraft companies. These are all components that are representative 
of the state of the art today in carbon-fiber-epoxy composite components. 
Several of them were actual flight components. The bulk of them, though, 
came out of technology test programs. The weather conditions specified were 
quite different for the two types of tests that were to be run. For one group 
called "source tests" the wind speed was essentially zero. A second group 
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which are called "dissemination tests" required winds that range upwards to 
about five meters per second or about ten miles an hour and a very restricted 
wind direction of 320 degrees plus or minus 35. There is a reasonable proba- 
bility of waiting for up to a month to get this kind of a wind direction 
coupled with this kind of a wind velocity. This program was extremely 
fortunate in weather which permitted three tests in less than two weeks time. 
A major consideration in the design of the outdoor tests was the kind of 
instrumentation that could be used at Dugway. One of the concerns was to be 
able to sample in the plume above the fire as many times and as independently 
as possible to obtain a good representation of what was being given off from 
burning the composite in the large outdoor fire. Figure 12 lists an overview 
of all of the instrumentation. The Peterson samplers were a development that 
came out of this program designed to sample close in to the fire, but still in 
the plume above it. They operated in an environment very close to the end of 
the visible flame in the plume. A vertical array of stainless steel mesh- 
covered cans was also fabricated. Both of these instruments were supported 
off towers that are close to the fire. Next was a separate system of six 
sampling types flown from a large net that was supported by balloons and which 
sampled the plume downwind from the fire. And, finally, there was the 
ground-supported instrumentation representing four types of instruments whose 
locations ranged all the way from 91 meters to 19,000 meters downwind from the 
fire. These were instruments that were basically mounted on posts about a 
half meter above the surface of the ground. The total amount of instrumen- 
tation involved is in excess of 2,000 instruments for each of these tests. 
Figure 13 shows in detail the location of the tower-supported instrumentation. 
The test site development started by building two fire pools, 10.7 m in 
diameter. The first fire pool was in the center of the array for fires which 
would be burned for the source tests with zero wind where the plume would rise 
straight up. The second fire pool was on the upwind side of the array for 
dissemination fires where the wind was going to be blowing and disseminating 
fibers from the cloud in the design direction. Four towers 60 m high were 
erected from which a steel cable network was suspended. The array of 61 
Peterson samplers were hung from the steel cables in a pattern designed to 
sample the fire plume. This array could be raised or lowered by winches at 
each of the towers so the samplers could be serviced, and so that it could be 
positioned just above the end of the visible flames for the particular test 
conditions. Between the two downwind towers there was a set of vertical array 
mesh can samplers that were designed to operate from ground level up to 53 m 
in the air. These provided another opportunity to intercept the plume as it 
was being bent over and leaving the location of the fire. 
Figure 14 is a photograph of the canopy of Peterson samplers suspended from 
the four towers about 40 m above the ground level at sunrise on one of the 
particular test mornings. The vertical array is between the towers downwind 
in the right-hand side of the photograph. Figure 15 is a photograph of the 
Peterson sampler. It is a stainless steel welded cylindrical can. The air 
enters through the inlet at the bottom and the entralned fibers are 
collected on a stainless steel mesh cylinder inside of this outer case. The 
soot goes on through the mesh cylinder and is exhausted out the back such 
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that during the fire test a partial separation of soot from the fibers occurs 
making the fiber sample easier to count after the test is over. The inlet 
and exhaust openings are sized for the aerodynamic pressures such that 
isokinetic flow exists for the velocity range of the hot plume. The vertical 
array consists of 221 stainless steel mesh cans (figure 16) 9.5 cm in diameter 
that are mounted on a set of vertical cables that are strung from a catenary 
between the downwind towers and are used to sample in the plume. For 
stickiness, the mesh is coated with a high temperature vacuum grease. 
Figure 17 is a schematic of the balloon-supported Jacob's ladder, which 
consists of a net that is 305 m wide and 305 m high. The entire system is 
constructed with Kevlar cables to minimize weight. The net is suspended from 
a catenary that in turn is suspended from two blimp-type balloons. These were 
operated by the Air Force Geophysics Lab who had a balloon crew at Dugway for 
the duration of this test program. This whole system is stabilized by a series 
of tether lines out to the sides, in front and rear. The design is based on 
concepts which have evolved from earlier tethered balloon operations 
(Reference 5). Distances are such that from one extreme side tether anchor 
to the corresponding side tether line anchor on the other side is over two km. 
It's roughly one km from the net to these forward stabilization tie down points. 
The Washington Monument is drawn in scale on figure 17 just to give a relative 
sense of the size of this sampling net. Also shown schematically is the kind 
of intercept area that a typical fire plume would have with that net. The net 
is anchored 150 m downwind from the fire pool. Depending on the way the wind 
blows, within the directional constraints, the plume might be over to one side 
or the other side or right down the middle. Also, depending on velocity, the 
plume might intercept up near the top, in the middle, or down near the ground. 
Figure 18 is a photograph of the net up and flying with one of the balloons and 
a part of the supporting catenary. The photograph covers about one-quarter of 
the net, from one side to about the center line and down to about mid-height. 
What appear to be little white squares at the net intersections of the 
horizontal and vertical lines, are the mesh viewgraph samplers that are 
literally a piece of bridal veil mounted in a viewgraph frame that is tied to the 
net at each of these locations. The net line spacing creates about 15 m 
squares with a sampler in each corner. This photograph gives an indication of 
the immensity of the instrumentation problem. For servicing the instrumen- 
tation between tests, the balloons were pulled down by winching in the aft 
tethers and releasing the forward tethers allowing the net to be laid 
down on a table on the ground that was constructed at about head-height so 
that people could work in under the net adding, removing or servicing samplers 
after a test. For each test, the balloons were inflated and the whole net was 
raised to an operating position as shown, held into the wind by the forward 
tethers. 
The kinds of instrumentation that were used on the net are shown in figure 19. 
Viewgraphs were located at every one of the 420 intersections on the net. 
Other types of instrumentation that were on the net were generally in the areas 
where the heavy black dots are shown. All of this instrumentation, of course, 
had to be sized to be minimum weight so that it would not pull the net down, 
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distort it, or pull the balloons and net down. Figure 20 is a photograph of a 
typical installation where four pieces of instrumentation are located at one 
particular intersection of a horizontal net line and a vertical net line. 
This assembly is shown while it‘s down on the table. From left-to-right are 
the mesh-covered can which was added to a number of intersections to calibrate 
the viewgraphs, the mesh-covered viewgraph, and the high voltage Schrader grid. 
A cardboard version of the Peterson sampler with tail fins attached to keep it 
pointed into the wind is hanging below the other instruments, but is suspended 
off to the side slightly when the net is up and flying. 
Beyond the balloon supported net, down range on the ground are sampling lines 
that were put out on the Dugway range at the locations shown in figures 21 
and 22. Figure 21 is the short range sampling location out to about 2,000 
meters of downwind range. Sampling line identifications are given by the 
double letter designations. The fire pool and towers are shown approximately 
to the correct scale. The balloon-supported Jacob’s ladder was anchored 
across the centerline at a location between lines AA and BB. The dashed lines 
indicate the plus or minus 35 o allowable variation in design wind direction 
which bound the extent of cross-range sampling. The locations of the long- 
range ground sampling are shown in figure 22. At 19,110 m the sampling line 
was near the reservation boundary and the sampling line was long enough that 
it had to be bent to run along the boundary rather than going outside of 
Dugway's boundary. Figure 23 is a photograph of some of this downwind, long- 
range sampling area. It’s bleak, flat terrain in general. This was taken from 
a location about 8 km from the fire pool, up on the side of a mountain which 
parallels the west side of the sampling range. The mountains in the background 
&are off at a distance from here of about 40 km. 
Figure 24 shows the specimen support table over the 10.7 m diameter pool. 
There was 5 - 8 cm depth of water in the bottom of the pool and 12.7 cm depth 
of fuel was pumped in and floated on top of that. The array of specimens laid 
out on the table were numbered for identification. Most of them were placed on 
the downwind side of the table, however, a few were on the upwind side for 
reference purposes. Typically, 13 to 25 specimens of different aircraft com- 
ponents were placed on the table to be burned in the fire. Also, several of the 
Peterson samplers can be seen down on the ground attached to the cable array 
that had not been raised until after work was completed on specimen installa- 
tion and thermocouple instrumentation on the table. 
Figure 25 is a photograph of the start of the second dissemination fire. At 
ignition, six pyrotechnic flares are set off firing into the fuel in the pool, 
under the specimens on the table. The over-head Petersons have been raised to 
an elevation about 30 m above the ground. Figure 26 is the fire after about 
ten seconds of burning. The large black cloud starting to grow is an indication 
of a well-established fire with the plume rising, but also being bent over by 
the prevailing wind. The view was taken from a quartering, upwind position. 
Figures 27 - 29 are sequence photographs taken after one minute of burning, 
from a camera position that is perpendicular to the wind direction. Figure 27 
is the fire and initial part of the plume with a well-established fire ball 
extending for several pool diameters. The effect of the wind in blowing the 
fire to one side of the pool is evident from the amount of the table that is 
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showing. Strips of material that were delaminating off the specimensas well as 
clumps and single fibers were being thrown out of the plume as it moves down- 
wind. Swinging the camera around to the right, figure 28 is a photograph of 
the next part of the plume as it passes between the two downwind towers. Some 
of the vertical array can be seen in front of the plume, but imaged against 
the dark background. Some of the Peterson. samplers on the near side of the 
plume also are imaged against.it. The plume passes generally through the 
towers, actually splitting itself on this one tower at this particular time. 
Figure 29 was taken swinging the camera still farther to the right with the 
end of the plume penetrating through the viewgraph samplers that were mounted 
on the Jacob’s ladder net supported from the balloons. The net cables are not 
visible in this picture and the balloons are well above the top of the picture. 
But this gives a view of the adequacy of the instrumentation intercepting the 
plume. 
The next sequence of photographs (figures 30 - 32) was taken from a location 
about 5 km to the side and 2 km downwind from the fire site after about 10 
minutes of burning. Figure 30 shows the plume building up and passing 
through, but well beneath the two balloons supporting the Jacob’s ladder. 
Swinging the camera around to track the full length of the plume down range in 
figures 31 and 32, the plume remains essentially at constant height against 
an inversion, but is approximately 6 km long. The end of the plume terminates 
just beyond figure 32. The mountain in the background is 12 km away. 
Figure 33 shows typical residual material that was left on the rack after the 
20-minute fire test. This is residual material from the third dissemination 
fire. It was two horizontal components and the vertical component of a tail 
from an F-16 fighter aircraft, which were burned in a fire identical to the sec- 
ond fire. In this fire, however, the steel table that was supporting the speci- 
men collapsed after 5 minutes of burning. Nevertheless, the components stayed 
in the fire and show evidence of being well torn up, delaminated, and burned. 
The other type of fire, a source fire, with essentially a zero wind condition 
is shown in the next sequence of photographs. Figure 34 was taken at ignition. 
The specimen table has been re-built from the last fire and is over the other 
fire pool. As the fire starts, figure 35 shows it at 6 seconds; figure 36 
shows it at 30 seconds; and figure 37 shows it at one minute. Development of 
the plume going essentially straight up and being sampled entirely in the over- 
head Peterson canopy can be clearly seen as time advances. Another series of 
photographs that was taken from a helicopter of this same fire are shown in 
figures 38 - 43. The helicopter was flying in the vicinity of the fire 
throughout the time, but generally circling around the plume so in some of these 
pictures the cloud pattern or the shadow on the ground will change positions 
depending on the location of the helicopter. And as time continues on, the 
plume rises up to the inversion layer, flattens out, and then drifts slowly in 
the direction of the prevailing low velocity wind. Ground observers stated 
that the cloud persisted in the general area for times up to four hours after 
the fire. 
Figure 44 is a summary of the meteorological conditions in each of these five 
tests. The three with dissemination had wind speeds on the order of five 
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meters per second. The significant thing here is that the wind direction was 
essentially on the two limits on the first two tests, but on the third test 
the wind was close to the design wind direction of 320 degrees. Weather 
stability condition was neutral on these dissemination tests. It was stable 
on the last two source tests where there was essentially no wind velocity and 
variable direction. 
One obvious outcome of the three dissemination tests was the strips of 
material that delaminated and were carried downwind for a short distance before 
they fell out of the plume and deposited on the ground (figure 45). These 
were picked up on sweeps out over the ground area that defined the magnitude of 
the density of the strips and the quantity of material that was picked up. 
The first test was off to the west, the second test was off to the east, and 
the third test right down the center line. The third test deposited material 
a bit farther downwind than the first two. The location of the Jacob's ladder 
net at about 120 m downwind from the fire pool made it necessary for strips to 
pass through the sampling net to get to the indicated areas on the ground. 
Figure 46 is a photograph of one of the viewgraphs on the sampling net that 
indicates that it intercepted two of these strips. There are also a large 
number of single fibers on the viewgraph but they don't show up at this 
magnification. 
The high voltage Schrader grids flown on the net gave an indication of the 
rate at which fibers were being deposited on the samplers on the Jacob's 
ladder. Figure 47 shows the fiber deposition for one particular net inter- 
section about in the middle of the plume on the third dissemination fire test. 
Although the rate is not linear, it does indicate a continuous flow of fibers 
during the burn after the initial 2 - 3 minutes from ignition. The maximum 
deposition is on the order of about 2 X 104 fibers per square meter. 
Figure 48 is a tabulation of an estimate by the Dugway data analysis group on 
the single fibers that were released in each of the tests. Note that the total 
number of fibers released in each of these tests was on the order of 10'. There 
were variations from individual test to individual test, but not significantly 
different. The amount of carbon fiber mass in the fire was essentially the 
same except for test D-3 which was the F-16 composite tail, and weighed about 
60 percent more than the carbon fiber components in the rest of the tests. 
That fewer total single fibers came out of this test may have been due to the 
larger, heavier four pieces of composite or to the change in location within 
the fire when the table collapsed. But even with these differences the percent 
of single fibers released is all within a factor of three. Note that the 
average length of released fiber was as high as five millimeters. The last 
test was run only last week and not all of the results are available for it. 
The maximum release for these tests was 0.13 percent. 
Figure 49 provides a "quick-look" at what was intercepted on the Jacob's 
ladder sampling net from initial readings of the viewgraphs. The outline in 
the upper left of the figure is the intercept of the cloud or the soot outline 
on the net as it was picked off from the various viewgraphs. The symbols 
indicate areas in which clumps were found, and they're pretty well distributed 
over the whole cross section of the plume. Viewgraphs were read along two 
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cuts through the plume to get a quick look at the data. A vertical cut 
roughly through the middle of the plume showed the distribution of fibers 
indicated in the upper right of the figure. There seem to be several peaks 
vertically on fiber deposition, but peak values are on the order of 104 fibers 
per square meter. A horizontal cut also taken near the center of the plume 
is shown in the lower left. Again the peak value is about 2 X lo4 which is 
not too much different from what was shown on the high voltage grid, (figure 
47). 
Finally, figure 50 lists the peak exposure levels measured from the downwind 
deposition of fibers on ground-based samplers for distances to 19,000 meters. 
These are the maximum exposure levels that were detected on those various 
cross range sampling lines from each of the first three dissemination trials. 
C,l$,%e to the fire, the maxi-mum exposure values are on the order of lo3 fiber- 
but at greater downwind distances the exposures are almost at the point 
of biing insignificant, but still are statistically sampleable on this system. 
These measured peak exposures also agree reasonably with predicted values from 
reference 6. 
Concluding Remarks 
Figure 51 summarizes the conclusions drawn from the large-scale fire-released 
fiber tests. They are considered to be tentative because much of the data 
are preliminary at this time due to the recent performance of the outdoor 
tests. 
The greatest fiber release observed was the one-half percent in the Dahlgren 
Shock Tube where the composite was burned with a continuous agitation to total 
consumption. In the large-scale, outdoor fires at Dugway Proving Ground the 
greatest fiber release was 0.13 percent. Therefore, the one percent release 
that has been used in the risk calculations appears to be conservative. 
Fiber length averages are based on measured lengths of those fibers that are 
greater than one millimeter in length. In the shock tube with the forced 
agitation the average length was two millimeters. Outdoors, the largest 
average length obtained for any one test was five millimeters. These two 
values bracket the three millimeter length used in the risk calculations. 
Equipment vulnerability to fire-released carbon fibers was nearly identical to 
vulnerability in chamber tests which justifies the use of the carbon fiber 
chamber test data in the risk calculations. 
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Figure 1.- Risk analysis elements. 
Figure 2.- Dahlgren "shock tube" burn test. 
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Figure 3.- Rotisserie agitation of carbon composites. 
8 FIRE 
SIZE 1,2 m SQUARE (4 FT,) 
DURATION 206 MIN. 
FUEL 0,371 m3 (98,l GAL,) COMMERCIAL JET A 
FLAME TEMPERATURE 950-1000°C (1740-183O'F) 
8 COMPOSITE 
INITIAL MASS 9.988 kg 
BURN TIME 134 MIN. 
RESIDUAL MASS RECOVERED 3,361 kg 
1 EXPOSURE TABLE 
AIR FLOW 18,9 m3/s (40,000 CFM) 
AIR VELOCITY 0.67 m/s cl,5 MPH) 
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE 25'C (77'F) 
TEST TEMPERATURE 300 (86OF) 
Figure 4.- Dahlgren shock tube fire test parameters, test 53. 
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Figure 5.- Fiber sampling instrumentation for 
Dahlgren shock tube fire test 53. 
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Figure 6.- Carbon fiber exposures measured by sticky paper samplers for 
Dahlgren shock tube fire test 53. 
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Figure 7.- Carbon fiber exposures determined by all instrumentation 
Eor Dahlgren shock tube test 53. 
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Figure 8.- Fire-released carbon fiber length distribution for 
Dahlgren shock tube fire test 53. 
114 
NUMBER 
OF 
STEREO 
AMPLIFIERS 
FAILED 
6' 
5- 
4- 
3- 
2- 
1- 
L 
d 
I I 
1 I I I I I 
26 
I 
40 60 80 
COMPOSITE BURN TIME, MINUTES 
Figure 9.- Electronic equipment failures for 
Dahlgren shock tube fire test 53. 
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Figure lo.- Probability of electronic equipment failures from exposure to 
fire-released carbon fibers and to virgin carbon fibers. 
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FIRE 
COMPOSITE 
WEATHER 
SIZE 
DURATION 
FUEL 
45 kg (100 LB.) 
10.7 m DIAMETER (35 FT,) 
20 MINUTES 
11,36 m3 (3000 GAL,) JP-4 
CARBON-EPOXY AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS 
SOURCE TESTS WIND SPEED O-O.4 m/s 
DISSEMINATION TESTS WIND SPEED 2,7-5,4 m/s 
WIND DIRECTION 320' + 35' 
Figure ll.- Outdoor fire test parameters at Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 12.- Fiber sampling instrumentation for outdoor fire tests 
at Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 13.- Test-site layout for outdoor fire test at 
Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 14.- Overhead Peterson sampler array suspended from towers 
at Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 15.- Peterson sampler. 
Figure 16.- Stainless steel mesh can - sampler 
on vertical array. 
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WASHINGTON 
MONUMENT 
Figure 17.- Balloon-supported Jacob's ladder fire plume sampling net. 
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Figure 18.- Balloon-supported Jacob's ladder sampling net. 
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Figure 19.- Instrumentation on Jacob's ladder fire plume sampling net. 
Figure 20.- Instrumentation on Jacob's ladder. 
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Figure 21.- Short range ground-supported fiber sampling lines 
at Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 22.- Long range ground-supported fiber sampling lines 
at Dugway Proving Ground. 
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Figure 23.- Downwind, long-range sampling terrain. 
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Figure 24.- Specimen support table over fire pool. 
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Figure 25.- Ignition of jet fuel in fire pool at start 
of second dissemination test. 
Figure 26.- Ten seconds after ignition of dissemination 
fire test, D-2. 
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Figure 27.- Initial part of fire plume one minute 
after ignition, test D-2. 
&$,$j,$,*,, ,,;* i ^ .a A.*:’ : ., ,s \ 
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” 
Figure 28.- Part of fire plume passing between two downwind towers, 
one minute after ignition, test D-2. 
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Figure 29.- End of fire plume, one minute after 
ignition, test D-2. 
Figure 30.- Initial part of 6 km long plume, 10 minutes 
after ignition, test D-2. 
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Figure 31.- Middle part of 6 km long plume, 10 minutes 
after ignition, test D-2. 
Figure 32.- Near end of 6 km long plume, 10 minutes 
after ignition, test D-2. 
126 
Figure 33.- Residual material after 20-minute burn of F-16 carbon 
fiber-epoxy tail at Dugway Proving Ground, test D-3. 
Figure 34.- Composite specimens on rack over ll-meter pool fire 
for test S-l - ignition. 
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Figure 35 - U-meter pool fire test S-l - 6 seconds. 
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Figure 36.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 30 seconds. 
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Figure 37.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 1 minute. 
Figure 38.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 20 seconds, helicopter. 
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Figure 39.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 50 seconds, helicopter. 
Figure 40.- 11-meter pool fire test S-l - 80 seconds, helicopter. 
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Figure 41.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 3 minutes 
30 seconds, helicopter. 
Figure 42.- 11-meter pool fire test S-l - 4 minutes 
45 seconds, helicopter. 
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Figure 43.- ll-meter pool fire test S-l - 14 minutes, helicopter. 
TRIAL 
D-l 
D-2 
D-3 
S-l 
s-2 
WINDSPEED WIND DIRECTION STABILITY 
(METERS/SEC) (DEGREES) CJTEGORY 
6,4 360 NEUTRAL 
5,8 289 NEUTRAL 
5,3 326 NEUTRAL 
< l#O VARIABLE STABLE 
< 280 VARIABLE STABLE 
I I I 
Figure 44.- Meteorological summary - measurements made during 
burn time at 8 meters above ground upwind of fire location. 
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Figure 45.- Ground footprints of composite strip 
fallout downwind. 
Figure 46.- Two fiber strips deposited on 
Jacob's ladder mesh viewgraph at Dugway 
outdoor fire test D-3. 
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TIME, MINUTES 
Figure 4i'.- Fiber counting with time from Jacob's ladder 
Schrader grid at Dugway outdoor fire test D-3. 
TEST 
REI EASED FIBERZ- ~~ 
AVERAGE AVERAGE SINGLE FIBERS 
CARBON FIBER LENGTH DIAMETER RELEASED 
MASS IN FIRE, ks TOTAL NUMBER ml Am 9 % 
D-l 3188 1,o x 108 4,9 ' 4,8 32 on10 
D-2 31,8 1,4 x 108 4,3 4,5 40 0,12 
D-3 52,O 0,8 x lo8 5,l 4,2 28 on05 
S-l 34,9 2,9 x 108 2,3 4,3 45 0,13 
s-2 31,8 2,o x 108 -- -- -- -- 
Figure 48.- Preliminary estimate of single carbon fibers 
released at Dugway outdoor fire tests. 
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Figure 49.- Fiber counts from Jacob's ladder mesh viewgraphs 
at Dugway outdoor fire test D-3. 
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Figure SO.- Exposure levels as a 
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0 FIBER RELEASE 
SHOCK TUBE 0,5% MAX, FORCED 
OUTDOORS 0,13X MAX 
.tl% FOR RISK CALCULATIONS I CONSERVATIVE 
@ FIBER LENGTH (FIBERS GREATER THAN 1 MM AVERAGE> 
SHOCK TUBE 2,0 MM AVERAGE 
OUTDOORS 5,1 MM AVERAGE 
.'b 3 MM USED FOR RISK CALCULATIONS I BRACKETED 
0 EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY TO FIRE-RELEASED FIBERS 
- NEARLY IDENTICAL TO FIBER CHAMBER TESTS 
- JUSTIFIES USE OF FIBER CHAMBER TEST DATA IN RISK CALCULATION 
Figure 51.- Tentative conclusions - large scale test results. 
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SURVEYS OF FACILITIES FOR THE 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS FROM THE FALLOUT 
OF AIRBOR!'4E GRAPHITE FIBERS 
Ansel J. Butterfield 
The Bionetics Corporation 
The surveys of facilities which covered a representative cross section of the 
American workplace provided a necessary technical bridge-of-data between the 
analytical models and the actual working operations. The United States gen- 
erates a volume of economic data through agencies such as the Bureau of the 
Census and organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce. Economic modeling 
must utilize such data in evaluating the potential effects of fiber induced 
failures. The working operations within the United States generally recognize 
the potential for a failure within items of electrical equipment and usually 
take some precaution even if it only amounts to keeping some spare light 
bulbs. Since airborne graphite fibers have the potential to cause electrical 
failures, the surveys had to provide the three interrelated elements of data 
as outlined in Figure 1. The response to a failure in an item of electrical 
equipment implies an economic impact. The failure site must be located, the 
failure cleared, and the item repaired. During that period of time operators 
may be idled, product can be damaged, delayed or both. Such considerations 
become the basis for assigning a cost to a potential fiber induced failure. 
The survey effort made an early recognition that failures in some items of 
equipment could impact lives and these areas received the necessary priority. 
The third element of data addressed the nature of the operation performed. 
Airborne fibers represent an increment in the total environment at the work- 
place and many operations must contend with harsh or unusual environmental 
conditions. The need for an environmental control as dictated by the work- 
place could bar the entry of fibers, or conceivably even make the operation 
more sensitive to fibers. 
Surveys of facilities had to cover a representative cross section of the work- 
places in the United States; the survey teams made a total of 62 visits to the 
locations summarized in Figure 2. The approach to the conduct of the surveys 
first recognized those areas considered most sensitive to influence by air- 
borne graphite fibers and then utilized the result from the first series to 
focus the direction and detail for the next. The first series of surveys con- 
centrated on hospitals, air traffic controls, telephone exchanges, public 
communications and the manufacture of electronic equipment. The surveys then 
broadened to cover the range-of-use for equipment considered sensitive to 
failures from airborne graphite fibers. 
The surveys of manufacturing operations utilized the data from the Bureau of 
the Census "Standard Industrial Classifications" (SIC) as employed in the 
"Census of Manufacturers." In these col?pilations, the census divides manu- 
facturing into 20 general classifications each assigned a two digit code. 
The code extends to four digits to reach specific product areas. As an ex- 
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ample, acrylic fiber manufacture falls under the product designation of "Organ- 
ic Fibers, Noncellulosic" SIC 2824. All "Plastic Materials Synthetics" are 
combined as SIC 282 and are part of the total "Chemicals and Allied Products" 
SIC 28. The census data summarizes total yearly values-of-shipments for each 
two digit SIC code and then provides a total for the nation. The 20 manu- 
facturing operations surveyed provide a representative sampling of that 
portion of American industry whose functioning depends upon the use of elec- 
trical and electronic equipment. The sample surveyed includes typical in- 
dustrial operations which account for 85 percent of the total national value- 
of-shipments as compiled in the last Census of Manufacturers (1972). 
The conduct of these surveys acknowledges a cooperation and support from both 
governmental and private organizations. Municipalities and counties provided 
access to hospitals, airports, air traffic control towers and their police 
or fire communication centers. Cooperating federal agencies supported the 
surveys of air traffic control centers, Amtrak, the Post Office and a Federal 
Reserve Bank. The private sector supported the full range of survey work 
from hospitals and airlines through a representative range of manufacturing. 
The results from all of these surveys shaped the appropriate portions of the 
economic model for defining the impact cost associated with the risk analysis. 
Patterns for protective measures began to show early in the survey process. 
Figure 3 lists the types or elements of protection which appeared. Much of 
the office space and a significant portion of the industrial installations 
require air conditioning. Many of the newer buildings are not usable without 
air conditioning because their construction does not permit adequate venti- 
lation by natural means. In other cases the nature of the operation performed 
requires the cleanliness associated with a controlled and filtered ventilation 
system. Potentially sensitive items such as computers, data processors, sig- 
nal generators and electronic test racks often impose requirements on temper- 
ature controls or shielding which result in specialized isolated installations. 
For much of the manufacturing industries, the operating environment at the 
workplaces becomes hostile to electrical and electronic equipment. Such op- 
erating environments involve sprays from cutting fluids, corrosive fumes, 
even explosive atmospheres. The operation of electronic equipment under such 
conditions requires either tight cabinets or coated circuit boards. In some 
operations even the best electrical devices can wear, drift, or change in 
some way that requires attention. Such operations recognize these limitations 
and either keep a stock of spare parts or employ multiple installations. 
The survey program identified ten areas where an electrical failure could im- 
pose a major impact. Each of these areas had recognized environmental con- 
straints which would influence their interactions with airborne fibers. 
Figure 4 summarizes these areas in terms of the concern, the operating 
environment, the protective measures currently in place and the effect such 
measures would have on the ingestion of airborne graphite fibers. 
The compromise of life-supporting electrical equipment in hospital operating 
rooms or intensive care units became one of the first major concerns. A 
patient in an operating room or an ICU must have protection from airborne 
micro-organisms and a range of ingestible contaminants. In recognition, the 
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Hill-Burton act which provides federal funding to hospitals also imposes the 
requirement for high efficiency dust removal filtration in such ventilating 
systems. High efficiency dust removal filters and filters classified as 
High Efficiency Particle Arrest (HEPA) effectively bar the entrance of air- 
borne fibers; both types are now in hospital service. For patients in the 
regular hospital areas, the electronic equipment provides monitoring or sup- 
port for a specific function. Here, the quantity of bedding in a hospital 
imposes a lint laden environment. Cases or cabinets which protect against 
lint also protect against the entry of graphite fibers. 
Ground control of aircraft represents a second area where an electrical fail- 
ure could have a serious impact. The combination of transmitters, displays, 
and signal conditioning equipment impose thermal loads which result in dedi- 
cated air conditioning systems for towers and area air traffic control centers. 
Remotely mounted beacons and transmitters must be protected from the weather, 
and these items have particular needs for radio frequency (RF) shielding or 
isolation. The net result of the combination either prevents fibers from 
entering the area or prevents fibers from entering a cabinet. 
A third area involving a potential hazard to life could be the failure of a 
communication system in responding to emergency situations such as fires, 
accidents or even natural disasters. The communication links between a dis- 
patcher and remote vehicles require the use of redundant installations. 
Communities must be capable of responding to more than one call at a time; 
thus more than one dispatching radio communicates with more than one remote 
vehicle. Cities face the problem of signals reflected from buildings and 
these effects lead to the provision of even more redundancy in the system 
for communicating with vehicles. (One city employs an electronic logic 
system which samples a number of radio paths and then selects the one with 
the best signal quality). Within a police car or fire truck, "harsh" describes 
the normal environment for an electronic unit in terms of heat, vibration, 
moisture and corrosive road dirt. The packaging of electronics necessary 
for successful operation in road vehicles also makes them invulnerable to 
graphite fibers. 
The recent fire in a New York City Central Telephone Exchange raised the con- 
cern for a failure incident which cou,ld block the operation of a telephone 
switching center. Surveys have shown that the older stations are more open 
while the newer electronic systems need the advantages of a closed recircu- 
lating air conditioning system. All new construction will have controlled 
ventilation. It appears that fibers could get into the older stations and 
potentially interrupt a switching function. On the other hand, telephone 
stations represent numbers of identical installations each performing the 
same task. Single fibers could cause wrong numbers or stalled switching in 
one or more individual elements, but not upset the entire exchange at one 
time. 
. 
The history of blackouts in the Northeast leads to a concern for the circuitry 
which controls power generation stations, in particular fossil fueled plants. 
Such installations live with fly ash, and in addition, coal fired plants live 
with coal dust. Practical considerations led to isolated control rooms with 
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the electrical portions of control circuits contained within the control rooms. 
The isolation afforded by the control rooms in older stations may admit some 
airborne fibers. Such stations use voltages in the range 125-200 volts in 
their control elements; single fibers are not considered capable of precipi- 
tating a damaging failure at such voltages. The newer installations employ 
digital computers as active elements in the control systems. The correspond- 
ing ventilation systems employ more than one stage of air filtration with the 
second stage specified as a high efficiency dust remover. Such systems effec- 
tively isolate the control room from the rest of the generation station. 
The financial community and a segment of the manufacturing community depend 
upon data and records stored in computers. A failure which compromises such 
records represents a major impact. The term "computer room" as an environ- 
mentally controlled area reflects the history of usage for electronic comput- 
ers. Practical considerations of heat generation and access for cabling 
lead to installations with dropped ceilings, raised floors and a separate 
air conditioning system employing filters for dust and lint control. The 
computer electronics generate heat, the printers can be noisy and tape readers 
are sensitive to airborne dirt and dust. The trend toward smaller computers 
has not changed the manner of installation or the needs for protection. 
Computer manufacturers currently specify a minimum value for the dust removal 
efficiency of the air conditioning filters, and at these minimum values 
filters are effective barriers to airborne fibers. While airborne fibers 
may enter areas containing items such as point-of-sale cash registers or local 
terminals the main-frame installations appear environmentally isolated. 
"Continuous process" describes the manufacture of such items as paper, textile 
fibers, industrial chemicals, petroleum refining, etc. For such an instal- 
lation the loss of control at one location could stop the entire operation, 
and a restart could be costly. Control for such operations depends upon 
systems built up of specialized elements and displays with the control stations 
often standing alongside the operating line. The local environment can be 
benign, just wet, corrosive, or even explosive. A long roster of American 
companies manufacture control related equipment; most represent specialty 
items with but a few firms providing the major portions of the integrated 
control systems used in the continuous process industries. A canvass of the 
principal manufacturers of control system elements revealed that each recog- 
nized the potential applications of his equipment and designed accordingly. 
One assumed every unit would see service in the extremely corrosive environ- 
ment of a pulp mill. All circuit boards received a conformal coating. A 
second manufacturer utilized tightly sealed cases. A third used a mix of 
both depending upon the installation. The installation of electrical cir- 
cuitry into industrial buildings utilizes standardized classes of enclosures 
as defined by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). The 
classes range from General Purpose Indoor (NEMA Class 1) as the most open and 
continues through degrees of sealing for rain, dust, immersion and explosive 
atmospheres. NEMA Class #12 appears as the industrial standard for an in- 
stallation which needs protection from both moisture and dust. The nature of a 
continuous process operation seems to preclude any exposure of electrical 
circuit elements to the ambient environment. 
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"Automated production" can be envisioned as those operations which machine 
metal, fill bottles, seal cans or wrap packages. A number of closely con- 
trolled steps proceed in sequence. The disruption of one step halts all the 
others, and an unscheduled halt could result in a damaged product. The en- 
vironment in such lines can range from benign (as in some food processing 
lines) up through cutting fluid sprays to explosive as in a line which filled 
aerosol cans with a hydrocarbon propellant. Automated machining lines employ 
numerically controlled machine tools and some employ dedicated computers. 
Equipment operating in such environments finds the need to place high effi- 
ciency filters in the ventilated cases or to completely seal the cases. Re- 
views of maintenance records for machining lines show that sealed units have 
minimum calls. The records also show that when the environment includes metal 
chips,, a damaged seal usually results in an electrical failure caused by the 
ingestion of conductive debris. For such installations the measures which 
seal out the ambient contaminants also seal out airborne graphite fibers. 
Assembly line operations involve products which range from automobiles to 
washing machines. Failure at any step in an assembly line could halt the 
entire line and idle the work force. Where electrical items play critical 
roles in the process, the surveys have found either sealed cases, multiple 
units or ready spares. For some assembly lines such as televisions, or home 
appliances, a degree of cleanliness becomes a requirement. Cleanliness tends 
to limit the potential for a line halt caused by graphite fibers. In summary, 
assembly lines require continuous monitor for potential stoppages or bottle- 
necks. Problems receive prompt attention. Operations in unprotected environ- 
ments such as the assembly of automobiles requires ready spares or redundant 
installations; other assembly lines have the protection afforded by air- 
conditioning. As a result assembly line operations do not appear vulnerable 
to stoppage by airborne graphite fibers. 
The results from surveys can be summarized in terms of events which will not 
happen. Figure 5 lists the principal findings for services, for utilities 
and for commercial institutions. Life-critical functions appear to have the 
necessary degree of environmental isolation to preclude a threat to life. The 
police, fire and rescue communication links will function. Generating sta- 
tions do not appear vulnerable. For telephones one could get a wrong number 
or not complete a call on the first try, but that happens even now. The 
banks, the brokerage houses and similar operations appear to have adequate 
protections. 
Figure 5 summarizes the results from surveying manufacturing installations, 
and these show a range in potential for impact. The potential for impact 
may be addressed in terms of industry types as defined by the two digit 
SIC code. Eight of the SIC classes for manufacturing industry operate under 
environmental conditions which result in an effective isolation of electrical 
iterns from the ambient environment. The Food Processing Industry, SIC 20, 
lives with a cleanliness requirement. In these industries operations must 
proceed in environmentally controlled areas. As examples,in a frozen food 
plant, equipment has to proceed in refrigerated areas, meat packing equipment 
has to permit wash down, etc. 
141 
The printing plants, SIC 27, must control humidity just to keep paper moving 
through their presses. Their sensitive electrical equipment becomes environ- 
mentally isolated. The other 6 classes represent the continuous process 
industries working in corrosive environments. The two classes of manufacturing 
which machine metal and thereby must contend with conductive debris include 
the fabrication of machinery and the fabrication portion of the automobile, 
airplane, and railroad equipment industries. These two together with the 
first eight show value-of-shipments totalling 55 percent of all manufacturing 
as compiled by the last Census of Manufacturers. 
The manufacturer of electronic and electrical circuitry items requires a 
degree of cleanliness for control of contaminants and debris. These factories 
take advantage of air conditioning or air filtration as a measure of control, 
The air conditioning reduces the probability for entry of fibers and thereby 
reduces the economic impact for another 10 percent of industrial installation. 
Where assembly lines and fabrication lines operate with ready spares such as 
observed in the controllers for spot welding of auto bodies, the potential 
for economic impact is also reduced. Another 7 percent of American industry 
carries this type of protection. 
The total experience from surveying a cross section of the workplaces in the 
United States leads to a series of conclusions relative to the degree of 
economic impact which can result from the entry of airborne graphite fiber 
into a workplace. Figure 6 lists these conclusions. The life critical areas 
may be excluded from any impact considerations. Emergency services, utilities 
and commercial institutions could suffer non-disruptive failures. For the 
manufacturing industries half the total value-of-shipments comes from factories 
which may be eliminated from impact projections. The surveys did not see any 
failure sites within factories where airborne fibers could cause a total 
factory shutdown. For manufacturing, impact will be in terms of single 
machines. The losses will be costs for troubleshooting and repair with some 
operators temporarily idled and some product damage or production loss. 
The surveys found that manufacturing operations must contend with a number of 
randomly occurring failures in items of electrical equipment. The potential 
number of additional failures caused by fibers would not be recognized against 
the background of the present random failures. In a discussion after a tour, 
one plant engineer summarized the potential impact in the words, "We probably 
would not even know if it had happened." 
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THE SURVEYS OF PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
INSTALLATIONS PROVIDED THREE ELEMENTS OF DATA: 
l ECONOMIC MODELLING: DATA TO ESTIMATE THE IMPACT OF 
A FIBER INDUCED FAILURE AS COSTS OF REPAIR, REPLACE, 
LOST TIME, ETC, 
o HAZARD SENSITIVITY: DATA TO IDENTIFY WAYS FIBERS 
COULD INTERFERE WITH LIFE CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY 
SERVICES, 
o OPERATION SENSITIVITY: DATA TO DEFINE THE EFFECTS OF 
AN IN-PLACE PROTECTION OR HIGHLIGHT A PARTICULAR SEN- 
SITIVITY TO AIRBORNE FIBERS, 
Figure 1.- Survey of facilities for potential effects 
from airborne graphite fiber. 
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1) PUBLIC SUPPORT JKJ, 3) COMMERCIAL INSTALLATIONS NO, 
HOSPITALS 7 DEPARTMENT S ORES 2 
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLS 6 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 
AIRPORTS-AIRLINES 3 RADIO AND TV STATIONS 6 
POLICE HEADQUARTERS 2 ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES 1 
FIRE DISPATCH 2 
POST OFFICES 
4) MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS (SIC> 
1 
TRAFFIC CONTROL 1 MEAT PACKING (20) 1 
TEXTILE MILL (22) 1 
21 UTILITIES GARMENTS (23) 1 
TELEPHONE XCHANGES 3 PULP AND PAPER (26) 1 
POWER GENERATOR, DISTRIB, 3 PUBLISHING (271 2 
REFUSE INCINERATORS 2 TEXTILE FIBERS (28) 1 
AMTRAK 1 TOILETRIES 
STEEL MILLS 
WIRE, CABLE 
ELECTRICAL EQUIP, 
AUTOMOTIVE FAB/ASSY 
(28) 1 
(33) 2 
(33) 1 
(361 6 
(37) 4 
Figure 2.- Summary of facilities surveyed. 
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o ON-SITE TECHNICAL SURVEYS COVERED 62 LOCATIONS 
AS PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 
o PRESENT OPERATING REQUIREMENTS RESULT IN FACILITY CON- 
FIGURATIONS OR FEATURES WHICH PROTECT AGAINST FIBER ENTRY 
OR INTERACTIONS, 
-AIR CONDITIONED BUILDINGS WITH FILTERS FOR INTAKES AND 
RECIRCULATION, 
-SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT IN SEPARATE ROOMS WITH INDEPENDENT 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, 
-SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT IN CLOSED OR FILTERED VENTILATION CABINETS, 
-ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT BOARDS WITH CONFORMAL COATINGS, 
-FAILURE PRONE EQUIPMENT BACKED BY READY SPARES, 
Figure 3.- Surveys of facilities, general findings. 
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AREA OF CONCERN 
1, HOSPITAL OPERATING ROOMS 
AND CRITICAL CARE AREAS 
2, HOSPITAL ROOMS 
3, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
TOWERS AND EQUIPMENT 
4, POLICE/FIRE EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
5, TELEPHONE XCHANGE 
CENTERS 
6, POWER GENERATION CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
7, DATA STORED IN CENTRAL 
COMPUTERS 
8, CONTINUOUS PROCESS CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
9, AUTOMATED PRODUCTION CONTROL 
SYSTEMS / 
10, ASSEMBLY LINE OPERATING 
AND CONTROL ELEMENTS 
PRESENT OPERATING CONCERN .~ .~_._ ..~ 
AIRBORNE INFECTIONS 
' CONTAMINANTS 
e LINT 
OPERATING TEMPERATURE 
: ELECTROMAGNETIC NTERFERENCE 
RF SIGNAL QUALITY 
: IN-VEHICLE OPERATION 
AIRBORNE PARTICULATES 
: NEED FOR MULTIPLE INSTALLATION 
FUEL DUST 
: FLY ASH 
HEAT GENERATION - HUMIDITY 
: AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS 
CORROSIVE FLUIDS AND 
: EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES 
SPRAYS 
CUTTING FLUID SPRAY 
: EXPLOSIVE/CORROSIVE ATMOSPHERES 
EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN 
: AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS 
Figure 4.- Critical failure areas and present protection. 
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PRESENT PROTECTION 
"ABSOLUTE" AIR FILTRATION 
' (HILL-BURTON REQUIREMENT) 
, CLOSED CASES 
RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
: RF SHIELDED CABINETS 
MULTIPLE UNITS 
: CLOSED CASES 
RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
: REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT 
CONTROL ROOMS EPARATED 
' WITH RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
~~~ 
ROOM-WITHIN-ROOMS 
: RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
COATED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
: SEALED CASES (NEMA #12) 
HIGH EFFICIENCY FILTERS OR 
' SEALED CASES 
READY SPARES 
: RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
EFFECT 
I FIBERS DO NOT ENTER AREAS 
, ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
FIBERS Dil NOT ENTER AREA 
: ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
: ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
: SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
OLDER STATIONS: LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
' CONTROL VOLTAGES NOT SENSITIVE TO FIBERS 
, NEW STATIONS: ENVIRONMENTALLY ISOLATED 
, FIBERS DO NOT ENTER COMPUTER AREAS 
, NO ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT ELEMENTS 
OPEN TO FIBERS 
, FIBERS DO NOT ENTER CASES 
SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
: LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
Figure 4.- Concluded. 
147 
PERCENT OF 
. INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS 
- NO IMPACT BECAUSE OF PROTECTION FROM PRESENT OPERATION 
ENVIRONMENT: 
NATIONAL VALUE-OF- 
SHIPMENTS 
40 
SIC 20 FOOD, 22 TEXTILE MILLS, 26 PAPER, 27 PRINTING, 28 CHEMICALS, 
29 PETROLEUM AND COAL, 30 RUBBER, 31 LEATHER 
- NO IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS NEED LOCAL PROTECTION 15 
FROM CUTTING FLUIDS, CONTAMINANTS: 
SIC 135 MACHINERY, 37 TRANSPORTATION (PARTIAL) 
- REDUCED IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS NEED AIRCONDITIONING OR 10 
SOME CONTROL OF AMBIENT CONDITIONS: 
SIC 36 ELECTRICAL, 38 INSTRUMENTS 
- REDUCED IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY READY SPARES: 7 
SIC 37 TRANSPORTATION (PARTIAL) 
SIC 33 PRIMARY METAL (PARTIAL) 
l LIFE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS HAVE IN-PLACE PROTECTIONS AGAINST 
THE ENTRY OF AIRBORNE GRAPHITE FIBERS, 
o EMERGENCY SERVICES WILL NOT BE INTERRUPTED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS .
o ELECTRICAL UTILITIES WILL NOT BE DISRUPTED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS, 
o TELEPHONE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE DISABLED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS, 
o COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR ESSENTIAL RECORDS 
STORED IN COMPUTERS, 
Figure 5.- Results from surveys. 
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o LIFE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS: EXCLUDE FROM IMPACT PROJECTIONS, 
o EMERGENCY SERVICES: ECONOMIC IMPACT LIMITED TO SINGLE ITEMS 
OF EQUIPMENT, 
o UTILITIES: ECONOMIC IMPACT IN TERMS OF A LOCAL OUTAGE/REPAIR, 
o COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS: IMPACT IN TERMS OF PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT, 
o INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS: 
- FOR HALF OF INDUSTRY, NO ECONOMIC IMPACT, 
- NO FACTORY SHUTDOWNS, 
- ECONOMIC IMPACT IN TERMS OF SINGLE FAILURES AND REPAIRS, 
Figure 6.- Conclusions. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK DUE TO RELEASE OF CARBON FIBER 
IN CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS 
PHASE II REPORT 
Leon S. Pocinki, Merrill E. Cornell, and Lawrence Kaplan 
ORI, Inc. 
SUMMARY 
Under Contract NASl-15379, ORI, Inc. investigated the risk associated 
with release of graphite fibers following a commercial aircraft accident and 
fire. The computer simulation model developed in Phase I was refined in Phase 
II. Additional experimental data has been made available. Phase II results 
indicate that the risk, considerably lower than that obtained in Phase I, is 
relatively small. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarizes ORI's Phase II investigation of the risk associated 
with the potential use of carbon fiber composite material in commercial jet 
aircraft. In Phase I a simulation model was developed to generate risk 
profiles for several airports; the risk profiles show the probability that the 
cost due to accidents in any year exceeds a given amount. The computer model 
simulates aircraft accidents with fire, release of fibers, their downwind 
transport and infiltration of buildings, equipment failures, and resulting 
economic impact. The individual airport results were combined to yield the 
national risk profile. Phase II was conducted to examine the risk with more 
precision, and incorporate previously unavailable experimental data. These 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. 
The structure of the OR1 Airport Risk Model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The principal steps in the simulation of each accident are illustrated in 
Figure 3; each is discussed in turn in this paper. The major focus is on 
those elements of the analysis into which changes were introduced in Phase II, 
principally: 
0 Availability of detailed analyses of jet aircraft accidents with fire 
0 Incorporation of new experimental data for the amount of carbon fiber 
released in a "burn" 
0 Generalization of the OR1 transport and diffusion model 
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0 New evidence indicating high filter efficiency relative to carbon 
fibers 
0 Recent experimental values for equipment failure parameters 
0 Introduction of a more detailed costing model 
0 A new national risk assessment model facilitating the computation of 
statistical confidence limits. 
The report covers these items as well as presenting brief descriptions of all 
other elements of the risk analysis methodology. Phase II results are compared 
to the previous Phase I results. 
ACCIDENT WITH FIRE/RELEASE OF CF 
In Phase I, OR1 conducted a limited analysis of individual aircraft acci- 
dent reports and summary data available through the National Transportation 
Safety Board. In Phase II, under NASA auspices, the major aircraft manufactur- 
ers completed a detailed analysis of approximately 100 jet aircraft accidents 
in which fire played a part. These analyses provided estimates of the damage 
to each major aircraft structural component. It was determined that the annual 
fire-accident rate pertinent to the risk assessment was 3.8; this has been 
accepted as the best estimate available for the 1993 scenario. For the risk 
assessment calculation we are only concerned with aircraft containing composite 
material, estimated to be about 70 percent of the 1993 fleet, for a resulting 
national mean number of carbon-fiber aircraft accidents with fire of 2.6 per 
year. 
The calculation proceeds one aircraft size at a time. Accordingly, for 
airport A and aircraft of size S, we estimate the annual accident-with-fire 
rate by: 
NA,S x 2.6 (1) 
CCN 
AS A'S 
where N A s is the number of operations of aircraft of size S at airport A; thus 
the sum Represents all operations in the U.S. The model computes the expression 
(1) from appropriate input data, and then draws a random sample from a Poisson 
distribution with this mean value in each replication. 
In a related effort the principal aircraft manufacturers, NASA, and NASA's 
risk assessment contractors prepared estimates of the projected changes in the 
commercial aircraft fleet from now to 1993. These schedules included project- 
ed utilization of graphite fiber composite in each component. These data were 
combined with the accident analysis results to provide estimates of the amount 
of composite that would be involved in a fire following an accident to any of 
the projected new aircraft. In effect, for each projected aircraft type we 
computed the sum 
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C (fraction consumed)i 
i 
x (amount of composite)i 
for all accidents in the airframers' analysis, where the index i refers to an 
aircraft component. Thus, for one aircraft type, defined by a distribution of 
composite material, we have the total composite that would have been consumed 
in each of the historical accidents. These results were then used as the pro- 
bability distribution for the amount of composite involved in the fire. In 
each simulated accident the model determines the type of aircraft involved, 
based on the relative numbers of the different types in the fleet. For that 
type aircraft the model then draws the amount of composite involved from the 
distribution just described. It is then assumed that one percent of the carbon 
is released as 3-mm single fibers. In those accidents in which an explosion 
occurs, an additional two-and-a-half percent is assumed to be released due to 
the agitation of the composite material. These input assumptions are based on 
experimental evidence generated after completion of Phase I. The model also 
selects a random accident location based on analysis of the accident data. 
PLUME 
The graphite fiber release starts with an aircraft accident leading to a 
fire; the fire is fed by the aircraft fuel. As a result of the fire some 
fraction of the aircraft is consumed. The estimation of this fraction, and the 
ultimate amount of fiber released were discussed in the preceding section. As 
a consequence of the fire a hot buoyant plume is formed that rises to a 
"stabilization" height which is a function of the energy available, the wind 
speed, and the atmospheric stability. The graphite fibers enter the buoyant 
plume and are lifted to the stabilization height. 
Plume Height Calculation 
As in Phase I, calculation of the plume rise (or elevation), H, at stabi- 
lization from an open fire follows the work of Briggs (Ref. 1). The height of 
the plume, in meters, is given by: 
H= 2.9 (F/us) l/3 (2) 
for stable conditions, and 
H = 1 6F1'3u-1x2'3, when x <3 5x* . . 
H = l.6F1'3u-1(3.5x*)2'3, when x >3.5x* 
(3) 
(4) 
for neutral or unstable conditions, where u is the mean wind speed in meters 
per second and: 
x* = 14F518 , when F < 55 
x* = 34F215 , when F > 55 
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The buoyancy flux parameter, F, appearing in the above equations, is given by 
gQR F=- 
aCppT 
where: 
2 
8 = acceleration of gravity, 9.8 m/set 
QR = heat emission rate, kcal/sec 
C P = specific heat of air at constant pressure, 
.2391 kcal/kg'K 
P = atmospheric density, 1.239 kg/m3 
T = ambient temperature, OK. 
The atmospheric stability parameter, s, is defined by: 
where: 
a0 - = gradient of potential temperature, 0.35'/km aZ for stable conditions. 
Heat Emission Rate 
In order to use the Briggs formulas, we must specify Q,, the heat 
emission rate for a burning aircraft; this is, in turn, the product of the 
rate measured, gallons per unit time, and the fuel heat content per gallon. 
In Phase I a standard burn rate was used, based on experimental data. In Phase 
II we were able to turn to the detailed fire-accident analysis previously re- 
ferred to. In this case it was possible to estimate the fuel burn rate for 
accidents occuring during different operational phases, as well as accidents 
of different severity. The reported accidents involved small jet aircraft 
almost exclusively, so a scaling factor proportional to the relative volume of 
the aircraft fuel tanks, as reported in Janes (Ref. 2), was used to estimate 
the burn rates for other size aircraft. With these inputs we are able to 
determine the plume rise.for accidents involving different aircraft for any 
combination of wind speed and stability conditions. 
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DOWNWIND TRANSPORT AND DIFFUSION OF FIBERS 
Basic Concepts 
In Phase I the "standard" EPA transport and diffusion model was adapted 
to the needs of the risk assessment study. The model provides for downwind 
transport of material in the form of a plume that diffuses simultaneously in 
the crosswind and vertical directions. The initial source can be elevated at 
a specified height. The atmosphere is characterized as being in one of several 
stability classes. Dispersion parameters that govern the rate of crosswind and 
downwind diffusion are associated with each stability class (Ref. 3). The 
plume rise calculations, described above, give the source height, which is then 
used explicitly in the transport and diffusion model. 
In Phase II further extensions were made to the transport and diffusion 
model. These allow for multiple reflections of the diffusing particles and 
provide an improved mechanism for accounting for particle fallout at downwind 
distances that are so large that the cloud is uniformly dispersed in the verti- 
cal. 
The wind speed at plume height is taken as representative of the layer in 
which the carbon fibers are dispersing., The standard power law may be written: 
u = u. (H/7)' (5) 
The exponent p is assigned specific values for different stability classes. In 
most cases rather stringent physical conditions must be met for the plume to 
"punch through" an inversion. Observations indicate that this typically does 
not occur. It was therefore considered reasonable to assume that if the com- 
puted plume height is greater than the height of the inversion, it can be set 
equal to the inversion height. 
When the vertical range over which the plume is mixed becomes equal to the 
depth of the'mixed layer (below the inversion), we can assume a relatively uni- 
form distribution of particles in the vertical. The model therefore makes the 
distribution of graphite fibers uniform in the vertical, from the ground sur- 
face to the base of the inversion, when uz becomes larger than 1.6 H . m 
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OR1 Diffusion Equations 
With these assumptions, and the Phase II modifications to allow for multi- 
ple reflections, we obtain: 
D(x,y,O,H') = Q exp [ exp [ 
ITU (5 Y Z YZ 
l(H'+2H m> 
2 
5 
-H' + 2 H 2 
+ rexp [ - 2 1 + exp - 1 ( m> 1 
(5 u 
Z Z 
+ r2 2 -H'+4H 2 exp 1 - $ ( H'+4H ml 1 + rexp 1 - 3 ( m) 3 
u u 
Z Z 
+ r2 1 exp 1 - 7 (-H+6H 2 d 1 } 
u 
Z 
(6) 
where: 
D(x,y,O,H') = dosage at x,y,O (receptor location) in particle- 
sec/m3 for the particle size of interest 
x = downwind distance from source to receptor, 
y = crosswind distance from source to receptor, 
u = mean wind speed, m/set, 
Q = number of particles released 
u 
Y 
= standard deviation of the wind speed in the crosswind 
direction, as a function of x and the stability class 
u 
Z 
= standard deviation of the wind speed in the vertical, 
as a function of x and the stability class 
r = reflection coefficient, the fraction of particles that 
are reflected from the ground surface 
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In order to incorporate the effect of particle fallout into our calcu- 
lations we adopted the tilted-plume method presented by Van der Hoven (Ref. 4). 
Equation (6) makes use of the effective plume height, H', given by: 
H' =H-(vs/u)x (7) 
At distances far enough downwind (oZ B1.6 H ) that mixing results in an 
m 
essentially uniform distribution of the fibers in the vertical we use: 
D(x,Y,%H') = + exp 1 
vs x (l-r) 
exp [ - 2uH 1 (8) . 
ym Y m 
Inputs to Transport Calculation 
Mixing heights were developed, as in Phase I, from climatological mean 
values (Ref. 5) adjusted for different stability classes (Ref. 6). Sensitivity 
analyses are planned to test the impact of changes in mixing height values. 
In many diffusion problems it is customary to determine the location of 
an upwind virtual point source from which a diffusing plume would have grown 
to the size computed for plume stabilization. In view of the large uncertain- 
ties in other phases of the risk calculation, and our concern with effects 
some miles downwind from the accident site, we have set the virtual point 
source directly over the accident/fire site. 
The reflection coefficient has been set equal to 1 at the inversion and to 
0.7 at the ground. 
The diffusion calculation requires input values of the dispersion para- 
meters, (5 and r~ 
Y Z’ 
as functions of the downwind distance, x, and the prevailing 
stability conditions. The standard in this case is provided by the well-known 
Pasquill-Gifford curves. Several investigators have questioned their universal 
applicability; the reader is referred to Pasquill's recent work on this subject 
(Ref. 7). In view of the fact that no generally accepted modification of the 
Pasquill-Gifford curves exists, we adopted these curves for the Phase I calcu- 
lations and continued to employ them in Phase II. 
The basic weather inputs required - surface wind speed and direction, and 
stability class - are drawn from historical data. These data were obtained 
from the National Weather Records Center for the airports we studied; the data 
provide the frequency for each combination of the three weather parameters. 
The simulation model makes a random draw of one of these combinations weighted 
by the input frequency. 
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TRANSFER OF FIBERS INTO INTERIOR OF STRUCTURES 
Method 
When a building is impinged on by a plume of carbon fibers, some of the 
fibers may enter the building through air conditioning or other ventilation 
systems and by various leakage paths. Once inside the building or enclosure, 
fibers will be removed by fallout and through leakage paths back to the out- 
side. If inside air is recirculated and filtered, additional fibers will be 
removed. The concentration of fibers that produce failure stresses on equip- 
ments in a building or enclosure at any time may be determined from equations 
describing the net flow. These have been developed in a relatively simple 
form by Slade (Ref. 4). 
In Phase I, OR1 was able to show that the "transfer function" or ratio of 
interior to exterior exposure can be expressed as: 
E V. 1 -= 
EO 
vo+avs+v (9) r 
where: 
V. 1 = rate at which fiber-borne air enters the building, or enclosure 
through both the air conditioning system and through all sources of 
leakage 
V 
0 
= rate at which fiber-borne air leaves the building, including that 
removed by recirculation 
V = fall rate of carbon fibers 
S 
V r = rate at which fibers are removed by recirculation filtering 
a = area of space subject to fallout. 
Implementation 
Equation (9) formed the principal basis for the calculation of interior 
exposure values. It was assumed that all buildings can be adequately defined 
by one or more of the following categories: 
1. Small Equipment Building or Van 
2. Medium Equipment Building 
3. Large Equipment Building or Factory 
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4. Equipment Room inside a building 
5. Utility Room 
a> filtered 
b) unfiltered 
6. Residence 
a) air conditioned 
b. not air conditioned 
7. Retail/Wholesale Establishments 
Design factors were associated with each category of building defined above. 
These design factors are used to determine the air conditioning flow rates, 
filter efficiencies, and air leakage rates used in Equation (9). Ventilation 
rates were based on standards in References 8 and 9. 
Phase I values of filter effectiveness were revised to incorporate Phase 
II experimental results. The transfer functions shown in Table I were used 
in all Phase II calculations. Specific building types were associated with 
different categories of business and industry, as described below. 
EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
Failure Model 
The probability of failure of equipment which is exposed to carbon fibers 
is obtained from the exponential expression: 
PF = 1 - exp (-E/c) (10) 
where: 
PF = probability of equipment failure 
E = exposure level in the immediate vicinity of the vulnerable 
equipment, in fiber-seconds per cubic meter 
E = average exposure causing a failure. 
During Phase I, the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aberdeen, 
Maryland determined that experimental failure data-fit an exponential failure 
law (Ref. 10). In Phase II it has been shown that, even for those equipments 
whose failures do not obey the exponential law, it is conservative to assume 
that the exponential law is obeyed. Typical values of the failure parameter 
for generic equipment types are shown in Table II. 
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The exposure used in Equation (10) is that directly impinging on the 
vulnerable equipment. When this equipment is inside a building, the interior 
exposure may be obtained from the exterior exposure by multiplying the exterior 
exposure by the appropriate transfgr function (TF). Since the transfer function 
and the mean exposure to failure, E, are constants for a particular piece of 
equipment in a particular building, we define a failure parameter: 
K ij = (TF)j/Zi (11) 
where: 
K ij = overall failure parameter for equipment of type i in a building of 
type cl 
(TF) j = penetration factor (transfer function) for a building of type j 
Ei = mean exposure to failure for equipment of type i. 
In subsequent applications, the parameter K.. 
1J 
is substituted into Equation (10) 
to give the probability of failure for equipment of type i in a building of type 
j for any exterior exposure: 
P F,ij = 1 - exp (-KijEo) (12) 
Equipment Configurations 
In treating typical equipment configurations it is convenient to develop 
expressions for the collective probability of failure of the complete configura- 
tion. In particular, if n identical equipments are in series so that a failure 
of one causes the entire "line" to fail, the probability that the line fails is: 
PF O.-m = l- (1-P F,ij) 
n 
e l- eBnKijEo (13) 
Similarly if n like equipments are in parallel, so that the operation fails 
only if all equipments fail, the aggregate probability of failure is: 
PF(Operation) = Pi ij , (14) 
The computer program that determines the impact of each simulated aircraft acci- 
dent and associated release of graphite fibers uses Equations (12), (13), (14) to 
160 
estimate the probability that each business or industry in the geographical 
area of interest is affected. 
One of the major efforts in Phase I was the characterization of each 
business-industry sector, defined by an SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
number, by a specific set of equipments installed in a specific building. This 
effort was extended and made more detailed in Phase II. A complete basic 
equipment configuration is shown in Figure 4; in any particular facility one or 
more portions of this configuration may not be present. In addition, the 
equipment "suit" is made specific to plant size (small, medium, or large). An 
example will illustrate the method. A large plant in Category 28A (comprising 
all 3-digit SIC code numbers under 28, basically chemical and allied products) 
has an internal power interface characterized by one set of input power service 
equipment, one distribution panel, and auxiliary power equipment. Its common 
module consists of two computers in parallel and two keyboard display units in 
parallel. The plant has 25 lines in its distributed module. Each line consists 
of: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 high-voltage power supply units 
5 interface units 
5 manual controllers 
5 minicomputers, used as controllers 
2 high-voltage motor controllers 
2 machine station servo-mechanisms 
1 heater control unit 
5 sensor units. 
Similar configurations were defined for all vulnerable categories of business 
and industry. The data was developed as a result of an extensive literature 
search, augmented by site visits during Phases I and II. The different build- 
ing types defined in Table I are related to the different modules of each type 
of vulnerable business and industry. For example, Table III associates the 
different building types with the major sections (modules) of plants of 
different size in Category 28A. 
Computer Implementation 
The mean exposure-to-failure values for several of the generic equipments 
defined above are summarized in Table II. In using these inputs the 
equipment-specific value of E was combined with the building-specific transfer 
function, in accordance with Equation (11). In order to estimate the impact 
on specific business and industrial complexes it was assumed that the plant is 
down if electric power is lost inside the plant, if the common module fails, or 
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if more than one half of the "lines" in the distributed module fail. Since 
Phase II results reported by other investigators indicated that the high- 
voltage power supply system is essentially invulnerable, it was assumed that an 
equivalent piece of equipment representing the output bushings and buss of a 
step-down transformer could be used to represent the possibility of an exterior 
power supply failure. 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
Scope of Calculation 
This section of the paper presents ORI's Phase II methodology for 
determining the costs associated with equipment failures. The most significant 
changes to the Phase I methodology were introduced in this part of the risk 
assessment calculation. Three categories of cost were defined for business and 
industry impacts: 
0 Repair of damaged electrical equipment 
0 Facility cleanup 
0 Business/industry disruption. - 
In the Phase I risk assessment, attention was focussed on the latter cost 
category using an expected value technique. In Phase II the model has been 
expanded to treat all the above categories explicitly, while disruption costs 
are now computed by a Monte Carlo process. Household equipment failures are 
treated as in Phase I. A completely new module has been introduced to compute 
the cost incurred due to repair of damaged avionics equipment. 
Repair Costs 
A repair cost was defined for each generic type of equipment shown in 
Table II. Categories of business and industry were defined by SIC code 
(primarily at the three-digit level) as well as by size. As described in 
the preceding section each facility has a specific number of each equip- 
ment type. The model computes the probability of failure for each type 
of equipment at a particular location; the number that fail is determined 
in a Monte Carlo random draw. Model inputs include the equipment repair 
costs. The product of the number that fail and the repair cost yields 
the repair costs associated with that kind of equipment at that location. 
Facility Clean-Up Costs 
Estimates of facility clean up costs were made for different businesses 
and industries on the basis of type of business and size of plant. Using 
information gained during the Phase II site visits it was estimated that the 
decision to institute a special plant-wide clean up would be made on the basis 
of evidence of major impact of the presence of carbon fibers. Accordingly, it 
is assumed that an intensive plant cleanup is implemented whenever the plant 
is shut down due to equipment failures, as described below. 
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Dislocation Cost 
It was assumed that a plant or place of business would be shut down if 
power is lost, the common module fails, or more than half of the production 
lines fail. This determination is made for each plant in one SIC-code group 
at the location. In contrast to Phase I, then, we determined plant closings 
on a plant-by-plant basis, rather than employing an expected-value algorithm. 
The fraction of.an industry or business shut down was estimated by comput- 
ing the employee-weighted fraction of production lost. The method may be ex- 
pressed as: 
c (No. of Empl.) SIC, Size x (No. of Plants Shut)SIC Size 
Size , 
FmCeSIC = .----. ---_--i.----.----~ 
c (No. of Empl) SIC, Size x (No. Of Plants)SIC Size Size , 
(15) 
The risk assessment model assumes that the impact of a carbon fiber incident 
on the economy can be measured by the fraction of the local GDP allocated to a 
particular industry over the period of time that the industry is "down." We 
assumed that the down time would be of the order of one day. The impact in 
dollars is then calculated by using this result in the following algorithm: 
c (Local Payroll)SIC 
cost = K SIC GDP 
(National Payroll)SIC 
SICFCSIC 
(16) 
National-level inputs from the Department of Commerce provide the national 
payroll broken out by SIC number and the Gross Domestic Product broken out 
by SIC number. Available data for counties surrounding the particular 
airport include payroll for each SIC-coded business and industry. The 
factor K adjusts the result for the fraction of a year the plant remains 
shut, since the other data is typically annual. 
Household Impact 
The method used in Phase II is essentially the same as that employed in 
Phase I. We define the fraction of households in an area that are air condi- 
tioned (FAC) and use the methods previously described to estimate the failure 
probability of vulnerable equipment in air conditioned and non-air conditioned 
households. The latter calculation includes both the failure and ventilation 
parameters. If the resulting failure probabilities are PF Ac in the air con- 
ditioned household and PF NAc in the non-air conditioned h:usehold, then the 
, 
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estimated cost to repair all damaged equipments of a particular class at all 
households is given by: 
Repair Cost x Number of Households x Number of Equipments per 
Household (PF ACFAC + PF NAc (1 - FAC)) 
, , 
The locations and numbers of residential units were obtained from the Bureau 
of Census publication, County and City Data Book. Based on the latest 
experimental evidence our attention was limited to household television and 
high fidelity equipment, while updated Phase II ventilation data were used. 
Geographical Area Specification 
As in Phase I, county-based economic data was adopted for computer input; in 
many cases counties were divided into smaller, homogeneous geographical units. 
In each case the center of the county or sub-county geographical unit was 
selected and a representative circle inscribed within the area. The input 
data set includes the coordinates of the center and the associated radius. 
The exposure and resulting impact calculations are made at the center and 
points a distance equal to two-thirds of the radius to the east, west, north, 
and south of the center. In each case the county-based business/industry 
sites are uniformly distributed over these five points. The concept is 
illustrated schematically in Figure 5, as applied to one county for the 
Washington National Airport risk calculations. In all cases this method was 
applied to the area around each airport to a distance of 80 km or more. 
Aircraft Vulnerability 
In Phase I, OR1 concluded that key airport operations were relatively 
invulnerable due to the many designed redundancies in the system. The analysis 
did not cover the risk to aircraft on the ground at the time of the accident. 
Because of safety-of-flight, as well as other factors, it was decided that an 
investigation should be made of the risk to aircraft on the ground, at 
passenger gates and maintenance locations. This was initiated in Phase II, and 
focussed on failures of avionics equipment. In a cooperative effort the air- 
craft manufacturers analyzed data to determine the number of aircraft expected 
to be at passenger boarding gates and at maintenance locations on the airport 
by day and night. This was done for the nine airports previously selected as 
representative (with a bias toward the busier airports). The 1978 data were 
extrapolated to the 1993 time frame, based on estimated fleet changes. For 
aircraft at each location a survey was made to provide estimates of the 
fraction of time each aircraft is in each of several defined ventilation modes. 
Transfer functions were estimated for each of these ventilation modes, for each 
of several locations on board small, medium, and large aircraft. The latter 
data, together with mean-exposure-to-failure values for typical avionics equip- 
ment enabled us to estimate the probability of failure of each of several 
generic classes of avionics equipment on board each aircraft. 
A summary of key avionics equipment input data is shown in Table IV. The 
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aircraft vulnerability module first randomly determines whether the accident 
occurred during day or night; it then selects the number of each size air- 
craft at representative gate and maintenance locations. The model aggregates 
each type of vulnerable equipment over all aircraft in one size range, and 
randomly determines, based on the input probabilities, the number of equip- 
ments in that category in each ventilation mode (transfer function value). 
The model computes failure probabilities and randomly determines the number of 
equipments that fail for the computed exterior exposure at each location. With 
the input repair costs we then determine the total cost. These steps are 
illustrated in the flow chart appearing as Figure 6. 
Costing Summary 
At one geographical location the model computes business-industry impact 
as the sum of costs of equipment repair, facility cleanup, and business dis- 
ruption. At those locations defined as residential centers the model computes 
the total cost due to household equipment failures. At the airport the model 
computes costs required to repair failed avionics equipment. Summary results 
for each simulated accident present the total of costs in each of these three 
major categories, obtained by adding the costs over all geographical locations 
that were affected by the accident. 
RESULTS OF AIRPORT SIMULATIONS 
Basic Results 
The simulation model was run for the nine airports previously studied in 
Phase I, and listed below: 
O'Hare/Chicago 
John F. Kennedy/New York City 
Washington National Airport/Washington, D.C. 
Lambert/St. Louis 
LaGuardia/New York City 
Logan/Boston 
Hartsfield/Atlanta 
Miami International/Miami 
Philadelphia International/Philadelphia. 
Figure 7 illustrates, schematically, the results provided by the simulation 
of randomly selected accidents. The data for one sample accident is shown 
in Figure 8. Randomly selected accident and weather parameters are indicated. 
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In this accident all impacts were limited to Queens County, represented by 
the circle, where the average exposure was 3.5 x 104 fiber-seconds per cubic 
meter. Damage to households there totalled $533; business impact was $37,177, 
of which $5,600 was equipment repair cost and $31,577 was due to business 
closings. 
For each airport the number of samples (replications) was selected so 
that at least 2500 accidents were simulated. In this section of the paper 
several examples of the results are presented. The accident results are 
summarized in Table V. The table shows that the airports near relatively 
small centers of population tend to have somewhat less costly accidents. The 
damage to avionics equipment appears to be small at all airports; the largest 
single impact on avionics in all simulated accidents was $3,910 at Kennedy 
Airport. 
Risk profiles were computed for all of the airports. Examples of several 
are shown in Figure 9. We first note that O'Hare/Chicago, the nation's 
busiest airport has a risk profile that shows that the probability of exceeding 
$10,000 in total CF-related impact is approximately .0004. For St. Louis, 
the corresponding probability is approximately .OOOl (one in 10,000). In 
comparing the risk profiles shown in Figure 9, it should be noted that O'Hare 
Airport is a high traffic airport serving a major urban area; Atlanta's air- 
port is also one of the busiest in the nation, while its population concen- 
tration is somewhat smaller. St. Louis is characterized as both a low-traffic 
airport and a relatively low population concentration. 
Accuracy/Sensitivity Test Results 
Several special analyses were conducted. We computed statistical 
confidence limits for the risk profiles. In Phase I it was shown that the 95% 
confidence limits could be expressed as: 
P+2 
J 
P(l-P) 
n 
where p is the computed exceedance probability after simulating n samples. 
Figure 10 shows the Washington National Airport risk profile with the 95% 
confidence limits. The confidence limits apply to the purely statistical 
nature of the simulation, and not to the impact of errors in input data. The 
results do show that conclusions based on the risk profiles need not be 
altered because of inherent statistical uncertainty. 
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An example of sensitivity testing that can be conducted with the OR1 risk 
assessment model is shown in Figure 11. In this figure, two O'Hare/Chicago 
risk profiles are compared: the best estimate in which the mean amount of 
composite per aircraft is 2803 kilograms, and a "worst case" in which all air- 
craft operating at O'Hare are assumed to be large jets with the maximum 
composite considered for any aircraft, 15,600 kilograms. The comparison shows 
the significant impact of the increased carbon fiber. Even in this case, 
however, the probability of exceeding $10,000 in annual damages in only about 
.005 (five in a thousand). 
To test the effect of increasing the sample size the O'Hare/Chicago 
simulations were run for 22,000 and 44,000 annual samples, resulting in 2537 
and 5038 accidents respectively. The outputs are compared in Table VI. The 
44,000-sample case indicates that a significantly larger extreme value 
occurred, The risk profile results are, however, quite similar. 
NATIONAL RISK 
Method 
In order to estimate the total national risk the set of airports for which 
the individual risk profiles were obtained was used to represent the entire 
United States. This set of airports accounts for approximately one-third of 
the nation's commercial traffic. Since they are predominately large, busy 
airports, this method overestimates the national risk. A random number of 
accidents is generated for a one-year replication at the national level. 
Individual accidents are allocated to airports on the basis of that airport's 
share of the total traffic. Instead of "replaying" the simulation for each 
airport we saved the individual accident results from the single airport 
simulations. For each airport that an accident is allocated to, the national 
model draws an accident at random from that airport's accidents that were 
simulated previously. Figure 12 is a flow chart for this calculation. 
Results 
The results of the calculation, using results from the individual air- 
ports, and the weighting factors described above, indicate a maximum annual 
impact for business and industry of $274,000, with a mean of $466. For 
avionics impact the results are $3,900 and $2, respectively. The national 
risk profile with the 95% statistical confidence limits is shown in Figure 13. 
In Figure 14 the Phase I and Phase II results are compared, showing that the 
new Phase II inputs result in a greatly reduced estimated risk. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
ORI, Inc. has developed a versatile generally applicable risk assessment 
simulation model. Using the best available data - we have assessed the risk 
associated with the use of carbon fiber composite material in commercial air- 
craft. Confidence in model-generated results is relatively high, based on 
examination of the statistical confidence limits, model stability, and 
sensitivity tests. As a result we conclude that the use of carbon fiber 
composite material in commercial aircraft structures constitutes a relatively 
low risk. 
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TABLE I. - VALUES OF TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR TYPICAL ENCLOSURES 
Enclosure 
Category 
1. Small Equipment Building or Van 
2. Medium Equipment Building 
3. Large Equipment Building or Factory 
Building (per floor) 
Transfer 
Function 
.012 
.OlO 
.004 
4. Equipment Room in Building (one exterior wall) .OlO 
-- 
Filtered .023 
5. Utility Room 
Non-Filtered .094 
Air Conditioned .058 
6. Residence 
Non-air Conditioned .a4 
7. Retail/Wholesale Establishment .004 
, 
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TABLE II. - MEAN EXPOSURE TO FAILURE (z) FOR TYPICAL GENERIC EQUIPMENTS 
(Fiber-Seconds per Cubic Meter) 
Equipment 
High-voltage Power Supply 
Interface Unit 
Manual Controller 
Computer ("Standard Size") 
Keyboard-Display Unit 
High-voltage Motor Controller 
Machine Station Servo-Controller 
Sensor 
Power Distribution Panel 
Switchgear 
Auxiliary Generator 
E 
lo8 
lo8 
lo8 
lo7 
lo8 
lo8 
lo8 
lo7 
108 
lo8 
106 
171 
TABLE III. - ASSOCIATION OF PARTICULAR BUILDING TYPES* 
WITH INDUSTRIAL FACILITY FOR SIC 28 - CHEMICAL 
ANTI ALLIED PRODUCTS 
Plant Size 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
* SEE TABLE I 
5b 3 5b 4 
5b 3 - 
5b 2 - 
DISTRIBUTED 
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TABLE IV. - AIRCRAFT AVIONICS EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATIONS WITH FAILURE AN-D COST 
INPUTS 
Aircraft 
Size 
Small 
Medium 
& 
Large 
Avionics 
Equipment 
ID No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Number on 
Aircraft 
38 
7 
6 
2 
1 
18 
26 
24 
153 
4 
22 
43 
3 
2 
4 
E Repair 
(Failure cost 
Parameter*) ($1 
108 100 
1.5 x lo7 100 
lo8 450 
1.5 x lo7 450 
lo8 300 
lo8 50 
1.5 x lo7 215 
lo8 220 
lo8 175 
lo8 250 
lo8 210 
lo8 385 
lo8 530 
lo8 1295 
lo8 1665 
*In fiber-seconds per cubic meter. 
173 
TA
BL
E 
V.
 
- 
R
ES
U
LT
S 
FO
R
 S
IM
U
LA
TE
D
 A
C
C
ID
EN
TS
 A
T 
N
IN
E 
AI
R
PO
R
TS
 (
19
76
 
D
O
LL
AR
S)
 
M
ea
n 
Ai
rp
or
t 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
Bu
sl
ln
d.
 
Av
io
ni
cs
 
At
la
nt
a 
1 
70
 
2 
Bo
st
on
 
2 
15
2 
0 
W
as
h.
 
N
at
’l.
 
5 
31
0 
0 
Ke
nn
ed
y 
11
 
19
9 
3 
La
G
ua
rd
ia
 
11
 
37
3 
0 
M
ia
m
i 
2 
28
 
1 
C
hi
ca
go
 
6 
16
2 
1 
Ph
ila
de
lp
hi
a 
7 
19
2 
0 
St
. 
Lo
ui
s 
2 
67
 
0 
M
ea
n 
of
 
10
 W
or
st
 
14
,2
38
 
35
,8
18
 
62
,4
97
 
32
,5
44
 
56
,1
86
 
7,
56
6 
32
,5
10
 
28
,9
71
 
13
,7
79
 
N
O
TE
: 
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
25
00
 
ac
ci
de
nt
s 
si
m
ul
at
ed
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
ai
rp
or
t. 
TABLE VI. - 1993 CHICAGO/O'HARE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SETS OF SIMULATIONS 
22,000 
Samples 
44,000 
Samples 
No. of Accidents 2537 5038 
Mean Accident $147 $166 
Worst Accident $54,000 $110,299 
P > $1,000 .000955 .OOl 11 
P>$10,000 .000545 .000545 
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PHASE I 
___ ~-~~-~~ 
Analysis 
Experiments 
Model 
PHASE II 
Figure l.- Conceptual relationship of Phases I 
and II - OR1 carbon fiber risk assessment 
program. 
1st Accident 
Do 
stats 
Figure 2.- Flow chart for OR1 airport risk model. 
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Accident with Fire 
* 
Release of CF 
+ 
Plume 
4 
Transport & Diffusion 
4 
Transfer Inside 
4 
Equipment Failures 
4 
cost 
Figure 3.- Events in aircraft accident scenario 
replicated in each accident simulation. 
POWER MODULE 1 COMMON MODULE I DISTRIBUTED MODULE 
I I 
I 
I 
Drimsru - 
i + Computer + 
1 
Distribution ’ 
Panel + 
I 
I* 
Computer + 
/ 
I 
I +L.tLJlt+l-I 
I 
I 
Figure 4.- Schematic electric power flow in typical business/industry facility. 
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Commercial and ROIldenthl 
lNDUSTRlAL SUES 
Figure 5.- Definition of areas at risk for Washington National Airport. Howard 
County, Maryland, outlined in upper map, shown in detail in lower map. Cir- 
cles represent concentrations of business, industry, and residences. 
This Time. Location 
This Size AIC 
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Figure 6.- Flow chart for modeling avionics equipment failures. 
. . II , ,, I 
SAMPLE ACCIDENl \IRCRAFT 
:ATEGOR’r 
4CCIDENl 
TYPE WEATHER FAILURES CONSEQUENCES COSTS 
Figure 7.- Schematic illustration of detailed simulation results. 
Accident 
A/C Type 16 - 
Large Jet, 3000 Kg Composite 
Take-Off 
Release = 1.3 x 1010 Fibers 
Plume Height 100 m 
Figure 8.- Factors associated with one randomly generated accident 
at Kennedy Airport. Airplane indicates airport location; aster- 
isk indicates accident location. 
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Exceedance 
Probability 
.Ol 
,001 
.ooo 1 
.00001 
100 
I I 
1,000 10,000 100,000 
Annual Cost ($4 
Figure 9.- 1993 risk profiles for selected airports. 
ORD is O'Hare/Chicago; ATL is Hartsfield/Atlanta; 
STL is Lambert/St. Louis. 
Exceedance 
Probability 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure lO.- 1993 risk profile for Washington National Airport 
with 95 percent statistical confidence limits. 
180 
.0001 - 
100 1,000 10,000 100,000 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure ll.- 1993 risk profiles for O'Hare/Chicago. 
Comparison of best-estimate with "worst case" 
in which all aircraft are large jets with maxi- 
mum carbon fiber. 
Generate Random No. of 
Accidents in U.S. this Sample 
Accident to Airport 
I Draw Random Accident from File for the Selected Airport I 
Figure 12.- Flow chart for computing national risk. 
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Probability 
.l 
\ 
\ 
\ 
100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1 ,ooo,ooo 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure 13.- 1993 national risk profile with 95 percent 
statistical confidence limits. 
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.OOOl 
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Phase I x 
t 
100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1 ,ooo,ooo 10,000,000 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure 14.- Comparison of Phase I and II national risk profiles. 
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ASSESSMENT OF RISK DDE TO THE USE OF CARBON FIBER 
COMPOSITES IN COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION 
J. Fiksel, D. Rosenfield and A. Kalelkar 
Arthur D. Little, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
Arthur D. Little has been working with NASA for two years in an effort to 
assess the risks to the nation posed by the potential usage of carbon fiber com- 
posites in aviation. Last year at this time we presented the results of a Phase 
1 study which estimated the national risk through 1993 due to the potential use 
of carbon fiber composites in air carrier aircraft. Since then we have performed 
a number of modifications and revisions to that initial assessment, as shown in 
Figure 1. The Phase 2 enhancements included refinements in several areas: 
dispersion models, facility vulnerability analyses, CF release conditions, and 
risks due to CF usage in general aviation and in surface transportation vehicles. 
Our presentation is divided into two parts: I will speak on the risks for 
commercial aviation and Dr. Donald Rosenfield will then discuss our findings for 
general aviation. The risks due to surface transportation will be addressed by 
Drs. Hergenrother and Hathaway of the D0T.l 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION RISK ASSESSMENT 
The objectives of the commercial aviation risk assessment are shown in 
Figure 2. The ultimate objective was the assessment of national risk. To meet 
this objective, several related objectives were formulated. In order to quanti- 
fy the amount of carbon fiber that could be found on aircraft, we were required 
to project the potential usage of carbon fiber composites in commercial aircraft 
through 1993. In order to estimate the frequency with which such fibers could 
be released, we were required to investigate the incidence of commercial air- 
craft accidents with fire and explosion, in terms of both their location and 
frequency. In order to describe the physical mechanisms whereby fibers could 
be released and dispersed over the surrounding area, we had to develop disper- 
sion models. A related objective was to estimate the potential economic losses 
in situations where the accidentally released carbon fibers were able to pene- 
trate buildings and equipment cabinets, creating damaging short circuits. In 
addition, we were required to explicitly show the uncertainties in the assump- 
tions that entered into the risk analysis, and to test the sensitivity of the 
risk profile to those input parameters. 
The sequence of events that needed to be modeled in order to describe the 
phenomenon of carbon fiber risk is shown in Figure 3. Air carrier operations 
will occasionally result in accidental fires and/or explosions. If the aircraft 
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is carrying carbon fiber composites in the structure, then some of these fibers 
may be burned away by an intense fire, will rise in the convection plume and 
will be dispersed over a large area, depending upon the atmospheric conditions 
and the wind direction. If there are buildings or other facilities located in 
the path of the carbon fiber cloud, and if these buildings contain electronic 
equipment which is potentially vulnerable to the fibers, then there is a possi- 
bility that they will penetrate these buildings, damage the equipment and thus 
result in economic losses to the residents or proprietors of these facilities. 
We will separately address each of the steps involved in this sequence of events 
and show how we analyzed them. 
Carbon Fiber Usage 
In order to describe the usage of carbon fiber composites in aircraft, we 
divided the commercial aircraft into three categories of jets--small, medium 
and large jets. Each of the jet aircraft produced by the major airframe manu- 
facturers was assigned to one of these classes. We did not consider other 
classes of aircraft,such as turbo-props,since there is not expected to be a 
great deal of carbon fiber usage for these type of aircraft. The projections 
for carbon fiber usage in commercial aircraft are shown in Figure 4. These are 
based on estimates obtained from the three major U.S. airframe manufacturers, 
McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed and Boeing. They estimated both the fleet mix, 
that is the relative numbers of different sizes of aircraft in service in 1993, 
and the potential usage of carbon fiber composites for each of these classes. 
As indicated in Figure 4, roughly half of the aircraft in service in 1993 will 
be large jets, the majority of which will be using carbon fiber composites. The 
projected weight of actual carbon fibers, including the epoxy binding,ranges 
from only 11 kg. on some of the small aircraft to as much as 15 600 kg. on some 
of the large aircraft. For the purposes of the risk analysis we used these es- 
timated ranges to develop a probability distribution for the amount of carbon 
fiber involved in an aircraft accident. 
To characterize air carrier activity within the U.S. as a whole, we focused 
upon the 26 large hub airports which account for approximately 70% of domestic 
passenger enplanements. As shown in Figure 5, the balance of the passenger 
traffic in the U.S. is accounted for by 40 medium hub airports and a large num- 
ber of small hub airports. Only about 3% of total commercial passenger enplane- 
ments occur at airports other than these hub airports designated by the F.A.A. 
Our approach was to study in detail the traffic patterns and the exposed popu- 
lation in the vicinity of the 26 large hubs and then to extrapolate the result- 
ing risk estimates to the rest of the nation. 
Accident Conditions 
The typical conditions surrounding a severe fire and/or explosion in the 
case of an air carrier accident were investigated through use of the National 
Transportation Safety Board accident and incident statistics for the years 1968- 
1976. Using their records, we created a data base of aircraft accidents that 
listed for each accident the phase of operation, the location of the accident, 
the weather conditions at the time of the accident, the nature of the fire, and 
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other relevant details. This data base was augmented with the help of the air- 
frame manufacturers who provided additional data on accident characteristics, 
such as fire duration, that would affect carbon fiber release conditions. We 
then utilized these data to determine the distribution of possible accident char- 
acteristics. We found that almost half of the severe accidents involving fire 
occurred during the landing phase. As shown in Figure 6, the take-off phase ac- 
counts for one-quarter of these accidents, with the remainder being distributed 
in either the static/taxi or cruise phase. Cruise accidents were dealt with 
through a separate analysis since the location of these accidents is essentially 
random. However, the static, take-off or landing accidents were all associated 
with specific airport locations. 
From an analysis of the location of accidents relative to airport runways, 
we found that over 80% of accidents occur within 10 kilometers of the airport, 
and in fact 60% of accidents occur at the airport. We also investigated the 
angle between the accident location and the line of the runway to establish more 
precisely the potential locations of such accidents. 
Historically, there have been about 3.8 accidents per year involving jet 
air carriers. Alt:hough air carrier operations are gradually.increasing in num- 
ber, the accident frequency appears to be relatively constant from year to year. 
Therefore, we did not project any increase in accidents through 1993. Based on 
the expected fraction of the air carrier fleet that would be carrying carbon 
fiber in 1993, the projected frequency of incidents involving fire on aircraft 
carrying composites of carbon fibers would be approximately 2.7 per year in 1993. 
Release and Dispersion 
There are two different types of scenarios that describe possible carbon 
fiber release situations in the aftermath of an air carrier incident. One of 
them is a simple fire plume in which the fibers are carried aloft by the plume 
and then dispersed. The second is the fire and explosion case in which there is 
a sudden rapid conflagration of fuel resembling an explosion, in which much 
more rapid burning of composite and a sudden release of fibers can take place 
over a short period of time. Based on the 92 accident data base compiled by the 
airframe manufacturers, we estimated conservatively that at most 5% of air car- 
rier accidents would result in explosive release of carbon fibers of the type 
described. 
The two dispersion models corresponding to the two accident and carbon fi- 
ber release scenarios are shown graphically in Figure 7. In the fire and explo- 
sion case, we consider only those accidents in which there was a delayed explo- 
sion preceded by a period of burn during which the epoxy or resin surrounding 
the fibers would be burned away. This would expose the carbon fibers to an 
agitation by the force of the conflagration and thus would hypothetically result 
in a larger number of single fibers released. This scenario was modeled as an 
instantaneous release in the form of a cloud at a height of 10 meters above the 
site of the accident. In the fire plume model, rather than having an instanta- 
neous release,we have a continuous release of fibers over the period that the 
aircraft burns. The carbon fiber plume rises until it meets the inversion layer 
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and then is tilted or reflected back toward the ground. The direction and 
velocity of the wind determine the exposure contour over which carbon fibers 
will be deposited. 
The extent of dispersion of carbon fibers from a burning aircraft and the 
level of resulting exposures to the surrounding area are greatly influenced by 
the release conditions at the time of the accident. Release conditions include 
the weather conditions, such as atmospheric stability class, wind velocity and 
wind direction. These were examined at each of the 26 major airports with the 
help of NOAA statistics. However, it was more difficult to estimate the release 
conditions associated with the duration and the intensity of the fire. With the 
help of the 92 accident data base compiled by the airframe manufacturers we were 
able to develop distributions for several of the important release variables, as 
shown in Figure 8. These included the time of burn--that is, the duration over 
which the fire lasted, the percent of fuel burned,and the percent of carbon fi-. 
ber involved. Our approach to estimating CF involvement is described below. 
The degree of carbon fiber involvement was correlated with both the duration of 
the fire and the percent of fuel burned. Roughly speaking, the greater the 
amount of fuel burned, the longer the duration of the burn, and the greater the 
potential carbon fiber involvement. In addition, the amount of fuel on board 
was estimated for different phases of operation and different aircraft size cate- 
gories, and the amount of carbon fibers on board was estimated for the three 
size classes of aircraft. This allowed calculation of the actual amount of fuel 
burned and the actual amount of carbon fiber involved. 
Even though an aircraft may be carrying over 15 000 kg. of CF composite, 
the amount of carbon fibers that could be released in a fire is significantly 
less, partly because of the fact that not all the carbon fibers can be released 
as single fibers in a burn, and partly because the entire aircraft structure 
will not necessarily be involved in the fire. 
Based on experimental findings, which were described by Dr. Vernon Be11,'it 
is estimated that not more than 1% of the carbon fibers would be released in 
most fire plumes, and that not more than 2.5% would be released in most fire and 
explosion scenarios. These are conservative estimates using the best judgment 
and interpretation of the experiments conducted by NASA and other groups on 
burning composite materials. 
To examine structure involvement, we used the results of an analysis by 
the airframe manufacturers, who estimated the amount of structure that could be 
involved in a fire for various components of their aircraft. Using the data 
base of 92 fire incidents, they estimated the percent of each component that was 
involved in the fire, thus creating a distribution of potential structural in- 
volvement. As shown in Figure 9, we combined the structural damage estimates 
with the projected usage of carbon fibers by component (also developed by the 
airframe manufacturers) to produce estimates of the potential carbon fiber in- 
volvement in air carrier fires. The range of involvement varied from zero, 
reflecting a fire which did not damage any of the structure containing carbon 
fibers, to 100% involvement in which all portions of the aircraft containing 
CF were completely involved in the fire. Our median estimates of carbon fiber 
involvement were 45% for small jets, 69% for medium jets, and 64% for large 
jets. This variation is due largely to the different levels of CF usage in the 
different aircraft size classes. 
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Exposure Contours and Demographics 
A simplified illustration of'exposure contours is shown in Figure 10. Note 
that the aircraft runway here has not been drawn to scale. Assuming that an 
Iincident is located at some distance from.the runway, the carbon fiber cloud 
will move in the direction of the wind and may travel for distances of as much 
as 80 kilometers. The exposure is a measure of concentration over time, and as 
we move farther from the incident location, the exposures to carbon fibers will 
tend to decrease. Figure10 shows three exposure contours corresponding to expo- 
sures of 105, 104, and lo3 fiber-sec./m3. In our simulation approach we 
applied the appropriate dispersion model to each simulated accident and calcu- 
lated the resulting exposures at various points surrounding the incident loca- 
tion. The physical mechanisms underlying carbon fiber dispersion have been 
described thoroughly by Dr. Wolf Elber.3 
In order to assess the potential damage due to such a release, we performed 
a demographic and facility analysis for each of the 26 major airports. Upon 
each of these airports we superimposed a circular grid as shown in Figure 11, 
which divided the area surrounding the airport into 40 geographic sectors of 
varying sizes. The edge of the outside sectors was 80 kilometers from the air- 
port center. Using the results of the selected dispersion model for each simu- 
lated accident, we calculated an exposure distribution within each of these 
sectors. That is, we estimated the proportion of each sector that experienced 
an exposure of lo*, log, etc. We also enumerated the facilities, residences 
and other structures containing potentially vulnerable electronic equipment with- 
in each of these sectors, using census data and other sources. The categories 
of vulnerable facilities that were considered are shown in Figure 12. They 
included households, or private residences; manufacturers of electronic equipment, 
computers and aerospace equipment, as well as manufacturers of non-electronic 
equipment whose production control systems might be vulnerable; transportation, 
including aircraft and air traffic controls, mass transit,and railways; communi- 
cation facilities including telephone, radio, TV and micro-wave installations, and 
post offices, in particular the optical character reading equipment; and fire 
and police communications. In terms of business services, we included in our 
enumeration financial and insurance services, software and electronic data pro- 
cessing services, as well as hospitals. We also enumerated retail outlets and 
office buildings, which could contain varying amounts of electronic equipment. 
Because of the widespread use of electronics in contemporary society, and because 
of the tremendous growth rate envisioned for electronics in 1993, it was neces- 
sary in this risk analysis to consider almost every category of private or pub- 
lic building as being potentially vulnerable. We examined the properties of 
such buildings in terms of penetration, ventilation and filtration and concluded 
that some of them were not very vulnerable, for example, hospitals. The results 
of our facility site visits and vulnerability analysis have been presented by 
Ansel Butterfield.4 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
I have described the various elements of our analysis which provide 
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the necessary inputs for a Monte Carlo simulation. These data inputs included 
the accident characteristics, the release conditions, the dispersion model, and 
the characteristics of vulnerable facilities. Once these elements had been 
assembled, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation of potential aircraft accidents 
at each of the 26 large hub airports. We used the Monte Carlo method to develop 
an individual risk profile for each airport,and then these risk profiles were 
combined into a national risk profile. (A risk profile is a graph indicating 
the probability of exceeding various levels of dollar loss.) Figure 13 shows 
the Monte Carlo procedure for an individual airport. Each point at which a 
question mark is shown denotes a random draw from an input distribution. These 
distributions were developed through the analyses discussed previously. 
The Monte Carlo procedure works in the following manner: It simulates a 
large number of accidents, on the order of hundreds or thousands of accidents, 
and for each one draws from probability distributions a set of conditions for 
that accident. By repeating the simulation many times, we show the full range 
of possible accident types and thus develop a distribution of the potential 
accident results. As shown in Figure 13, the aircraft and incident details, 
such as the size of the plane and the phase of the operation,are randomly drawn, 
and these in turn influence the probable accident location, the likelihood of a 
delayed explosion, and the assumed release conditions. 
If an explosion does occur, which happens about 5% of the time, then the 
fire and explosion model is selected, whereas if it does not occur, the fire 
plume model is selected to compute exposures. The weather conditions such as 
stability class and wind velocity are drawn from weather distributions for the 
particular airport in question,and these together with the release conditions 
determine the exposures resulting from the dispersion model. These exposures 
are then calculated at a large number of points within the 40-sector grid and an 
exposure distribution is found for each sector. From this exposure distribution 
we use the penetration and vulnerability characteristics of the facilities ex- 
posed, and an economic analysis model which estimates the economic losses result- 
ing for each affected facility. The losses are then summed to determine the 
total economic losses resulting from the simulated accident. Once this is com- 
plete, the computer returns and simulates another accident, drawing a new set of 
aircraft/incident details. This procedure was repeated iteratively until enough 
samples had been taken to get a reasonably accurate distribution of the economic 
losses resulting from an accident. In this way we developed 26 individual risk 
profiles for the large hub airports. 
An example of the outcome of a typical computer simulation is shown in 
Figure 14. In this case, the computer generated a hypothetical accident at La 
Guardia airport, relatively close to the center of a runway. The aircraft in- 
volved was a medium jet in a static or taxi phase, which somehow caught fire. 
About 8500 kg. of fuel were burned over a period of more than thirty minutes, 
releasing 22 kg. of carbon fibers. There was also a delayed explosion during 
the burn. Based upon the randomly drawn weather conditions, the CF cloud moved 
westward, toward New York City, creating exposures as high as lOa fiber-seconds 
per cubic meter at the airport, and lo7 fiber-sec./m3 within 3 km. of the air- 
port. The resulting losses due to equipment failures amounted to a total of 
$178, of which households accounted for $66. By performing hundreds of itera- 
tions like this one, the computer generated a risk profile for La Guardia air- 
port. 
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The next task was to derive the national risk profile. This was done by 
combining the individual risk profiles with information concerning potential 
losses due to cruise accidents and accidents at airports other than the 26 
considered. 
Risk Profile Development 
We developed two kinds of national risk profiles in this analysis. One of 
them was the risk profile for a single incident, which gave the distribution of 
dollar losses resulting from any one air carrier accident. This was derived by 
taking a weighted mixture of the individual airport risk profiles for a single 
incident, weighted by the frequency of incidents at each airport. This proced- 
ure is shown in Figure 15. The second type of national risk profile derived was 
the national annual risk profile which showed the distribution of total losses 
due to accidents involving carbon fibers. This annual risk profile incorporates 
the possibility of one, two, three or more accidents involving carbon fiber re- 
lease during any given year. To derive the annual risk profile we used the 
national risk profile for a single incident and performed a convolution proced- 
ure based on the annual frequency of such accidents. 
Before proceeding to the results of the risk analysis, it is important to 
note the major assumptions that entered into this analysis. The most important 
assumptions are listed in Figure 16. First, atmospheric conditions are assumed 
to remain constant during the dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud. This is a 
somewhat unrealistic assumption since weather conditions are constantly changing, 
and a cloud moving at a rate of a few kilometers per hour could take as much as 
a day to cover 80 kilometers. However, it would be too complex to simulate dif- 
ferent atmospheric conditions in different geographic sectors, and therefore 
this assumption was made. The assumption is not expected to introduce any bias 
into the risk analysis since the variation of atmospheric conditions will some- 
times increase and sometimes decrease the resulting exposures. We also assumed 
that there was no precipitation, which is a conservative assumption since if pre- 
cipitation does occur it may wash out some of the fibers, resulting in lower 
airborne exposures on the ground. It was found that there was a high likelihood 
of rain or other forms of precipitation being associated with an aircraft acci- 
dent, since many of the accidents in the historical data base occurred in IFR, 
or instrument flight rules weather. The second major assumption is that for a 
given facility category all facilities are equal in size, equipment inventory, 
and financial characteristics. Again this is a necessary assumption due to the 
enormous volume of data that would have to be processed in order to identify all 
the different sizes or scales of facilities that do exist. Instead, we took the 
average case, based upon regional statistics for each facility category, and at- 
tempted to model the typical vulnerable facility. The variation in facility 
characteristics would introduce a little more variation into the risk profile 
but should not affect the results too greatly because of the large number of 
facilities involved that would tend to average each other out. The third major 
assumption is that all equipment is activated and that failures occur immediately 
after exposure. This assumes, first of all,that equipment which is exposed is in 
an activated state and is vulnerable to the fibers at the time of exposure. 
Since some fraction of the eletronic equipment exposed will not be activated, 
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this tends to be a conservative assumption. On,the other hand, there is a phen- 
omenon of post-exposure vulnerability, in which fibers that are deposited upon 
equipment do not cause a problem immediately but will affect the equipment when 
it is turned on at a later date. This phenomenon was not modeled explicitly, 
but it is taken into account by assuming continuous activation and failures im- 
mediately after exposure. 
The annual risk profile for economic losses due to air carrier fires in- 
volving carbon fibers is shown in Figure 17. The horizontal axis shows the 
total economic losses in dollars as a result of carbon fiber accidents during a 
given year. The vertical axis shows the annual probability of exceeding each 
dollar loss value. For example, an annual loss of approximately one thousand 
dollars would be exceeded with a probability of 10-l, in other words once every 
ten years. An annual loss of ten thousand dollars would be exceeded about once 
every three hundred years. The expected annual losses due to CF released from 
air carrier fires in 1993 is about $470. This includes only those losses in- 
curred by failures of equipment in the civilian sector. 
Discussion of Results 
The confidence bounds on the risk profile show the sensitivity of the risk 
estimates to variations in the input parameters. These confidence bounds are 
based upon several different sources of uncertainty: the statistical error due 
to the simulation method, the statistical error in estimation of accident fre- 
quency , and the modeling errors due to uncertainty about input parameters. The 
former two sources of uncertainty were judged to contribute less than an order 
of magnitude to the confidence bound at the high-loss extreme, and considerably 
less than that at average loss values. The confidence bounds are wider at high 
loss values because the simulation may not turn up an extremely unlikely high- 
loss event even among thousands of simulated events. 
To estimate the modeling errors, we performed a sensitivity analysis by 
varying several of the key input parameters. The results are shown in Figure 18. 
This analysis was run on the individual airport risk profile which had the high- 
est mean loss of the 26 hubs, namely Detroit. Of the three parameters tested, 
the largest increase in risk was obtained by setting the composite on the air- 
craft at its highest possible value, 15.652 kg. This increased the mean loss 
per incident by a factor of about 7, and increased the standard deviation and 
maximum value of the losses by a factor of about 4.5. Restricting the simula- 
tion model to only explosive releases increased these statistics by a factor of 
2 or 3, while setting the atmospheric stability class to E (moderately stable 
weather) increased the loss distribution only slightly. The two latter condi- 
tions are those which tend to result in highest exposures downwind of the release 
point. We concluded that modeling errors contributed less than an order of 
magnitude to the uncertainty of the risk profile. 
As a final verification of the simulation results, we compared the national 
conditional profile for dollar losses per incident against a risk profile ob- 
tained through an alternative analytic approach. The latter approach, which is 
based upon a Poisson model of equipment failures, will be described by Dr. 
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Rosenfield in the context of the general aviation risk assessment. As shown in 
Figure 19, the two methods agreed fairly well, with their mean values differing 
by a factor of less than 3. The simulation indicated an average loss of $172 
per incident, while the Poisson method resulted in an average loss of $472 per 
incident. 
GENERAL AVIATION RISK ASSESSMENT 
This section reports on the investigation of the effects of carbon fiber 
usage in general aviation aircraft. The objective of this analysis was to as- 
sess the national risk through 1993 in terms of economic losses and to deter- 
mine the sensitivity of the risk assessment to uncertainties in the input data. 
In formulating this objective, we identified as sub-objectives the projection 
of potential usage of carbon fiber composites in general aviation aircraft 
through 1993 and the investigation of fire accidents in general aviation with- 
in the U.S. The risk assessment thus involved forecasting future carbon fiber 
usage, development of an accident model for general aviation aircraft, analysis 
of the possible release amounts in general aviation accidents, and assessment of 
the economic consequences of a given release. These objectives are summarized 
in Figure 20. 
Methodology Overview 
The methodology utilized for the general aviation risk assessment was 
quite different from that utilized for commercial aviation. The major issues 
involved in selecting a methodology are summarized in Figure 21. The simula- 
tion model is more appropriate for large releases which will result in large 
numbers of failures, and allows detailed identification of the geographic dis- 
tribution of facilities as well as of the different possible accident and 
release conditions. As noted previously, the simulation approach results in 
statistical uncertainty at the high-loss tail of the risk profile. In the case 
of general aviation, the number of failures per incident was expected to be ex- 
tremely small, and the dominant variation in economic losses appeared to be 
caused by the random failure process rather than by the variations in physical 
conditions. Furthermore, there were insufficient data available to allow a 
detailed modeling of release and dispersion scenarios. 
For these reasons, an analytic methodology was developed to synthesize 
the accident model and carbon fiber usage forecast for assessment of the eco- 
nomic consequences of accidents. This methodology is shown in Figure 22. There 
were two key parameters influencing the economic consequences of accidents. The 
first was the amount of fibers released in an accident. By examining the dif- 
ferent types of general aviation aircraft and their accident statistics, a 
distribution of amounts of carbon fibers potentially released in accidents was 
developed. The second key parameter was the density of facilities near the 
location of an accident. Thus, an important aspect of the accident model was 
a quantitative description of the distribution of facility densities. The 
3,000 counties in the United States were chosen as a basis for estimating 
facility density, and hence a methodology was developed to apportion accidents 
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to the various counties. After a range of county and release amounts was de- 
veloped, the distribution of failures given an aviation accident was determined. 
A Poisson probability model was developed for this purpose and a computer pro- 
gram was utilized to tabulate failure probabilities as a function of the amount 
released and the county, and to aggregate these into a national risk profile of 
dollar losses. Based on the distribution of the number of equipment failures 
per accident, the statistics of dollar losses per accident, and the number of 
accidents per year, expressions were developed for the mean and standard devia- 
tion of a dollar loss per year. From these statistics, approximations and 
bounds were developed for the probability distribution of annual economic losses. 
Before examining the details of this methodology it is important to under- 
stand the theoretical basis of the Poisson approach, as depicted in Figure 23. 
For a given release scenario and equipment type, the number of equipment fail- 
ures may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with mean No. The mean 
number of failures is given by integrating the equipment density over the area 
in question and multiplying by the equipment failure probability, which is 
nearly linear in E for low values of the exposure E. Now, provided the amount 
released is held constant, we can aggregate over many release scenarios, and 
show that the average No is proportional to the surface integral S of the expo- 
sure, which in turn may be shown to depend only on the amount released. Thus 
an expression is obtained for the mean number of failures per incident in terms 
of just the average facility density, the amount of CF released, and the equip- 
ment vulnerability. This enables us to assess the risk without requiring de- 
tailed data on accident conditions or geographic locations. 
Steps in Risk Analysis 
The first step in the risk assessment procedure was the development of a 
forecast of the usage of carbon fibers in general aviation aircraft and deter- 
mination of the potential amounts released in accidents. Figure 24 presents a 
table summarizing our projections. For the purposes of this analysis, we iden- 
tified three classes of general aviation aircraft. These were: single-reci- 
procating-engine craft; multi-engine and jet aircraft; and helicopters, non- 
fixed wing and non-powered craft. Of the latter category, helicopters represent 
nearly all of the accidents historically. The annual growth rates for the 
number of aircraft in each of these categories are 6.3%, 4.8%, and 8.6%, 
respectively. Thus, the number of craft in 1993 will be 321,000; 72,500; 25,000; 
respectively. It is estimated that about 25% of the general aviation fleet will 
be carrying carbon fiber composites in 1993. Of these craft, helicopters will 
be using the largest amount of carbon fiber composites, about 54.5 kilograms, 
and the other classes of aircraft will be using substantially less than this. 
In a fire accident, any release up to 2% of the weight of the composite is 
possible. Based on NASA estimates, a one-half percent release was assumed for 
the case of substantial damage. Thus, the maximum conceivable carbon fiber 
release in a general aviation accident is about 1.1 kilograms. 
The accident model addressed three issues: 
l An allocation of accidents to the 3,000 counties in the nation 
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l A determination of the number of fire accidents per year 
l A determination of the conditional scenario probabilities. 
A scenario consisted of an aircraft type, damage level, and 
type of accident (cruise or on airport). 
As shown in Figure 25, accidents taking place on or near airport were allocated 
to the various counties on the basis of total operations. Cruise accidents 
were estimated to be proportional to the general aviation miles or hours flown 
in a given county. In determining probabilities based on these criteria, there 
were two problems encountered. The first problem was that only 30% of general 
aviation operations could be attributed to given counties, based on FAA statis- 
tics. The remaining operations were allocated to the counties in each state 
according to population. The second problem was that there were no data availa- 
ble on air mileage or flight hours within each county. Air hours were estimated 
for each county by taking a weighted average of the local and itinerant opera- 
tions attributable to that county. Weighting factors were based on the average 
length of time of itinerant and local operations. There was an implicit assump- 
tion that each operation takes place wholly within the county or counties cor- 
responding to the operation's origin and destination. 
The accident probability estimates used in the risk assessment are shown in 
Figure 26. According to the National Transportation Safety Board accident 
statistics from 1968 to 1976, there are approximately 340 general aviation fire 
accidents per year. Although the number of operations is increasing, the acci- 
dent rate is decreasing and the number of accidents per year has remained approx- 
:imately constant. On this basis we assumed that there will be about 340 general 
aviation fire accidents in 1993. Of these, based on a 25% incidence of carbon 
fiber composites in the general aviation fleet, we estimate that there will be 
85 fire accidents for carbon fiber-carrying general aviation aircraft in 1993. 
Air taxi and commuter operations would raise this to 88 accidents in 1993. This 
figure was used in the subsequent analysis. 
Figure 26 also presents the conditional probabilities of different accident 
types given that an accident occurs. These scenario probabilities are based on 
the 3058 accidents that occurred from 1968 to 1976. They represent the relative 
frequencies of aircraft and accident categories adjusted to account for the 
growth rates of different aircraft classes. Thus, for example, because the 
helicopter category is characterized by a higher growth rate, the scenario prob- 
abilities for helicopter accidents are slightly higher than the relative frequency 
of helicopter accidents from 1968 through 1976. 
After having determined the county and release amount probabilities, we 
used a computer program to tabulate the probability distribution of the number 
of failures per accident. The basis of the program was the Poisson model for 
the number of failures given a density of facilities and amounts released. For 
general aviation accidents the expected number of failures per accident is sub- 
stantially less than one as shown by the distribution in Figure 27. The average 
value is 0.022 although the average would be larger for certain combinations of 
county and release amount. For this order of magnitude nearly all of the varia- 
tion in number of failures per accident is due to the random nature of failures, 
rather than the release conditions such as wind direction and fire intensity. 
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As mentioned earlier, the expected number of equipment failures is thus propor- 
tional to the density of facilities and the amount of carbon fibers released, 
and inversely proportional to the mean outside exposure to failure for each 
equipment class. Furthermore, the number of failures can be described by a 
Poisson probability distribution with the parameter equal to the expectation. 
The important aspect of the Poisson model is that it eliminates the need for 
analysis of release conditions other than total amounts released. 
Risk Profile Generation 
Because of the large number of equipment categories, counties, and amounts 
released, a computer program was necessary to tabulate the various parameters 
of the Poisson distributions. The procedural flow of the computer program is 
depicted in Figure 28. For each combination of amount of carbon fibers re- 
leased and county location, an expectation is determined together with a proba- 
bility distribution based on this expectation. From the county location 
probabilities and the amount released probabilities a national conditional dis- 
tribution can be developed for the number of failures given an accident. Based 
on the statistics of economic losses for each given equipment category, the 
relative Poisson parameters for the various equipment categories, and an annual 
accident frequency, the mean and standard deviation of dollar loss were computed 
for a single accident and for total annual loss. We found that for general 
aviation accidents the mean annual loss was estimated to be $253, as shown in 
Figure 29. The standard deviation was $1067. 
For losses near the mean value a normal distribution is a reasonable approx- 
imation. For high dollar losses, however, it is necessary to develop statisti- 
cal upper bounds based on the mean and standard deviation of annual loss. From 
standard statistical results, it is known that the probability of a random event 
exceeding a given number of standard deviations above the mean is inversely 
proportional to the square of that number of standard deviations. Thus, for 
example, the probability of a random event exceeding 100 standard deviations 
above the mean is no more than l/loo2 or 10m4. Based on this inequality, we 
developed the upper bounds on the distribution for annual dollar loss given in 
Figure 29. Using these bounds and a normal approximation near the center of 
the distribution, the risk profile depicted in Figure 30 was developed. It 
can be seen that the chances of exceeding losses of about $1 million are less 
than 10B6, or once every million years. 
Discussion of Results 
From this analysis we may conclude that it is highly unlikely that there 
can be a substantial dollar loss due to carbon fiber releases in general avia- 
tion accidents. To check the result, the sensitivity of the annual risk was 
analyzed with respect to uncertainties in the input data, as shown in Figure 31. 
If amounts released have been underestimated by a given factor or equipment 
vulnerabilities have been overestimated by a given factor, then there is a di- 
rect proportional effect on the probability factors for the annual loss 
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distribution. That is, the probabilities are increased by the same factor. 
As an example, if the carbon fiber releases go up by a factor of 10 or the 
vulnerability decreases by a factor of 10 the probabilities also go up by a 
factor of 10. Thus, the probability of exceeding 1 million dollars in losses 
in a given year goes from 10D6 to 10v5. Such changes still represent low 
probabilities of substantial losses.' 
In conclusion, it appears that. the expected annual risks to the U.S. due 
to the potential use of carbon fiber composites through 1993 are less than a 
thousand dollars per year, and that the chances of national losses reaching 
significant levels are extremely small. However, it should be noted that this 
risk assessment has addressed only dollar losses due to equipment failure in 
the civilian sector, and does not quantify other categories of risk such as 
costs of protection or cleanup of equipment, CF releases from non-aviation 
sources such as incineration of sporting goods, possible environmental damage 
by carbon fibers, or impacts upon military operations. 
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l Refinement of dispersion models to provide more accurate 
exposure estimates 
l Detailed field visits and vulnerability analyses for specific 
facility categories 
l Development of more accurate estimates for aircraft structural 
damage and CF release conditions 
l Incorporation of improved forecasts to 1993 jet aircraft fleet 
mix and carbon fiber usage 
l Improvement of confidence in risk profile through detailed 
sensitivity analyses and the development of an alternate 
methodology 
l Extension of risk analysis to include CF usage in 
- General aviation 
- Surface transportation vehicles 
Figure l.- Phase 2 enhancement to carbon fiber risk assessment. 
MAJOR OBJECTIVE: 
l Develop a national risk profile for total annual losses due to 
CF usage through 1993 
SUB-OBJECTIVES: 
l Project potential usage of CF composites through 1993 
l Investigate incidence of commercial aircraft fires within the U.S. 
l Model the potential release and dispersion of carbon fibers 
from a fire 
l Estimate potential economic losses due to CF damaging electronic 
equipment 
l Show explicitly uncertainties and assumptions in the risk assessment 
l Examine sensitivity of the risk profile to changes in the input 
parameters 
Figure 2.- Commercial aviation risk assessment. 
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Air Carrier 
Operation 
Aircraft 
Accident 
with Fire 
and/or 
Explosion 
Carbon Fibers 
Released and 
Dispersed 
Over Large 
Area 
Carbon Fibers 
Penetrate 
Buildings 
Housing 
Electronic 
Equipment 
Carbon Fibers 
Cause Equipment 
Failure and 
Result in 
Economic 
Losses 
Figure 3.- Sequence of events to be modelled. 
Size of Jet 
Small Medium Large TbTAL I- 
Number of Aircraft in Service 560 780 1399 2739 
Number of Aircraft Using CF 
Composites 
100 754 1127 1981 
Composite Mass per Aircraft (KG): 
Min. 11 215 155 
Max. 183 3787 15,652 
Figure 4.- Projected 1993 usage of carbon fiber composites 
in commercial aircraft (based on estimates of airframe 
manufacturers). 
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Small Hub 
Other 
Percent of Passenger Enplanements 
Figure 5.- Distribution of air carrier 
enplanements (source: 1977 airport 
activity statistics - FAA, CAB). 
l Phase of Operation: Cruise 16% 
Static/Taxi 13% 
Take-off 25% 
Landing 46% 
0 Location relative to runway: At Airport 61% 
Within 1 KM 67% 
Within 10 KM 83% 
l Historical Frequency: 3.8 per Year 
Projected Frequency of 
Incidents in 1993 
Involving CF: 2.7 per year 
Figure 6.- Domestic air carrier incidents with 
severe fire and/or explosion (source: NTSB 
accident/incident statistics, 1968-1976). 
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Inversion Layer -_------------ 
I------\ 
/ \ 
1. Fire followed by a delayed explosion 
(instantaneous release model) 
2. Fire Plume Model 
Figure 7.- Dispersion models. 
l From 92 accident data base: 
Time of burn 
\ 
Correlated 
Percent of fuel burned 
Percent of CF involved I 
variables 
l Amount of fuel on board ‘\ Depend on phase 
Amount of CF on board f and size category 
l Type of release: Fire plume 95% 
Fire and explosion 5% 
l Percent of burning CF 
Released as single fibers: Fire plume 1% 
Fire and explosion 24% 
Figure 8.- Assumed release conditions for 
aircraft fires involving carbon fiber. 
\ 
\ 
~1 
\ 
\ 
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PROJECTIONS 
4.i,,:,p 
CF INVOLVEMENT 
Median Estimates of CF 
Involvement: - Small Jets 
- Medium Jets 
- Large Jets 
Range of Involvement: 0.100% 
45% 
69% 
64% 
Figure 9.- Potential carbon fiber 
involvement in air carrier 
fires: analysis by aircraft 
components. 
Aircraft 
Wind Direction 
Runway 
/ / 
Incident 
Location 
Figure lO.- Exposure footprints after 
carbon fiber release. 
200 
-- 
Figure ll.- Distribution of sectors around 
Logan Airport, Boston, Mass. 
1. Residences 
2. Manufacturers 
3. Transportation 
4. Communication 
5. Services 
6. General 
- Electronic Equipment 
- Computers 
- Aerospace 
- Aircraft and Air Traffic Control 
- Mass Transit 
- Railways 
- Telephone 
- Radio/TV/Microwave 
- Post Offices 
- Fire/Police 
- Financial/insurance 
- Software/EDP 
- Hospitals 
- Retail Outlets 
-Office Buildings 
- Industrial Plants 
Figure 12.- Potentially vulnerable facilities. 
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ACCIDENT CF RELEASE 
LOCATION CONDITIONS 
? ? 
WEATHER 
7 v 
DETERMINE CALCULATE 
EXPOSURE 4 ______ EXPOSURE 
BY SECTOR VALUES 
VULNERABLE 
I FACILITY 
Figure 13.- Monte Carlo simulation procedure. 
(A "?" denotes a randan draw.) 
// 
FLUSHING 
ACCIDENT CONDlTlONS RELEASE CONDITIONS 
Medium Jet Fuel Burned .847O kg 
StaticfTaxi Phase Time of Burn 33.5 min. 
Explosive Release CF released 22 kg 
WEATHER CONDITIONS CONSEQUENCES 
Neutral Atmor~here IDI 108 Exposureat Airport 
Wind from Em at 7 mlrec 10’ Exposure within 3 km of Airport 
Temperat”re: 1oc Total Dollar Loses 5178 
Ho”rehdd LOS525 566 
Figure 14.- Typical simulation run at 
LaGuardia Airport. 
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INDIVIDUAL AIRPORT 
RISK PROFILES FOR A 
SINGLE INCIDENT 
INCIDENT 
FREQUENCIES 
FOR INDIVIDUAL 
Al RPORTS 
Figure l5.- Derivation of national 
risk profile. 
1. Atmospheric conditions remain constant during 
.dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud, and there 
is no precipitation 
2. For a given facility category, all facilities are 
equal in size, equipment inventory, and financial 
characteristics 
3. All equipments are in an activated state, and 
failures occur immediately after exposure 
Figure 16.- Major assumptions. 
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-- 
10' 102 103 104 16 
Total Losses13 IDollars) 
Figure 17.- National annual risk profile for 
carbon fiber releases from coimnercial air 
carriers (1993 CF utilization). 
Changes in risk profile due to variation of input parameters, tested for the 
airport with highest mean dollar loss 
Resulting Increases from Base Case 
Parameter 
Tested 
Composite on 
Aircraft Set at 
Max. (15,652) 
100% Explosive 
Releases 
(no plume release) 
Stability 
Class Set at E 
(moderately stable) 
Mean Dollar 
Loss 
($1184) - 
t by 7 
t by 3 
t 
by 1.5 
Standard 
Deviation 
($2409) 
t 
by 4.5 
t by 2 
f 
by 1.2 
Maximum 
Dollar Loss 
($16,429) 
t 
by 4.5 
t 
by 2.5 
t by 1.1 
Figure 18.- Sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 19.- Air carriers 1993 national conditional 
risk profile. 
MAJOR OBJECTIVE 
l Assess national risk of economic losses due to CF use 
in general aviation through 1993 
SUB-OBJECTIVES 
l Project potential usage of CF composites through 1993 
l Investigate incidence of fires in general aviation aircraft 
within the U.S. 
l Develop methods for assessing geographic distribution 
of potential economic losses 
l Determine sensitivity of risk profile to uncertainties in 
input data 
Figure 20.- General aviation risk assessment. 
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SIMULATION MODEL 
l Appropriate for large releases near metropolitan 
areas 
l Emphasizes variations in facility locations and 
release conditions 
l Estimates of high loss probabilities subject to 
statistical uncertainty 
ANALYTIC MODEL 
l Appropriate when number of failures per release 
is small 
l Emphasizes variation due to random nature of 
failure events 
l Addresses variations in facility density between 
counties 
‘0 Requires only data on amount of CF released, 
similar to “single-fiber” concept 
Figure 21.- Issues in choice of methodology. 
l Estimate distribution of CF released in general aviation accidents 
l Apportion accident locations by county based on air traffic activity 
l Develop Poisson model for estimating the distribution of failures 
given an accident 
l Use computer program to tabulate failure probabilities and aggregate 
economic losses 
l Develop national risk profile based on estimated accident frequency 
Figure i2.- Methodology overview. 
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D = Average Density of Equipment 
S = Surface Integral of Exposure 
E,= Average Outside Exposure to Failure 
E = CF Expkure at Any Location 
For a given equipment type and release condition 
the expected number of failures is: 
No = 
s 
Density . ( 1 - e- El!0 ) 
Area 
a 
s 
Density ( Fi Since E< <E. 
Area 
For different releaseconditionsbut equivalent amount 
released 
Average No= e 
When average No is small the variation in number of 
failures is predominantly due to the randomness of failure 
events 
Figure 23.- Basis of Poisson approach. 
Growth 
Rate 
CF Mass CF Mass 
No. of Released Released in 
No. of Aircraft Average CF in Total Substantial 
Aircraft Carrying CF Composite per Destruction Damage 
in 1993 in 1993 Aircraft (KG) Accident (KG) Accident (KG) 
Single reciprocating engine 6.3% 32 1,000 80,250 7 .14 .034 
Multi-engine and jets 4.8% 72,500 18,125 20.5 .41 .lO 
Helicopter, non-fixed 
wingand non-powered 8.6% 25,000 6,250 54.5 1.09 .27 
Figure 24.- Estimated usage of carbon fiber and potential releases (1993). 
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l Cruise accidents 
County probabilities are based on weighted average 
of local and itinerant operations 
l On or near airport accidents 
County probabilities are based on number of operations 
l 30% of operations accounted for. Other operations 
allocated to counties within each state according to 
population 
Figure 25.- Distribution of general aviation accidents. 
Frequency 
340 fire accidents per year, of which 85 would involve CF. 
Air taxi and commuter would raise this to 88 
Relative likelihoods of accident types: 
Cruise On or Near Airport 
Total Substantial Total Substantial 
Destruction Damage Destruction Damage 
Non-fixed or .072 .013 .043 .014 
non-powered 
Single .333 .023 .203 .034 
reciprocating 
Multiple or jet .lOl .014 .122 .028 
Figure 26.- General aviation accident data (1993 projections). 
(Source: NTSB accident statistics, 1968-1976) 
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1 
10.' 
10-l 
10.3 
1 
z 
Q 2 10-4 
10.5 
10-E 
10-1 
- 7- 
0 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
= .022 
= .17 
Figure 27.- General aviation 1993 probability 
distribution of number of equipment fail- 
ures per accident. 
Equipment 
Densities for 
All Counties 
Probability for 
Each County 
I 1 
L b 
Expected Number 
of Failures for 
Each Combination 
lity Distribution 
for Number of 
Failures per Incident 
Annual 
Accident 
Frequency 
Probability 
for Each Amount 
Released 
I I 
I Economic 
Profile 
Figure 28.- Risk analysis procedure. 
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Dollar losses 
Mean (per accident) : $2.88 
Standard deviation (per accident) $114 
Mean (annual) $253 
Standard deviation (Annual) $1067 
Upper bounds for annual loss 
$ Prob ( Loss> $1 - 
10,923 1o-2 
106,953 1o-4 
1,067,253 lo+ 
Figure 29.- Result of risk analysis 1993. 
1 10 100 1000 10,000 700,000 1 Million 10 Million 
Dollar Value D 
Figure 30.- Approximate upper bound on national risk profile 
for general aviation accidents (1993). 
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l Increase in amount released - direct effect on upper 
bound probabilities 
l Increase in equipment vulnerability - direct effect 
on upper bound probabilities 
E.G. 
CF increases by 10 
OI- I! decreases by 10 
then The probabilities go up by 10 
2. 
106,953 
1,067,253 
10.670,253 
Prob (annual loss Z $1 
1oe3 
1o-5 
1o-7 
Figure 31.- Sensitivity analysis. 
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Perspective on the Results 
Robert J. Huston 
NASA Langley Research Center 
This paper is an effort to put some of the things that we have found from the 
NASA study into perspective. I would like to start out by covering some issues 
that were not covered in detail in our discussions (Figure 1). One of the ques- 
tions that we were originally asked was: is additional aircraft protection re- 
quired? You should have noticed that air transport aircraft were included in 
the calculations of the risk profile, and, in fact, in the specific examples 
that were cited, you noted that the expected losses at the various airports were 
quite low. Independently, we have had Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas analyzing 
each of their own aircraft, using fiber dissemination footprints that have been 
calculated for crash fires and explosions on an airport where quite high expo- 
sures have been predicted. We found, in the analysis of the aircraft systems, 
that the key issue that prevented aircraft from being considered perhaps totally 
invulnerable was the fact that occasionally aircraft avionic bay doors would be 
open. On those occasions, we found that the interior exposure was sufficient to 
fail one or two pieces of avionics equipment in a fleet of aircraft that were 
sitting on the ground where an aircraft accident had occurred. That fact sug- 
gests that some precautionary measures may be prudent. If you have an aircraft 
crash fire releasing carbon fibers on an airport it makes sense to close the 
doors on the aircraft and not allow interior exposure to carbon fibers. 
We have also looked at fire-release strips as a possible cause of power inter- 
ruptions. Our calculations show that only at a probability of one chance in a 
thousand will we be able to get power interruptions from the kind of composite 
strips that were generated at China Lake and Dugway Proving Ground tests. This 
kind of failure, incidently, is equivalent to the interruption that occurs when 
a squirrel shorts a powerline to ground. 
The generation of composite strips and, in fact, the amount of carbon fiber de- 
bris that is actually found after a fire, suggests very clearly that carbon fi- 
ber debris should be cleaned up. Dr. Bell's paper, Reference 1, showed the mass 
balance distribution of carbon fiber from burned composites. The amount of 
debris or residue was quite large, in fact, many times the amount of free fiber 
that is released by the burn. Therefore, prudent practice would suggest that 
the aircraft owner go in and clean up the composite debris of an accident to 
prevent a secondary release of fibers. At this time it is the responsibility 
of an aircraft owner to clean up an accident so the extension of that require- 
ment to include composite debris would be normal practice. 
It should be pointed out that some unique carbon composites could be developed 
in the future. The term unique here applies to a carbon composite which has a 
release characteristic different from the average. Dr. Bell's paper described 
one composite with such a characteristic. It is possible that in the future, 
as additional carbon composite concepts are developed, other unique composites 
could turn up but we have also developed some test methods that are appropriate 
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for evaluating the fiber release characteristics. We think that these methods 
will be used to analyze the potential release from new concepts. 
As for the assumptions inherent in this study, Figure 2 lists those that we 
feel result in a conservative final answer. Our analysis assumptions have 
included one percent release for a crash fire and 3 and a half percent release 
for a crash explosion. This assumption was based on the amount of material 
that we had found to be released from specimen tests. Based on the data re- 
cently acquired from the outdoor tests, we see considerably less release than 
that. Therefore we feel that our estimate is quite conservative here. 
In the case of the explosive release model that A. D. Little uses (Reference 
2), the analysis is considered to be conservative, that is it gives excessive 
fiber concentrations because it is really a ground-level fiber release and 
not an explosive plume that is carried up in the developed fire plume. 
Our analysis at this point ignores the filter effect on fiber length. Dr. 
Elber's paper (Reference 3), showed that not only did filtration reduce the 
number of fibers that entered into either cases or buildings, but that it also 
provided an effective shortening of the fiber length spectrum. This phenomenon 
has a strong effect on the failure rate, as shown by Mr. Taback's paper (Refer- 
ence 4). Therefore the fibers that enter a filtered enclosure are not as 
damaging as the fibers exterior to that enclosure. Our analysis has not in- 
cluded that effect. 
We have based our equipment vulnerabilities on tests done with 1970 technology 
avionics and electronics. And as we see the future, electronics, avionics, 
and computer design and packaging is aiming towards low power, well-protected 
circuitry. Some of the more recent aircraft designs are utilizing totally air- 
conditioned avionics bays, primarily to increase the effective reliability of 
avionics. This effect is not considered in our analysis. 
The equipment failure model over-predicts the failure rate for multi-fiber sen- 
sitive equipment. Test data described by Mr. Taback (Reference 4) shows the 
multi-fiber effect on equipment failure rates. There is a lot of equipment 
that we know requires multiple fiber contacts to initiate failure. In fact, 
anytime the electrical contact spacing exceeds the fiber length, shorting can 
occur only when two or more fibers bridge the space. From a practical sense, 
for this analysis, we don't think it is practical to try to even identify the 
multi-fiber sensitive equipment. 
A final item on this list of conservative assumptions is that the analysis is 
made assuming that no precautions are taken against a known carbon fiber acci- 
dent. Earlier, I pointed out that aircraft avionics can be effectively pro- 
tected, when a crash fire occurs in an airport, by simply closing the avionics 
bay doors to prevent penetration by carbon fibers. Also, Mr. Taback (Refer- 
ence 4) pointed out that in the worst case, the range of a scanning beam M.L.S. 
landing aid would be effectively reduced by 45% if an approaching aircraft was 
flown directly down the center of a fire release?i?arbon fiber plume. Obviously, 
even present operating rules would not allow a second aircraft to approach an 
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airport directly over a burning aircraft where the crash cause was undetermined 
and could have been related to the operating condition of the landing aid. 
These examples of prudent precautions will obviously be expanded if cost effec- 
tive measures are found suitable even with the current level of projected risk. 
There are limitations in the analysis (Figure 3). One is that the data sample 
is small. We have only about 250 specimen burns in which to quantify the fiber 
release data. In addition, we have five outdoor tests in the most recent Dugway 
Proving Ground experiments that quantify the carbon fiber release. It is a 
small sample of data upon which to base our analysis. In addition, the total 
variety of equipment that we have examined for fiber vulnerability, either in 
the chamber here at Langley, at the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, or in 
the work that has been done by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Standards, 
consists only of about 150 pieces of equipment. We have had to have quantified 
the vulnerability of all of the equipment considered nationally from a very 
limited number of tests. We are.aware of and have considered other data in our 
analysis which is not available to the public. 
One limitation that is important to recognize is that the structural concepts 
tested are considered typical of carbon composites of the future, Basically 
we have made the assumption that the structural concepts that we have available 
to us today are those which are going to be used in composite applications on 
aircraft built in the future. 
We have not considered redissemination for the reasons that Dr. Elber (Reference 
3) presented in his paper. In addition, a test in a clean wall and floor room 
showed that even a fan recirculating fibers increased exposure only about a 
factor of two. Both results indicate redissemination should not be a signif- 
icant problem. 
We believe that an accident clean up should include the accident debris, and 
as an assumed prudent measure, that would be a limitation of this analysis. 
It should be pointed out that this analysis is limited to accidental release 
from civil aircraft and to damage done to residential, public, utility, com- 
mercial and industrial installations. What has been left out? The answer is 
very simple, what has been left out is the potential risk from military air- 
craft crashes and the potential damage to military sites. That is the subject 
of Department of Defense analyses. 
It is appropriate to review the key findings of this study (Figure 4). We 
know that the release of fibers does require agitation of the composite residue. 
We see, from the evidence that we have, that a substantial portion of the 
carbon fiber is oxidized away. We see, from our specimen tests, that about 
one percent of the available fiber is released, but in our outdoor tests, we 
found only about 0.13 percent released or about a factor of eight conservative 
from our assumptions in our risk calculations. One final point is that most 
released single fibers are very short. This point should be amplified be- 
cause we have had some specific examples of released fibers where the averages 
are longer than what we used in our analysis. A look at the sensitivity of 
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the risk estimates to the average fiber length is appropirate. If we normalize 
the risk at the 3 mm length used in the risk calculations, we can study the 
effect of fiber length on the risk. In our large scale tests in the Dahlgren 
shock tube, we found a mean fiber length of 2 millimeters. Now perhaps that 
is because of the extreme agitation of operating on the composite material 
with the rotisserie. However, in the outdoor tests we found a mean fiber 
length, in the worst case, of about 5 millimeters. Now, what is the effect of 
the mean fiber length on the mean exposure level for failure? Israel Taback 
(Reference 4) pointed out several possibilities. One possibility is that E 
bar is proportional to one over the length. Another possibility is that E 
bar is proportional to one over the length cubed. Figure 5 shows the effect 
of these two variations in the mean exposure to failure on the normalized risk 
assuming all equipment follows either one law or the other. The notation 
indicates the lengths obtained from the large scale tests. It is appropriate 
to point out that at least we have bracketed the large scale test data. The 
actual value of the risk could vary at the most, as a result of fiber length, 
by a factor of 2. Considering the fiber release characteristics as a whole, 
including percentage released as well as length, it would appear that we 
over-estimated the potential damage by somewhere between a factor of 4 and a 
factor of 8. 
If we review the key findings in the area of vulnerability of equipment, 
(Figure 6), we find that the damage done by released fibers is not as severe 
as once thought. The reason is that equipment vulnerability is lower for the 
currently acceptable structural fibers than for the very highly graphitic fibers 
once considered. If highly graphitic fibers (possessing modulus at elasticity 
two times that obtainable with current structural fibers) are found acceptable 
in the future, the base vulnerability level would have to be reevaluated. We 
find from our test data that vulnerability of domestic and industrial electron- 
ics and avionics is very low. The vulnerability of industrial electronics and 
avionics is low primarily because they are conformly coated and well protected. 
In addition our industrial power arc studies show that power vulnerability is 
low and unlikely to cause damage when properly fused. We have found that 
110 volt motors and home appliances can not be hurt by carbon fibers. 
Our present assessment of the risk, using current estimates of the carbon fiber 
release from civil aircraft and conservative vulnerability data, indicated that 
the expected annual cost is insignificant (Figure 7). A comparison of the 
results from the A. D. Little and the OR1 studies (Figure 8) shows quite rea- 
sonable agreement. While the details of the risk profiles are slightly differ- 
ent, the expected annual cost for air transport for either is under $500. 
Adding the expected dollar loss from crash fires of carbon composite general 
aviation aircraft adds about 50% to the mean cost. Compared with the mean 
cost of the aircraft accidents the expected annual cost is an insignificant 
number. The FAA study of 1966-1975 aircraft accident costs (Reference 5) 
showed that the costs of air transport aircraft accidents range from less 
than a million dollars to nearly fifty million dollars (non-fire accidents 
are included). The mean cost of those accidents where the aircraft sustained 
at least substantial damage ranged from 5 million dollars for small jet air- 
craft to in excess of 10 million dollars for large jet aircraft. Therefore, 
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considering the annual number of aircraft crashes, the $500 annual potential 
damage from released carbon fiber must be compared with annual aircraft crash 
costs of nearly 100 million dollars (based on 1974 dollars). Considering that 
comparison,the worst case, low probability event is basically a low cost event. 
Figure 8 shows that there is only about one chance in 2000 of exceeding 
$150,000 damage annually. Our studies show that there is no need for additional 
protection of civil aircraft avionics, and the potential shock hazard is in- 
significant, hence risk to life should not be a consideration in carbon fiber 
applications. 
In conclusion, we have some work to do (Figure 9). We have completed the 
planned work on the agreed to schedule. We will publish this conference 
proceedings, complete and publish the analysis of our large scale outdoor 
tests, and complete our final NASA summary report. NASA efforts in the 
carbon fiber hazard area will be completed when all NASA studies are 
published. 
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ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT PROTECTION IS NOT REQUIRED 
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ARE PRUDENT 
FIRE RELEASED STRIPS HAVE LOW PROBABILITY OF CAUSING DAMAGE 
CARBON FIBER DEBRIS SHOULD BE CLEANED UP 
UNIQUE CARBON COMPOSITES COULD BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE 
TEST METHODS ARE DEVELOPED FOR FIBER RELEASE EVALUATION 
Figure l.- issues not covered in detail. 
ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 1% FIRE, 3 l/2% EXPLOSIVE RELEASE 
EXPLOSIVE RELEASE MODEL GIVES EXCESSIVE FIBER EXPOSURES 
ANALYSIS IGNORES FILTER EFFECT ON FIBER LENGTH 
EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITIES BASED ON 1970'S TECHNOLOGY 
MODEL OVERPREDICTS FAILURE RATES FOR MULTI-FIBER SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT 
NO PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AGAINST KNOWN CF ACCIDENT 
Figure 2.- Conservative assumptions. 
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I 
-- 
THE DATA SAMPLE IS SMALL 
STRUCTURAL CONCEPTS TESTED ARE TYPICAL OF THE FUTURE 
REDISSEMINATZON IS NOT CONSIDERED 
ACCIDENT CLEAN UP INCLUDES COMPOSITE DEBRIS 
ANALYSIS LIMITED TO: 
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT 
DAMAGE TO RESIDENTAL AND PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS 
Figure 3.- Limitations in analysis. 
0 REQUIRES AGITATION OF RESIDUE 
0 SUBSTAilTIAL PROPORTIONS ARE OXIDIZED AWAY 
0 1% OR LESS RELEASED AS SINGLE FIBERS IN SPECIMEN TESTS 
. 0,13% OR LESS RELEASED IN LARGE-SCALE OUTDOOR BURNS 
0 ,MOST RELEASED SINGLE FIBERS ARE VERY SHORT 
Figure 4.- Key findings in carbon fiber risk analysis. 
Release of fibers by fire. 
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Figure 5.- Sensitivity of risk calculation to average released fiber length. 
0 LOW FOR CURRENT STRUCTURAL FIBERS 
0 HIGHER FOR HIGHLY GRAPHITIC FIBERS 
@ VERY LOW FOR DOMESTIC, INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONIC AND AVIONICS 
0 LOW FOR POWER SYSTEMS 
0 ZERO FOR llO-VOLT MOTORS AND HOME APPLIANCES 
Figure 6.- Key findings in carbon fiber risk analysis. 
Vulnerability of equipment. 
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0 THE USE OF CONSERVATIVE STIMATES OF ACCIDENTAL CF RELEASE FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT AND 
CONSERVATIVE VULNERABILITY DATA INDICATES THAT: 
0 THE "EXPECTED ANNUAL COST" IS INSIGNIFICANT 
0 THE WORST CASE, LOW PROBABILITY EVENT IS A LOW COST EVENT 
0 NO ADDITIONAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT AVIONICS IS REQUIRED 
0 THE POTENTIAL SHOCK HAZARD IS INSIGNIFICANT - HENCE RISK OF LIFE IS NOT 
A FACTOR 
Figure 7.- Key findings in carbon fiber risk analysis. 
Present assessment of risk. 
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Figure 8.- National annual risk profile. Carbon fiber released from 
commercial air carrier accidents. (1993 CF usage.) 
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0 REMAINING WORK 
PUBLISH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
FINAL ANALYSIS OF LARGE-SCALE OUTDOOR TESTS 
FINAL NASA REPORT ON PUBLIC RISK DUE TO ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED CF FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT 
@ NASA EFFORT WILL BE COMPLETE UPON PUBLICATION OF ALL TEST AND STUDY RESULTS 
Figure 9.- Conclusion of carbon fiber risk assessment. 
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CARBON FIBER DOMESTIC DATA BASE - MARKET ANALYSIS, 
PRODUCTION CAPACITY, AND COST PROJECTIONS 
D. Parsons 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Enavailable at time of publication.] 
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A RESEARCH PROGRAM IN WASTE MANAGEMENT 
TECHNOLOGY FOR CARBON FIBERS 
Richard A. Carnes and Laura A. Ringenbach 
Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
In FY 1978 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began 
developing a research and development program to address potential problems 
which may arise from the release of carbon fibers into the environment. 
The program consists of two parts: Carbon Fiber Characterization and 
Measurement Technology Development and Carbon Fiber Waste Management 
Technology Development (Figure 1). The Environmental Sciences Research 
Laboratory is developing the program for Carbon Fiber Characterization and 
Measurement Technology. We at the Municipal Environmental Research 
Laboratory are responsible for the Carbon Fiber Waste Management Technology 
program. Both of these laboratories are part of EPA's Office of Research 
and Development and Richard A. Carnes is the Agency's Coordinator for Carbon 
Fiber Research. 
EPA's budget for the first five years of the carbon fiber program is 
shown in Figure 2. By the end of this fiscal year, it is planned that all 
funds will be allocated for the characterization and measurement program. 
The annual funding for the waste management technology development program is 
expected to range from $600,000 to $l,OOO,OOO between FY 1979 and FY 1982. 
Carbon Fiber Waste Management Technology Development program being carried 
out by EPA's Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory was initiated in 
late FY 1979 with technical contracts awarded in three task areas. During 
FY 1980 and 1981 additional technical contracts will be awarded in four task 
areas. Long range plans call for further contract awards in five task areas 
in the FY 1982 period and beyond. The program has three objectives: (1) 
characterization and assessment of the carbon fiber problem, including market 
penetration studies, (2) d evelopment and demonstration of carbon fiber 
control technology (in the broadest sense, including process changes, etc.) 
and (3) assessment of the legal, economic and social impacts of carbon fiber 
regulation and control. 
The three tasks which were initiated during late FY 1979 are described 
below. A complete assessment will be performed by Bionetics of existing 
information on the environmental implications of the carbon'fiber problem 
including hazards, ambient concentrations and geographical distributions, 
existing control mechanisms, disposal techniques and risk assessment. The 
task includes several subtasks. Materials for these subtasks require a 
close liaison with all programs in other agencies and an incorporation of all 
pertinent information into the EPA program. The initial subtask is to perform 
a literature search to identify problems encountered by the release of carbon 
fiber during handling and disposal, uses of carbon fibers, potential health 
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effects, and information related to the properties, production,' manufacture, 
and resins applications. Based on this literature search, several sets of 
summary data tables will be prepared. Tables will summarize the type and 
number of present and/or proposed research military aircraft and transport 
aircraft which utilize a carbon fiber. Summary tables will be developed for 
information on carbon fiber manufacturers and their products. The objective 
of the second subtask is to define risk considerations as interpreted by 
various Federal agencies, compile their risk assessment programs, and identify 
areas of concern and data requirements. The third subtask required the 
preparation of a directory and locator for principal individuals participating 
in carbon fiber programs. Efforts on the fourth subtask are ongoing. The 
purpose of this subtask is to predict the average concentrations required 
to cause failure in the types of electrical equipment used for solid waste 
management; to calculate transfer functions for solid waste management 
facilities and enclosures for equipment; and to estimate free fiber charac- 
teristics at solid waste locations. Review of present disposal methods is 
an important part of subtask 5 and accordingly a visit has been made to the 
refuse incinerator at Saugus, Massachusetts. Finally, a subtask has been 
undertaken to develop scenarios for carbon fiber life cycles from raw product 
to ultimate disposal covering the range of potential usage in commerce. 
Additionally, critical points and potential areas relative to hazards for 
both individuals and the environment will be defined. We anticipate the 
completion of all these subtasks early in 1980. 
A separate effort has been undertaken by Econ of Princeton, New Jersey. 
The objective of this effort is the quantification of the current and 
projected uses of carbon fiber composites in the production of consumer 
products, evaluation of the potential threats to society from accidental 
discharge of carbon fibers to the environment and assessment of the economic 
tradeoffs associated with the use and/or restriction in the use of this 
material. As this is a 2-year effort the first major results are not expected 
until late 1980/early 1981. 
Researchers at the University of California at Berkeley are working on the 
assessment of the effects of carbon fiber composite materials in solid waste 
processing. This task will involve the use of a laboratory scale 9072 kg/hr 
(10 ton/hr) shredder, a 2722 kg/hr (3 ton/hr) continuing system, and associated 
equipment to investigate the effects of processing solid municipal waste 
containing projected typical amounts of carbon fiber wastes. The assessment 
will cover (1) comparison of the processed waste with conventional municipal 
solid waste, (2) effects of the carbon fiber waste on the processing 
machinery, including wear and tear and power consumption, (3) evaluation of 
fugitive dust at various locations in the process, worker exposure and possible 
pathways to the ambient environment, and (4) preparation of a number of refuse 
derived fuel (RDF) and densified RDF samples in order to test wear on 
equipment and power consumption in comparison to conventional solid waste. 
Four tasks are programmed to be initiated during N 1980 or 1981. The 
task with the highest priority is research on incineration. Combustion tests 
will be conducted on three types of pilot-scale incinerators to compare emission 
characteristics of conventional municipal solid waste with municipal solid 
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waste seeded with carbon fiber material. Emission control will be the best 
available technology for the control of particulate matter for both types of 
waste. It is the purpose of this study to determine if carbon fiber 
materials disposed of in the municipal solid waste sector by incineration will 
pose a potential environmental hazard should incinerator emission contain 
significant amounts of free fibers. Investigation will cover changes in the 
combustion process itself, characterization of emitted carbon fibers and 
changes in conventional emissions. Residue from the process will also be 
carefully analyzed for carbon fiber content. 
Three other tasks are planned. The first is an evaluation of carbon 
fiber waste impacts on existing and emerging disposal and resource recovery 
systems. This will include a study of trends in the use and application of 
current and emerging solid waste management technologies, identification of 
those processes or steps which will receive substantial carbon fiber impact 
and identification of those most likely to cause significant atmospheric 
emissions of carbon fiber. 
The second is an evaluation of measures to mitigate the impact of carbon 
fiber on municipal solid waste technologies such as source separation, 
modification of resins, production changes, modified or partial bans and 
labeling. 
Another task will evaluate carbon fiber discharge test results and 
determine the adequacy of current and future solid waste processing, 
recovery and disposal technology to eliminate carbon fiber hazards. This 
includes identification of technologies which must be modified or newly 
developed to adequately control discharges and an estimate of the research 
and demonstration efforts required. 
Tasks to be initiated during FY 1982 or beyond may include: 
- Evaluation of the legal, economic, environmental, social and political 
impacts of instituting necessary modifications to current and projected 
solid waste management systems. These impacts will be evaluated in 
light of the various risk assessments conducted previously by EPA 
and other agencies. 
- Evaluation of carbon fiber disposal demonstration research in three 
areas: (1) full-scale incineration studies, (2) RDF and densified RDF 
combustion, and (3) evaluation of a small particle collection device 
for controlling carbon fiber emissions. 
EPA is pleased to have the opportunity to participate in this meeting as 
it will help to insure the development of carbon fiber research programs 
which are compatible with the on-going and planned programs of other 
organizations. We look forward to working with all of you in the future on 
this interesting and important environmental program. 
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Figure l.- EPA's carbon fiber program. 
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Figure 2.- Five year carbon fiber budget plan. 
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CARBON FIBER MONITORING RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Jack Wagman 
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Research Triangle Park, N. C. 27711 
Environmental protection depends on efforts to detect, identify and 
quantify specific pollutants and to assess their effects. In anticipation of 
projected increases in the production and usage of carbon composite materials, 
the Federal Government action plan on the Carbon Fiber Hazard assigned to the 
Environmental Protection Agency the responsibility for developing capabilities 
for source and ambient air monitoring of released carbon fibers from manu- 
facturing and waste disposal facilities. The research program to achieve 
these capabilities is being conducted by the EPA Environmental Sciences 
Research Laboratory (ESRL) at Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. 
The present ESRL program consists of a number of projects that were 
initiated in fiscal year 1979 and are being carried out primarily through 
contracts, grants and interagency agreements. Studies under way fall into 
three categories as follows: 
1. Carbon fiber emissions characterization 
2. Measurement techniques for carbon fiber emissions 
3. Measurement techniques for atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
fibers 
CARBON FIBER EMISSIONS CHARACTERIZATION 
A two-year study has been initiated (August 1979) through a contract with 
Battelle-Columbus Laboratories for the "Characterization of Carbon Fiber 
Emissions from Current and Projected Activities for the Manufacture and Dis- - __ _.~ .-~=~-~ 
posal of Carbon Fiber Products." Tasks to be performed include: 
. Determination of mass concentrations, number concentrations, and 
size distributions of fibers emitted during manufacturing and 
incineration of carbon fiber products 
. Determination of chemical, morphological and other physical properties 
. Estimation of the material damage potential of emitted fibers, 
including damage to standard electrical and electronic devices 
Since extramural research programs require considerable lead times before 
they can be implemented, some preliminary in-house experiments (ref. 1) were 
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carried out early in FY 1979, using available facilities and instrumentation, 
with the objective of obtaining a rough characterization of dusts and other 
debris resulting from the machining and incineration of graphite/epoxy com- 
posites. While these experiments involved only laboratory simulations of 
actual or projected operations, it was felt that they could yield some useful 
information on the nature of potential carbon fiber emissions. 
Examination of residues after exposure of graphite fibers and fiber/epoxy 
composites to elevated temperatures in a laboratory tube furnace demonstrated 
the high resistance of graphite fibers to combustion at temperatures up to 
1000"c. Resins and binders in composites were destroyed rapidly but the 
fibers remained intact for significant periods even at 1000°C. (See figure 
1.) Resistance of fibers to damage varied from product to product and probably 
depends on degree of graphitization. Damage was first observed in the form of 
dimpling and thinning of the fibers after exposure for some minutes at 1000°C 
as shown in figure 2. One can predict from these results that the disposal of 
graphite/epoxy composite waste materials by conventional refuse incineration 
would result in the release of large amounts of both intact and partly degraded 
graphite fibers. 
Dusts generated by sawing or drilling of graphite/epoxy composites 
contained significant numbers of fibers free of the resin matrix. These 
fibers generally had lengths of about 50-100 urn. There was also evidence that 
sawing can cause longitudinal cleavage of the fibers, thereby making possible 
the generation of more respirable fiber fragments with diameters less than 
that (about 6-8 pm) determined in the fiber manufacturing process. 
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES FOR CARBON FIBER EMISSIONS 
The needs for two types of measurement methods for carbon fiber emissions 
are being addressed in the current program. One of the needs is a method that 
is highly specific for carbon fibers and can serve as a reference analytical 
procedure. Such a procedure is the objective of an 18 month study for the 
"Development of a Method for the Positive Identification and Measurement of 
Carbon Fiber Concentrations Emitted from Stationary Sources." This project 
began in August 1979 through a contract with Battelle-Columbus Laboratories. 
The other need being addressed is an instrumental method that can be used 
for continuous monitoring of carbon fiber emissions. This is perhaps the most 
important objective in the program, inasmuch as a capability of this kind 
would permit real-time verification of the effectiveness of emission control 
measures at manufacturing facilities, incinerators, and other possible sources. 
To achieve this objective, an 18-month project for the "Evaluation and Develop- 
ment of Instrumentation for Monitoring Carbon Fiber Emissionsll was started in 
October 1979 with the participation of the Bionetics Corporation, GCA Corpora- 
tion, Arthur D. Little Inc. and TRW Inc. This two-phase effort will consist 
of the following tasks: 
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Phase I: Evaluation 
. Survey of existing carbon fiber sensors 
. Identification of monitoring requirements 
. Laboratory performance tests of candidate sensors 
. Rank sensors; identify development needs 
Phase II: Development 
. Design and construct prototype monitoring system 
. Develop field calibration procedure 
. Laboratory evaluation of prototype 
. Field evaluation at selected sites 
ATMOSPHERIC MEASUREMENT METHODS DEVELOPMENT 
The EPA carbon fiber monitoring research program is also addressing the 
need for measurement technology to determine ambient air concentrations of 
carbon fibers. This capability is needed for problem assessment applications, 
including the monitoring of areas near known major sources and the determina- 
tion of long-term trends in airborne fiber levels. 
Current projects were initiated late in FY 1979 as follows: 
. Optical and Chemical Measurement of Carbon Fibers. A two-year study 
through a contract with Bionetics Corporation involves the development 
of analytical procedures for carbon fibers collected on membrane 
filters. Methods to be studied include carbon fiber mass determina- 
tion by high temperature combustion and fiber counting by light 
scattering. 
. Development of Generator and Low-Cost Sampler. A research grant has 
been awarded to the University of Minnesota for the development of a 
procedure to generate well-defined carbon fiber aerosols and an 
economical carbon fiber collector for ambient air use. 
. Development of Continuous or Semi-Continuous Measurement Methods for -- 
Carbon Fibers. A two-year project at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 
funded through an interagency agreement with the Department of Energy, 
involves the evaluation of alternative sampling and analysis strategies, 
and the design, fabrication.and testing of a prototype sampling and 
analysis system. 
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Characteristics and Environmental Effects of Carbon Fiber Aerosols. 
Through a research grant to the University of Arkansas, a three-year 
project is in progress to study carbon fiber release mechanisms, 
aerodynamic transport properties, and surface deposition charac- 
teristics. The development of a continuous ambient air monitor is 
another objective. 
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Figure l.- SEM micrograph of fiber residue following 
exposure of graphite/epoxy sample [Fortafil 5 
(Great Lakes Carbon)] for 5 minutes at 1000° C. 
Figure 2.- SEM micrograph of carbon fibers [Thornell 300 
(Union Carbide)] after exposure for 3.5 minutes at 
1000~ c. 
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EFFECTS OF CARBON/GRAPHITE FIBER CONTAMINATION ON 
HIGH VOLTAGE ELECTRICAL INSULATION 
Thomas Garrity 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Charles Eichler 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
East Pittsburgh, PA 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
The burning and/or explosion of carbon/graphite composites has been demonstrated to re- 
lease large numbers of small, electrically conductive carbon/graphite fibers into the atmosphere. 
These fibers are propagated by air currents over large areas as they settle back down to the earth. 
The length spectrum, electrical conductivity and propagation characteristics have been character- 
ized in detail by others. During the course of air propagation and settling, these conductive fibers 
come in contact with all structures located in the propagation path, including electrical power sys- 
tems. The electrically conductive nature of these fibers caused concern over the potential effects 
of exposure to electrical power systems. To determine the degree of hazard posed, the U.S. De- 
partment of Energy, through its contractor, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, initiated a testing 
and evaluation program to quantify the effects of carbon/graphite exposure to high voltage electri- 
cal insulation and to power plant and substation control systems. This work was carried out in 
close cooperation with the NASA risk assessment program. 
POWER SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
The basic elements of a power system are shown, in simplified form, in Figure 1. These basic 
elements consist of: 
1) Power plants 
2) Bulk power substations 
3) Transmission system 
4) Transmission substations 
5) Subtransmission system 
6) Distribution substation 
7) Distribution system 
8) Utilization voltages 
All of these components may be exposed to carbon/graphite fiber contamination. The areas of in- 
vestigation are the vulnerability of high voltage insulation and the vulnerability of power plants 
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and substation control systems. These areas encompass all of the eight enumerated power system 
components except utilization voltages. The vulnerability of utilization voltage installations and 
industrial plants is being evaluated by others. 
The evaluation of high voltage insulation vulnerability to carbon/graphite fiber-induced fail- 
ure required implementation of a laboratory testing program. A contamination test chamber was 
constructed, a fiber chopper was built and a high voltage power supply was assembled. Represent- 
ative samples of distribution class (2400 Volts to 35 kV) and transmission class (over 35 kV) insul- 
ators were selected for testing. 
CONTAMINATION SYSTEM 
The contamination system includes the fiber chopper, dispersal chamber, air ducts and blow- 
er, and contamination chamber. A floor plan of this system is shown in Figure 2. 
Fiber Chopper 
The fiber chopper is a multi-knife roller type manufactured by Binks which was modified to 
cut the relatively light-weight carbon fiber and to operate at low speeds. Figure 3 shows a schemat- 
ic of the chopper. This chopper has various multi-knife rollers to cut different lengths of fiber. 
During normal operation, a single end of fiber is fed off a I 14-g (l/4-lb) roll into the chopper. 
Dispersal Chamber 
The dispersal chamber was designed to mix air with the chopped fibers and collect any 
clumps of fibers which may be generated by the chopper. A diagram of the dispersal chamber is 
shown in Figure 4. The dispersal chamber is constructed entirely of clear LEXAN sheeting material 
so its operation is clearly visible from the outside. 
Contamination Chamber 
The chamber provides dispersion and confinement of the fibers and maximum visibility of 
the test object. The layout of the chamber is shown in Figure 2. The chamber is constructed of 
.64-cm (.25-in) LEXAN sheeting coated with an anti-static compound and assembled with structural 
fiberglass and nylon fasteners. Structural members are external so the inside walls are smooth and 
clear of any projections to prevent any accumulation of fibers and to facilitate cleaning of the 
chamber. The dimensions of the chamber are 2.44 x 2.44 x 3.05 meters (8’ x 8’ x 10’). 
Air Ducts and Suction Blower 
The air ducts and suction blower transport the chopped fibers from the dispersal chamber 
into the contamination chamber. The suction blower also collects fibers during the contamination 
tests and during the clean-up of the chamber after a test. The air flow through the contamination 
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chamber is controlled by an air by-pass at the suction blower. The location of the air ducts and 
suction blower are shown in Figure 2. 
Lighting 
Experiments were made with light positioning to obtain the best view of the test. The trans- 
parent chamber made changing light positioning simple. Finally, three 150 watt spotlights mount- 
ed in a triangle arrangement over the test object were found to allow good visual observation of 
the airborne fiber movements. 
HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY 
IEEE Standard 4, “Standard Techniques for High Voltage Testing” recommends that a high 
voltage supply with an rms fault current of at least three to six amperes should be used for artific- 
ial contamination tests. Testing experience has shown that these fault current capabilities will re- 
sult in five percent or less error in determining the disruptive discharge voltage. Therefore, the 
main design criterion selected for the high voltage supply was that it should produce at least 5 am- 
peres of fault current at the lowest contemplated test voltage, 4 kV. There is no guarantee that the 
IEEE recommendations will apply directly to carbon fiber testing, but it is the best guideline avail- 
able for contamination testing. 
In order to minimize cost and delivery time, it was decided to design the high voltage supply 
using standard distribution transformers rather than ordering a custom built supply. In this partic- 
ular design a distribution transformer can be energized from a 240 volt supply and the voltage 
stepped up to distribution class levels. A standard variable autotransformer can be used to adjust 
the test voltage by varying the voltage supplied to the low voltage side of the distribution trans- 
former. It soon became apparent in pursuing this design that severe requirements are placed on the 
autotransformer if a single distribution transformer is chosen to supply test voltages from 4 kV up 
to approximately 30 kV. If a single distribution transformer was selected to supply 5 amps of fault 
current at 4 kV, then the fault current at 30 kV would be 37.5 amps. 37.5 amps of current sup- 
plied at 30 kV would subject the variable autotransformer to approximately 4,700 amps of current 
during an insulator flashover. The 4,700 amps of fault current is beyond the capability of readily 
available variable autotransformers. Considering the variable autotransformer limitations and dis- 
tribution transformers which were readily available, it was decided to design the high voltage 
supply utilizing two different configurations. Figure 5 shows the configuration used for supplying 
test voltages from 4 kV to 15 kV and Figure 6 shows the supply configuration for producing test 
voltages from 15 kV to 30 kV. 
By using the single distribution transformer scheme shown in Figure 5, fault currents of 5.6 
amps and 2 1 amps were supplied at test voltages of 4 kV and 15 kV respectively. 
In the scheme shown in Figure 6, three distribution transformers were placed in cascade to 
produce test voltages from 15 kV up to 30 kV. The fault currents available range from 4.5 amps at 
15 kV to 9 amps at 30 kV. With this configuration the distribution transformer at ground poten- 
tial steps the voltage up to 15 kV and energizes the transformers on the insulated platform. The 
transformers on the insulated platform then boost the test voltage by another 15 kV for a total of 
up to 30 kV on the test object. In later tests on transmission voltage class insulators two more dis- 
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tribution transformers were placed in cascade with the first three transformers to produce test 
voltages up to 45 kV line-to-ground. 
Fiber Selected for Testing 
Celanese GY-70 fiber was selected. It was used in all of the contamination tests. At high vol- 
tages the fiber resistivity becomes relatively insignificant. GY-70 was selected because of ease of 
chopping and its resistance to clumping after being chopped. 
Fall Velocity Measurement 
An improved method was developed for measurement of the mean fiber fall velocity during 
chamber operation. To measure fall velocity two sticky tapes were placed in the chamber, one 
covered and the other uncovered. The chopper was operated for 15 minutes. The chopper and 
blower were turned off and the second sticky tape uncovered allowing fiber in the air to settle on 
the sticky tape. If fibers from top to bottom of the chamber is assumed to be evenly distributed 
the number of fibers on the sticky tape uncovered at chopper shutdown corresponds to the fiber 
in a volume of air above it at the time of shutdown so concentration can be determined. The total 
15 minute sticky tape count corresponds to the total amount of fiber chopped. Determination of 
velocity was made as follows: 
E = Exposure 
Sl = Fiber count on sticky tape uncovered at chopper shutdown 
s2 = Fiber count on sticky tape left uncovered through the entire test 
c = Average concentration 
v = Fiber velocity 
vol = Volume above sticky tape 
T = Total time chopper was run 
c = Concentration 
Then: 
s2 - 
E=V=C xT (1) 
Solving for V: 
S2 v= 7 
C XT 
(2) 
but if it is assumed that average concentration is approximately the concentration at shutdown: 
so, 
Sl C~C?-- 
vol 
VZ 
s2 x vol 
S1 XT 
(3) 
(4) 
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This method provides an alternate way of determining fiber fall velocity. Several tests were per- 
formed and the average velocity for 2 mm tests was determined to be 2 cm/set. 
CONTAMINATION TESTING 
Several representative samples of distribution class insulation were selected for testing. These 
are enumerated in Table 1. The samples include pin insulators, line posts, station posts, transform- 
er bushings, and suspension insulators. Rated voltages range from 5 kV to 34.5 kV. The samples 
selected cover the range of generic classes of distribution insulation present on modern power dis- 
tribution systems throughout the United States. 
Test Procedure 
Each test was begun by mounting an insulator in the chamber and placing sticky tape near it. 
After the chamber door was sealed rated voltage was applied to the insulator and the charged ball 
detectors were activated. Then fiber material was injected into the chamber until flashover. 
After flashover the fiber chopper was shut off, the fiber count from the charged balls and the 
time to flashover recorded, and the sticky tape removed and a count made. 
Three parameters were monitored during tests; exposure, fiber length distribution, and con- 
centration. These characteristics were monitored with sticky tapes and charged balls. 
The sticky tape count is used to determine exposures up to 10’ fiber-sec/m3, but for greater 
exposures accurate counts cannot be made due to high fiber densities on the sticky tape. For these 
greater exposures the charged ball count was used. (The charged ball detection system, utilizing 
two differentially connected charged balls, is the same as that used by NASA and others in their 
testing programs and is shown in Figure 7.) 
Fiber Lengths Selected for Contamination Testing 
The fiber lengths selected for contamination testing were 2 mm nominal, 4.3 mm nominal, 9 
mm nominal, and 10.8 mm nominal. In addition, combinations of fiber lengths were chopped 
simultaneously during selected tests. These combinations were 4.3 mm and 9 mm, and 9 mm and 
10.8 mm. Each of these nominal lengths and combination of nominal lengths has a fiber length 
distribution associated with it and these are shown for the 2 mm, 4.3 mm, 9 mm, 10.8 mm, 4.3 
mm plus 9 mm, and 9 mm plus 10.8 mm cases in Figures 8 through 13, respectively. Table 2 lists 
the significant parameters of these different length distributions. The actual fiber release spectrum 
for an accidental release as postulated by NASA is shown superimposed with the 2 mm fiber 
length spectrum in Figure 14. The fiber length spectrum for accidentally released fibers lies be- 
tween that for 2 mm fibers and 4.3 mm fibers. However, the 4.3 mm fiber length distribution con- 
tains a far greater number of relatively long fibers than the fiber length distribution for acciden- 
tally released fibers. Hence the testing results for 2 mm fibers are, within testing accuracy, deemed 
the best overall representation of insulator performance under accidental release contamination. 
For the sake of conservation, an estimate of vulnerability between that for 2 mm and 4.3 mm 
fibers can be chosen for distribution class insulation vulnerability assessment. A wide range of fiber 
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lengths and combinations of lengths was chosen to allow determination of the dynamic range and 
trends of insulator vulnerability to conducting fibers. This allows for a greater understanding of 
the contamination mechanics and resulting failure modes. 
Effects of Weathering 
Insulators installed outdoors on a utility distribution system have received a certain amount 
of weathering. These weathered insulators, though ideal for testing, are difficult to obtain in the 
numbers and variety necessary to this test program. Clean, new insulators are readily obtainable. 
In order for clean, new insulator samples to be tested in this program it was necessary to establish 
that their behavior under carbon/graphite fiber contamination does not differ significantly from 
that of weathered insulators. Samples of weathered 7.5 kV pin insulators were obtained from a 
local utility. Samples of new insulators of the same type were purchased from a supplier. Both 
groups were tested with 9 mm fibers and the results of the test series are shown in Figure 15. It 
can be seen that there is no statistical differences between the mean exposure to fail at 95 percent 
confidence level. 
Hence, new insulators were used throughout the remainder of the test program as test sam- 
ples with confidence that their behavior models that expected under field conditions. 
TEST RESULTS 
The data on exposure to flashover are presented in Table 4 for each test series performed. For 
uniformity and to facilitate comparisons all data were plotted on Weibull paper for analysis since 
this distribution provided the best fit. “o is the theoretical minimum exposure at which flashover 
is possible. It is a parameter necessary m making a Weibull curve fit. For these data an a0 = 0 was 
selected because we can IX: confident that 0 is a lower limit to flashover exposure and also most of 
the data fit best when a :‘I !7;. Each graph indicates the number of tests, the mean and standard 
deviation of the data, an$a and $ of the Weibull curve fit. 
Confidence Intervals 
Established techniques were used in placing confidence intervals about mean flashover ex- 
posure of an experiment. Because the data distribution is non-Gaussian, the technique utilized in 
placing confidence intervals about the mean is the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test. A description of 
this test may be found in the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 91. 
For each confidence interval about the mean the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test is performed 
twice, once for the upper limit and once for the lower limit. In order to determine the confidence 
interval, the upper and lower limit must be assumed. After making the assumption, the Wilcoxon 
test is utilized. If a level of significance, a = .025, is obtained then the limit has been found. If the 
desired level of significance is not obtained then a new assumed value of a limit must be chosen 
and the test performed again. 
Another method of data evaluation discussed by Guttman and Wilkes in Introductory Engi- 
neering Statistics makes no assumption about the distribution of samples and places a probability 
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of obtaining a flashover below the lowest observed exposure. This method states that the number 
of observations required so that the probability is 6 that at least 1 - a of the distribution will ex- 
ceed the smallest observation of the sample is given by: 
,=- 
log (1 -a) 
(5) 
From this we can derive the statement that with 6 confidence, there is no more than a prob- 
ability of obtaining a flashover at an exposure below the least observed exposure of n tests or a = 
1 - (1 - 6)1/n. Table 3 shows the relationship between the number of tests and the probability of 
obtaining flashovers below the lowest observed exposure with confidence levels of 85%, 90%, and 
95%. This table indicates that a large number of tests is required to establish the lower end of the 
flashover exposure curve for the confidence level listed. For example, 45 tests are required to es- 
tablish 90% confidence that no more than 5% of an insulator type would flashover at an exposure 
less than the minimum observed exposure. 
Table 4 summarizes data for all insulators tested. It shows the number of tests, the nominal 
fiber length of contaminating fibers, exposures; means and standard deviations, confidence limits 
about the mean exposures, minimum exposures, probability of obtaining an exposure less than 
the minimum, and the mean fiber concentrations during the experiment. 
Short Fiber Tests 
As discussed earlier the performance of distribution class insulation contaminated by short 
(2 mm) fibers is believed to be the most representative of what would be expected in an actual ac- 
cidental fiber release. Studies have shown that most of the fibers at locations any distance away 
from the burn site would be short, averaging 2 mm to 2.5 mm. Figure 14 illustrated the fiber 
length distribution postulated by NASA for an accidental release superimposed on the 2 mm fiber 
length distribution used for the 2 mm tests in this report. The tests performed with 2 mm fibers 
indicate mean flashover exposures of approximately 10s fiber-set/m 3 for distribution class insula- 
tion. 
2 mm and 4.3 mm test data are found in Table 4. Only a limited quantity of 2 mm fiber test 
data are available because of the extended time required to complete each test. 
Wet Tests 
Wet insulation tests were conducted with 2 mm fibers to simulate actual fiber releases under 
heavy fog conditions. Insulator surfaces were wetted continuously during the tests by vapor con- 
densing as it passed over the surfaces. The insulator was contaminated with airborne contamina- 
tion. Wet surfaces were found to decrease the exposure required for flashover. There was great 
variability in the degree that wet testing lowered mean exposure to flashover. The 15-kV distribu- 
tion post insulator test results showed only a slight decrease in exposure to flashover while the 
7.5-kV pin insulator test results showed a great decrease in exposure to flashover. This can be seen 
in Table 4. Fibers show a greater tendency to stick to wet insulator surfaces than dry, lowering the 
exposure required to induce flashover. Also, the rising steam carries fibers up over the surface, 
contaminating lower surfaces which are normally shielded. The wet fibers tend to stick together in 
241 
strings which align in the direction of the voltage gradients. This may also decrease flashover 
exposure. The wet tests give more consistent results than dry tests with less variability of data. For 
wet tests oIP X 25% was obtained as compared to O/P w 50% for dry tests. The severity of contam- 
ination of an insulator, wet from condensate, is usually greater than of one wet from pouring rain 
because running water over the insulator’s surface would clean the insulator. 
Long Fiber Tests 
Test series with longer fibers had the advantage of being performed quickly since failures oc- 
cur at much lower exposures. The data were also more consistent so these tests were better used 
to show trends in the data. The disadvantage is that in actual release situations very few long fibers 
are released, therefore long fiber tests are not representative of actual releases as predicted by 
NASA. 
The usefulness of long fiber tests lies in application of trends discovered to predict data for 
more difficult tests such as short fiber or higher voltage tests. In many cases trends are indicated 
but not enough data exists to substantiate them. The next section discusses trends observed in the 
data. 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Test results were examined to determine the effects of fiber length, concentration, and volt- 
age class on exposure to flashover of distribution class insulation. The effect of an accidental re- 
lease on an actual power distribution system is reviewed. 
The Effect of Fiber Length on Exposure to Flashover 
Tests were performed on selected insulator specimens using several different fiber lengths. 
Mean exposure to flashover was determined at each length. Tests at several fiber lengths indicate 
an exponential relationship be een mean fiber 1ength.L and mean exposure to flashover E. E was 
found to be proportional to e !% . The curves shown in Figure 16 indicate this trend in the data. 
The mean fiber length for tests with multiple fiber lengths also fits the exponential exposure curve 
as shown in the same figure. 
The objective of the multiple fiber length tests was to determine the effect of irregular fiber 
length distributions on exposure to flashover. Test results indicate that even for unusual length dis- 
tributions the mean fiber length can be used to obtain an approximation of flashover exposure. 
Test time could be reduced if data from tests with long fibers could be extrapolated to the 
shorter fibers that would actually be released. As Figure 16 indicates, results of 9 mm and 10.8 
mm test data could be used to indicate the results of 2 mm tests but the exposure to flashover pre- 
dicted could be very inaccurate. For example, the results of actual tests on a 7.5 kV pin with 2 
mm fibers indicate a mean flashover exposure of 2.8 x lo8 but a flashover at over 10’ o would 
have been predicted if only a line drawn through the 9 and 10.8 mm test data had been used. 
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To obtain a reasonably accurate prediction of short fiber flashover exposures, tests should be 
performed with at least three different longer fiber lengths such as 12, 8, and 4 mm. 
The Effect of Fiber Concentration on Exposure to Flashover 
The fiber concentration for the test series was somewhat controllable by varying the speed of 
the fiber chopper driving motor and by varying air flow through the dispersal chamber. Measured 
average concentrations vary as much as 3 to 1 during a given test series with test conditions un- 
changed. This is due to fiber clumping in the dispersal chamber, occasional chopper plugging, 
measurement inaccuracy, and the random nature of the phenomenon. 
The concentration given for each test series in Table 4 represents the average over all the 
series test times. This average is determined by: 
Concentration = IZ exposure 
2 test time 
(6) 
Preliminary tests with long fibers indicate that lowering concentration levels tends to increase 
mean flashover exposures. This phenomenon was observed when accidental increases in concentra- 
tion precipitated a flashover on several occasions. Although a limited number of tests indicate 
there is an effect, more tests are needed for quantification of this effect. Figures 17, 18, and 19 
show the effect on test results of varying the concentration. Since concentrations expected in an 
accidental fiber release at any distance away from the release point are less than those used for 
testing, the test results of exposure to flashover may be conservative. Current predictions for an 
actual release indicate fiber concentrations of approximately 100 fibers per cubic meter may be 
expected. 
The longer fiber length tests indicated a possible effect on concentration, but no pronounced 
concentration effect was observed during short fiber tests. Test concentrations for the short fiber 
tests were maintained at over lo4 in an effort to shorten test times. No short fiber tests were made 
at lesser concentrations to determine the effect of concentration. All indications are that break- 
down of test specimens is a fiber deposition related surface phenomenon even though concentra- 
tions are high. Although variations in flashover exposure with concentration were observed, no evi- 
dence of air breakdown was noted. 
The Effect of Voltage Class on Exposure to Flashover 
Tests on a given type of insulator indicate that mean exposure to flashover decreases as insul- 
ator rated voltage increases. The 9 and 10.8 mm data on pin cap insulators, transformer bushings, 
and distribution post insulators shown in Table 4 indicate this trend. This trend may not be ap- 
plicable to station class insulation. It is hoped that future tests will clarify this trend. 
Other Trends 
Station insulation is designed with much larger creepage distances than is line insulation. As 
would be expected, station insulation is much more resistant to carbon fiber contamination. The 
exposure required to cause flashover for station insulation is so high that testing even with long 
fibers is very time consuming. 
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The mean exposure to flashover for insulators mounted vertically is lower than for the same 
insulators mounted horizontally in most cases. This trend is indicated in Table 4 by the data for 9 
mm fiber lengths on the 15 kV distribution post and the 7.5 kV station post. The data on the 5 kV 
transformer bushing is not consistent with this trend. Since it is a spin top bushing different results 
are expected. For a spin top bushing the top electrode is enclosed and covered. There are holes in 
the sides around the high voltage electrode for wire entrance. When the 5 kV bushing is mounted 
vertically the fibers are better shielded from the more critical insulation near the high voltage con- 
ductor. 
Another trend observed is that insulators with similar geometry have similar mean exposures 
to flashover as well as similar flashover probability distributions. For example, the 15 kV trans- 
former bushing gives results very similar to the 15 kV distribution post. This is probably because 
insulator shapes and creepage distances are similar. The transformer bushing creepage is 28 cm 
while the distribution post creepage is 25 cm and the transformer bushing dry arcing distance is 17 
cm while the distribution post dry arcing distance is 15 cm. There are 5 sheds on the transformer 
bushing and only 3 on the distribution post. The transformer bushing sheds are closer together 
which could offset the greater creepage distance since fibers are long enough to bridge some of the 
creepage distance. 
EFFECTS OF CARBON FIBER CONTAMINATION ON POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
Portions of the actual power distribution systems surrounding selected major airports are 
being evaluated by NASA to determine the degree of hazard posed by a worst-case accidental fiber 
release. Technical information on the types and number of insulators in the areas immediately sur- 
rounding the selected airports was obtained by NASA from the electric utility companies serving 
these areas. This information was used in conjunction with the Waltz Mill chamber test data on dis- 
tribution class insulation to evaluate the vulnerability of the power distribution systems. The vuln- 
erability calculations were performed by NASA in conjunction with the development of the com- 
puterized risk models. 
The carbon fiber exposures predicted by the NASA fiber release models indicate a worst case 
of about lo5 fiber-seconds/m3 with the vast majority of releases less than lo3 fiber-seconds/m3. 
The areas of maximum exposure involved in these worst case scenarios are on the order of one 
square kilometer. These areas of high exposure are small and the worst case exposures are 3 to 5 
orders of magnitude below the mean exposure required to fail distribution class insulation with 2 
mm fibers. The probability of inducing extensive insulation failures was shown to be negligible. 
The outage incidence due to accidental carbon fiber releases is insignificant when compared 
to the current distribution system outage rates normally experienced by these electric utilities 
due to such occurrences as lightning, tree contact, vehicular damage, etc. The NASA calculations 
were performed to verify this. Results of these calculations were presented earlier.(l) 
SLURRY DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of the slurry development and the efforts to discover trends relating voltage to 
flashover exposure is to allow testing of transmission class insulation without the use of an air- 
borne contamination test chamber. The objective is to develop a technique for performing these 
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tests “synthetically”. Work was performed on the development of a slurry testing technique to 
supplant airborne fiber testing in a contamination chamber. It was found that: 
1. Shorter fibers do not clump as easily in the slurry. The question remaining is whether 
2 or 4.3 mm fiber is better for testing. 
2. Resistance measurements do not work in determining how many fibers are in the slurry. 
3. A binder or thickening agent is needed in the slurry to keep fibers on the insulator sur- 
face. A wetting agent alone was utilized and too many fibers slid off the surface. 
Two things are required for a slurry to be useful. First, a requirement of a useful slurry is 
a method of correlating results to make them meaningful in the case of an actual airborne con- 
tamination problem. Results can be correlated by using a standard slurry which flashes near the 
operating voltage of an insulator and then comparing other insulators by determining the voltage 
at which they flash. Another way of correlating results is always testing at rated voltage and vary- 
ing slurry fiber density to obtain flashover at the rated voltage. 
Varying the voltage is more useful because it is more easily and quickly done. The greatest 
value of a slurry is in allowing relative comparisons between insulators. It is doubtful that direct 
correlation could be made between slurry and airborne contamination in all circumstances. 
A second requirement is a method of measuring fiber density in the slurry. One possible solu- 
tion to this problem is to measure the fibers put into the slurry by weight. Otherwise, expensive 
particle counters set up to count particles in a suspension could be utilized. To verify the applic- 
ability of determining fiber density by fiber weight measurements, work needs to be performed to 
determine if water evaporation or insulator dipping would cause appreciable changes in slurry fiber 
density. 
The slurry can be used either dry or wet. The following points should be considered when de- 
ciding whether it is better wet or dry. The wet slurry allows more rapid testing and less delay be- 
cause there is no wait for insulators to dry. However, results are not so reproducible if insulators 
are tested wet because they need to be handled to be mounted. Also, the uneven drying caused by 
leakage currents heating the surface during testing could change flashover characteristics. 
The dried slurry binds fibers so no change in orientation occurs during testing. When the dry 
slurry was tried some’ of the fibers on the insulator surfaces jumped out of the binder and off the 
surface. A dried slurry would allow multiple dipping which would be convenient for increasing 
fiber deposition on the insulator surfaces. 
To enable correlation of deposition on insulators at flashover to slurry depositions, qualita- 
tive deposition measurements were made. This was done for the airborne tests by sticking trans- 
parent tape on contaminated insulator surfaces and using it to lift the fibers. The tape was pre- 
served by placing it on white paper. The fiber does not deposit evenly over insulator surfaces. For 
short fiber tests upper surfaces have fibers piled up before lower surfaces are contaminated enough 
to cause flashover. 
Further development of slurry techniques will enable an investigation of binders to be used 
for the slurry. One is Metylan wallpaper paste. The other is Cab-o-Sil, a pyrogenic silica. Prelimin- 
ary testing was done using a Metylan slurry. Best results were obtained with approximately 13 
grams of Metylan per liter of water. Flashover of a 7.5 kV pin insulator occurred near rated voltage 
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when the insulator was dipped, allowed to dry, dipped again in a solution with 1.4 gms of fiber 
per liter of solution, and allowed to dry again. A selection of fiber length, binder, and the test 
method will be made as future work. 
Work to be Performed in the Future 
0 Continue slurry development and evaluation of transmission class insulation vulner- 
ability. 
0 The power supply will be uprated to 40 kV line-to-ground. 
0 Investigate power supply requirements for DC testing. 
0 Data analysis will be continued and tests made to better establish observed trends. 
0 Limited testing will be performed with air flow across insulator surfaces to examine the 
effects of wind on flashover characteristics. 
VULNERABILITY OF NUCLEAR, FOSSIL, AND HYDRO 
GENERATING PLANTS TO CARBON/GRAPHITE FIBER INDUCED OUTAGES 
This study evaluated the ability of power generating stations to maintain normal power 
generation when the surrounding environment is contaminated by an accidental carbon fiber re- 
lease. Loss of nonessential equipment is not considered critical since loss of the plant does not re- 
sult. The vulnerability assessment included only the power plant generating equipment and its 
associated controls, instrumentation, and auxiliary and support systems. It specifically excludes 
exposed outdoor high voltage substations, but includes the substation’s controls. The outdoor sub- 
station high voltage equipment is being evaluated separately using insulation failure data deter- 
mined under Phase II of this project. 
This study includes the following types of power plants: 
0 Nuclear power plants 
0 Coal fired power plants 
0 Oil and gas fired power plants 
0 Hydroelectric power plants 
0 Gas turbine-generators. 
Investigative Methodology 
During NASA investigations into the vulnerability of civil aircraft to carbon fiber release it 
became apparent that detailed testing of every item in the aircraft was not necessary. This was be- 
cause not all components are critical and only a certain few are likely to be both critical and highly 
vulnerable. The analysis procedure involves identifying the critical systems and selecting items 
from these systems for tests based on an engineering evaluation of vulnerability using test data on 
generically similar or related components. It has been demonstrated that reasonably accurate es- 
I 
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timates of carbon fiber vulnerability can be made for items on which test data on generically sim- 
ilar items is available. These generic classes of equipment include such things as TTL logic on PC 
boards-coated/uncoated, terminal strips - .64-cm (l/4-in) spacing, cabinets with top and bottom 
louvers - natural circulation, etc. This approach has been adopted for estimating the vulnerability 
of the control systems in power plants and substations. 
The investigation of power plants and substation vulnerability proceeded along the following 
lines: 
1. Detailed discussions were held with Gibbs & Hill, Inc. to obtain the design details of 
nuclear and fossil fired power plants. The designs of typical plants were reviewed for 
vulnerability to fiber penetration regarding outside air entrance points, air filtering, 
plant internal heating, ventillation and air conditioning, and control room air supplies. 
Using this information, along with transfer function test results for commercial air 
filters, carbon/graphite fiber transfer functions were determined with assistance from 
NASA for the numerous functional areas of each type of power plant. This permits an 
evaluation of expected fiber exposures to equipment in these areas. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
From these design drawings of typical power plants, and from power equipment manu- 
facturer’s technical literature lists have been compiled of the generic types of equipment 
in the different functional areas in the power plants under consideration. 
These lists were refined to identify only the critical functions and equipment in each 
type of power plant. 
Existing test data on generically similar types of equipment, or on related equipment 
if available, has been assembled. This is used in light of vulnerability testing experience 
and engineering judgement based on the generic classes of components present to assess 
the vulnerability of the individual critical components. 
Each type of power plant was then evaluated in light of expected release scenarios to 
determine its vulnerability to carbon fiber releases. 
The vulnerability analysis of substation controls proceeded along similar lines with 
typical substation control layouts, building details, air filter data, and technical infor- 
mation on equipment having been obtained. The vulnerability analysis relative to criti- 
cal components also proceeded in a similar manner. 
STATUS AND RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 
fossil 
During the course of the investigation it became apparent that the area transfer functions’ for 
fired plants were essentially the same for corresponding plant areas regardless of the plant 
fuel type. In other words the functional area transfer functions are equivalent for corresponding 
areas of coal fired, gas fired, and oil fired power plants. The area transfer functions calculated for 
these plant types are applied to all the generic fossil fuel-fired power plants considered in the an- 
alysis. 
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It also became apparent that the control equipment located in these plants is generically 
equivalent regardless of the type of plant. For example, a control computer can be expected to 
have the same vulnerability to carbon/graphite fibers regardless of the type of plant it is located in. 
This same principle applies to other typical power plant and substation control equipment. 
Table 5 itemizes the functional areas for the generic power plants and substations under con- 
sideration. It also shows: 
The type of air filter typically utilized for air filtration in each functional plant area. 
ASHRAE dust spot efficiency for the filters above (conservative) and filter transfer 
function. 
Volume and floor area for each functional area in each plant (typical). 
Air infiltration and circulation rates. 
The calculated area carbon/graphite fiber transfer function for each area. 
The expected range for typical and worst case carbon/graphite exposures to equipment 
located inside each area. 
The assessed or estimated mean exposure to fail for the most sensitive component in 
each area. 
It can be seen from Table 5 that the mean exposure required to fail the most sensitive critical 
component in each area is several orders of magnitude greater than the worst exposure it is ex- 
pected to ever receive. The probability of inducing a failure in a component under these conditions 
is extremely small. The equation below is used to calculate the probability of component failure, 
Pf, due to carbon/graphite fiber contamination. 
pf=l- -E 
eE- 
(7) 
It can be seen that this probability of failure, for the expected exposures, is on the order of 
10e5 to 10m7 during any given exposure incident. However, these components generally have an 
inherently much higher probability of failure in any given year of normal service due to malfunc- 
tions other than those likely to be induced by carbon/graphite exposures. These “routine” mal- 
functions during normal service, and the resulting outage of the particular item involved, are gen- 
erally compensated for through redundancy of this critical equipment at the time of plant design 
and construction. In addition, most automatic control systems, besides redundancy, may allow 
for a manual mode of operation in the event of unit failure. Through this redundancy of design 
and the extremely low probability of a carbon/graphite fiber induced failure, it is concluded that 
accidental releases of carbon/graphite fibers do not pose any unusual hazard to power plant and 
substation control systems. 
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TABLE 2.- FIBER LENGTH 
Nominal Length p (Mean) mm c c 
2.06 2.06 .67 
4.3 4.1 .51 
5.0 4.0 2.1 
9.0 8.6 .74 
9.2 9.8 1.4 
10.8 11.8 2.7 
TABLE 3.- PERCENT OF INSULATORS (a) THAT WILL FAIL AT AN 
EXPOSURE OF LESS THAN MINIMUM SAMPLE 
u (Mode) mm u (Standard Deviation) mm 
Number 
of Tests 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
85% 
85% 
61% 
47% 
38% 
32% 
27% 
24% 
21% 
19% 
17% 
16% 
15% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
11% 
11% 
10% 
10% 
9% 
9% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
vel (6) 
90% 95% 
90% 95% 
68% 78% 
54% 63% 
44% 53% 
37% 45% 
32% 39% 
28% 35% 
25% 31% 
23% 28% 
21% 26% 
19% 24% 
17% 22% 
16% 21% 
15% 19% 
14% 18% 
13% 17% 
13% 16% 
12% 15% 
11% 15% 
11% 14% 
10% 13% 
10% 13% 
10% 12% 
9% 12% 
9% 11% 
8% 11% 
8% 11% 
8% 10% 
8% 10% 
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Figure 1.- Basic elements of a power system. 
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Figure 2.- Contamination system floor plan. 
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Figure 3.- Multi-knife carbon fiber chopper. 
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Figure 5.- High voltage supply for 4 kV to 15 kv. 
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Figure 6.- High voltage supply for 15 kV to 30 kV. 
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Figure 7.- Fiber counting instrumentation. 
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Figure 8.- The 2 mm fiber length distribution plotted 
on normal probability paper. 
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Figure 9.- 4.3 mm fiber length distribution. 
IL2 - 
Il.0 - 
10.8 - 
I(16 - 
IQ4 - 
E 10.2 - 
5 10.0 - MEAN p 8 S.Omm 
= 
5 
9.8- MODE u -8.6mm 
5 9.4 6 - SLOPE /3 = .58 
i 92- 
ii 9.0 - 
a8- 
8.6 - 
8.4 - 
8.2- 
&O- 
7.6 - 
I II llllII I I I I I I I I I 4 
001 .Ol G5.10 2030405090JD .60 .90 .95 .97 .98 990 .m 997.996 .9Bo 
PERCENT OF FIBERS LESS THAN OR EOUAL TO GIVEN LENGTH 
Figure lO.- 9 mm fiber length distribution. 
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Figure 12.- The fiber length spectrum for 4.3 and 9 mm fibers 
combined, plotted on extreme value paper. 
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Figure lx.- The fiber length spectrum for 9 and 10.8 mm fibers 
combined, plotted on extreme value paper. 
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EFFECTS OF CARBON FIBERS ON CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
R. A. Wise and C. D. Lovett 
National Bureau of Standards 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to evaluate the potential effects of carbon fibers 
on consumer products, the Center for Consumer Product Technology 
of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) was called upon due to 
its familiarity with the design, construction, operation and 
features of major and small consumer appliances. The NBS role 
was to develop the basic data needed to estimate hazard and fault 
susceptibility. The calculation of the possibility of hazards 
and faults actually occurring was not included in the NBS study 
nor were any actual fiber exposure tests made by NBS. Home 
entertainment (electronic) and vehicular products were excluded. 
The information we are about to present covers work done by 
NBS under contract' to NASA which will be detailed in a report to 
be delivered to NASA titled: 
Fibers on Home Appliances*. 
A Study of the Effects of Carbon 
H. A. Wise will discuss the test and analytical methods used 
and C. D. Lovett will ttlen describe the method used to select 
products and the results of the NBS activity. 
Once the selection of appliances to be evaluated was made, 
typical models were purchased, and each was disassembled and 
thoroughly evaluated for hazard and fault potential. Follow on 
activity expanded the evaluated products list with particular 
emphasis on gas and oil fired heating products. 
METHODOLOGY 
Hazard Analysis 
Of the hazards considered, fire, flood, physical harm, 
explosion, and electrical shock. only the latter was found to be 
a possible occurrence particularly related to carbon fibers. 
1 Order no. L-81246A. 
2 Lovett, Denver; and Wise, Robert A.: A Study of the Effects of Carbon 
Fibers on Home Appliances, National Bureau of Standards IR 79-1952, 
December 17, 1979. 
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Fires due to arcing or heat from the fiber seem unlikely due to 
the low maximum wattage that fibers can dissipate, but this was 
not experimentally verified. Shock possibilities were considered 
for four classes of product: 
1. 240 volt, direct wired 
2. 120 volt, direct wired 
3. 120 volt, 3 wire. plug-in 
4. 120 volt, 2 wire, plug-in 
Although the first three categories present no shock hazard if 
the appliances are manufactured and installed correctly and the 
electrical distribution system is correct, all categories were 
analyzed due to the possibility of an electrical ground 
connection being disconnected or of a three wire grounded plug 
being defeated. Since no current flows when a carbon fiber makes 
a connection between an electrical conductor and an ungrounded 
touchable conductive part of an appliance, the fiber will not 
burn out; and, since fibers are low enough in resistance to allow 
a current to flow that is large enough to cause a sensible shock, 
all non-insulated electrical conductors were examined. First 
determined was the distance of exposed electrical conductive 
parts (mostly terminals, frequently referred to as nodes) from 
any touchable conductive surface. If the distance was less than 
20 mm a possible hazard was considered to exist. The 20 mm was 
selected on the assumption that fibers longer than 20 mm are not 
likely to find their way into home appliances. The exception to 
a simple distance measurement of uninsulated electrical 
connections was with open wire heaters. Such designs were 
evaluated by measuring the length of the heater wire or coil that 
was less than 20 mm from the chassis. 
All potentially hazardous locations were then evaluated as 
tc their enclosure (restriction to entrance of fibers). 
insulation of the nearby grounded surface (paint or enamel), air 
circulation, and whether the circuit was electrically energized 
all of the time or only when switched on. On permanently 
installed appliances only the ungrounded electrical parts (those 
not connected to the neutral incoming power line) were considered 
potentially hazardous. However, plug-in appliances could be 
connected with either input wire at above ground potential so all 
exposed conductors were evaluated for such appliances. 
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Figure 1 shows a simplified schematic diagram of an 
appliance. The load IL" might be considered as a single device 
or a very complex assembly of electrical controls and operators. 
In any case, it can be seen that with an ungrounded chassis, line 
voltage from the chassis to ground measured at "V" could result 
from a fiber connection anywhere along the electrical circuit 
such as at "A", "BI, or "C'. These would result in an electrical 
shock if a person located at IV1 touched the chassis at the same 
time as he touched a nearby grounded conductor. All three 
connectors are affected by the polarity of the plug-in 
connections and the connection at "B' is affected by the setting 
of the on-off switch. 
Fault Analysis 
A fault was considered to be any effect on the performance 
of an appliance which would result in a complaint or require 
service action. Figure 2 is a simplified electrical schematic 
showing some typical electrical circuits. It can be seen that 
fibers across 240 or 120 volt components such as heaters 'H,' 
motors "M," etc. can have no effect since they only constitute a 
very small additional load on the power supply and will quickly 
burn out. Recognizing the very low current carrying capacity of 
fibers, fibers across switch connections "S" are generally no 
p r o b 1 e m . The only possible faults that can arise are those shown 
at locations 1 and 2. Fibers located at these positions where a 
switch operates a very low current device such as a timer motor 
"Tff or relay "K," (under 10 watts) could cause the timer to run 
or the relay to close. Very few cases were found where such 
conditions exist, and these were tested with a carbon fiber 
simulator. This is an electronic device developed at the Langley 
Research Center and supplied to NB, C to simulate fibers of various 
resistances and their burnout characteristics. Electronic 
controls have recently begun to replace electro-mechanical 
controls on a few consumer products so an attempt was made to 
determine the effect of fibers on these electronic controls 
through circuit analysis. The number of potential problems that 
could arise was very high, and actrlal exposure testinp in a 
chamber was the only evaluation possible. However, all such 
products had their electronic parts well enclosed: so the 
likelihood of a fiber falling on such circuits is extremely 
remote. 
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Market Statistics 
An analysis of market statistics resulted in estimates of 
the total depreciated 1977 dollar value in U.S. homes of $50 
billion for major appliances and $10 billion for small 
appliances. Using the total depreciated dollar value, appliance 
categories accounting for 80% of the estimated total values were 
identified and subsequently 59 models representative of these 
categories were selected. These selected models include 
specific models that are (1) representative of appliances in the 
field (2) representative of changing technology in appliances and 
(3) appliances that have rapid growth trends. In addition to 
these 59 rnodels other household consunier products and equipment2 
were examined to deterrnine if carbon fibers might have an adverse 
effect. 
Faults 
Forty-seven of the 59 appliances were nonelectronic and were 
considered amenable to evaluation by probe testing and analysis. 
The evaluation determined the potential faults and hazards that 
could occur if fibers should enter the electrical circuits of 
these selected appliances. In these 47 appliances examined, 23 
potential faults were detected. Twenty of these faults were of 
minor consequence, such .as indicator lights operating when not 
expected. The remaining 3 faults could result in possible false 
cycles. 
1 Major appliances included: refrigerators, clothes washers, electric 
ranges, freezers, dishwashers, cZothes dryers, microwave ovens. 
SmaZZ appZianees inekded: vacuwn ebaners, irons, toasters, fry 
pans, coffee makers, bed covers, blenders, can openers. 
'Other products and equipment included: fans, driZZs, gas ranges, 
gas clothes dryers, gas furnaces, automatic flue dampers, furnace 
controk, garage door openers. 
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III - 
Hazards 
As explained earlier, an electrical shock depends on several 
conditions occurring at the same time as the user physically 
interfaces with the appliance. Our evaluation of electrical 
shock did not attempt to determine whether the interaction of the 
user provided the right set of conditions to complete a circuit 
between a touchable surface and an available ground. Rather, the 
evaluation counted the number of exposed nodes located close 
enough to a conductive surface for fibers to bridge the gaps, 
thus creating circuits which would allow a voltage to exist on a 
touchable surface. 
Figure 3 shows that these 47 nonelectronic appliances 
contained approximately 1000 exposed nodes. A croup of 947 nodes 
represent low likelihood of hazards because of the following 
restrictive conditions. 
1. 85% of the fibers are expected to have lengths less than 5 
mm so very high exposure will be required for fibers to 
bridge the gaps between any one of 802 nodes and their 
respective adjacent surfaces. 
2. Coated surfaces adjacent to 40 nodes provide insulation. 
3. A group of 105 nodes are well protected by their location in 
nearly closed compartments. 
The remaininp 53 nodes can be divided into two groups. The 
first group of 37 nodes is fout!ci in 19 major appliances. In 
these major appliances the possibility of a hazard depends upon 
the integrity of the ground system. If the ground system is 
intact, the likelihood of hazard occurring is very low. The 
second group of 16 nodes was found in 9 small appliances which 
have no provision for grounding. Figure 4 shows nine small 
appliance rnodels and the number of potentially hazardous nodes. 
Appliance Ground System 
Plug-receptacle compatibility for 3-wire plug-in appliances 
depends on the availability of 3-contact household receptacles 
which are grounded. If plug-receptacle compatibility could be 
assured for all major appliances. then all potentially hazardous 
nodes would be confined to small appliances. Since this is not 
always the case, we identified those appliances for which plug- 
receptacle compatibility is assured and those appliances for 
which plug-receptacle compatibility is questionable. These nlt,jor 
appliances and the corresponding number of potentially hazardous 
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nodes are shown in Figure 5. For example, clothes dryers, ranges 
and dishwashers contained 17 of the 37 hazardous nodes within 
this group of major appliances. Since clothes dryers and ranges 
are 3 wire, 240 volt appliances, their special 3 wire plugs will 
always be provided with compatible 3 wire receptacles, or they 
will be directly wired. Also, since most dishwashers are 
directly wired to their supply circuits, ground integrity is 
likely. The remaining ground systerrl uncertainty is in 120 volt, 
3 wire appliances consisting of four clothes washers which 
contain 13 hazardous nodes and 2 microwave ovens which contain 
seven hazardous nodes. 
After completing the main program of consumer product 
analysis, several additional products were evaluated. Gas or oil 
furnace flame sensors of the photocell type were felt to be 
particularly susceptible, so several were purchased and evaluated 
analytically and with the carbon fiber simulator. 
This extended study showed that the gas fueled appliance 
hazard possibilities were essentially the same as the electric 
counterpart designs and the electric shock hazard potential in 
furnaces is near zero due to the high probability that the 
electrical system and cabinetry are well grounded. The only 
possible fault-hazard condition was found to be in an 
intermittent ignition type furnace control which could permit 
fuel to flow with the flame out and igniter off. This fault is 
an extremely remote possibility since a fiber would have to 
arrive after the burner had started and then would require a 
flame-out to occur before the furnace had gone into its next off 
cycle. After the “off” cycle a f-iber in this location would 
prevent the burner motor or gas valve from operating at the next 
rronfl cycle. 
The occurrence of any potential hazard depends on the carbon 
fiber transfer function into appliance compartments. If the 
transfer is small, the possibility of occurrence is remote. NBS 
did not evaluate transfer functions for appliances. 
Appliances Recommentied for Chamber Testing 
Sixteen of the appliances were not amenable to probe testing 
and analysis for quantifying potential faults and hazards, the 
reason being: 
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1. Some of the models contained electronic controls. 
Evaluation of these electronic control models indicated that 
potential faults were too numerous to quantify. 
2. Toaster, toaster-ovens, heaters and hand irons contain 
uninsulated stiff wire or sheet metal conductors. Because 
of the varied configuration, and the large number of 
possible interconnections, it is not practical to 
analytically evaluate the hazard potential of these 
products. 
3. Portable room heaters, toasters, and clothes dryers contain 
uninsulated heater wires which are exposed to various 
amounts of fan and convection forced air. These products 
also have numerous possibilities for fiber connections. 
Eleven rnodels were recommended for chamber testing (See 
figure 6). Nine, because they were representative of those not 
amenable to probe testing and analysis. Two other products, a 
clothes dryer and a dishwasher, were chosen as representative 
appliances to quantify the fiber exposure required to cause a 
fault or a hazard as an indication of the vulnerability of these 
appliance categories and others of similar construction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Few products were f'ound to be susceptible to faults. 
For nonelectronic appliances most faults were of minor 
consequences. However. for electronic appliances our analysis 
inaicated that the fault possibilities were too numerous to 
analyze. Therefore, these appliances were recommended for 
chamber testing. A review of carbon fiber chamber test data from 
other NASA contractors revealed no faults in those appliances 
recommended,for chamber testing.--' 
8. Our analysis showeti that carbon fiber generated circuits 
could create many potential hazards in many appliances. However, 
the number of potential hazards is reduced by (1) increased 
spacing to fiber length ratio (2) coated surfaces and (3) the 
availability of correctly grounded receptacles. A review of the 
carbon fiber exposure data for those appliances recommended for 
chamber testing, in most cases, confirmed our prediction of 
hazards for these appliances. 
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appliance plug 
APPLIANCE 
C ‘\ 
appliance 
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Figure l.- Hazard analysis. 
FIBER LOCATION 
mm__--- Fauh 
--- No fault 
120V 240V 
S - Switch 
H - Heater 12ov 
M - Motor c 
Lp - Lamp 
C - Clock motor 
T - Timer motor 
Kl - Relay Coil 
CT - Timer contact 
CK - Relay contact 
L - Any load over 15 watts 
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2 
Figure 2.- Fault analysis. 
47 APPLIANCES EXAMINED 
BY PROBE TESTING AND ANALYSIS 
1000 NODES INSPECTED 
947 NODES WITH LOW LIKELIHOOD 
OF HAZARD DUE To: 
l SPACHG TO FlBER-LENGTH RATID 
l COATED SURFACES 
. INTERIOR COMPARTMENT 
ENCLOSURES 
53 NODES SOME DEGREE OF HAZARD 
16 NODES IN 9 SMALL 37 NODES IN 19 MAJOR 
APPLIANCES APPLIANCES 
REPRESENT POTENTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF HAZARDS 
HAZARDS DEPEND ON 
GROUNDSYSTEM 
Figure 3.- Appliance probe test summary. 
PRODUCT NUMBER NUMBER OF 
CATEGORY EXAMINED HAZARDOUS NODES 
VACUUM CLEANER 3 4 
l FOOD MIXER 3 4 
‘PORTABLE HEATER . 3 a 
TOTALS 9 16 
*Hazards in these appliances were verified by carbon fiber chamber 
tests sponsored by NASA-Langley 
Figure 4.- Small appliances with potential hazards. 
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PRODUCT NUMBER NUMBER OF 
CATEGORY EXAMINED HAZARDOUS NODES 
CLOTHES WASHER 4 13 
RANGE* 2 1 
DISHWASHER’ 3 5 
CLOTHES DRYER* .4 11 
MICROWAVE OVEN 2 7 
TOTALS 15 37 
* Ground system violation highly unlikely for these appliances 
Figure 5.- Major appliances with potential hazards. 
APPLIANCE CATEGORY 
CLOTHES DRYER 
DISHWASHER 
TOASTER 
TOASTER OVEN 
HAND IRON 
SMOKE DETECTOR 
HEATER 
MICROWAVE OVEN 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
TOTAL 11 
Figure 6.- Appliances recommended for carbon fiber chamber test. 
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RISK ASSESSMENT OF CARBON FIBER 
COMPOSITE IN SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
W. T. Hathaway and K. M. Hergenrother 
Transportation Systems Center 
Department of Transportation 
SUMMARY 
The vulnerability of surface transportation to airborne carbon fibers and 
the national risk associated with the potential use of carbon fibers in the 
surface transportation system have been evaluated. Airborne carbon fibers may 
cause failure rates in surface transportation of less than one per year by 
1995. The national risk resulting from the use of carbon fibers in the surface 
transportation system is projected to be an annual dollar loss on the order of 
$6,000. 
INTRODUCTION 
This report describes the status of the Department of Transportation 
Carbon Fiber Project which addresses the surface transportation portion of the 
coordinated Federal Government Carbon Fiber Action Plan presented in reference 
1. 
The DOT responsibilities are to assess the vulnerability of surface 
transportation to airborne carbon fibers and to assess the national risk due 
to carbon fibers released from surface transportation. 
The project was divided into the following five tasks: 
(1) To estimate the quantities of carbon fiber that will be used in the 
surface transportation system by 1995. 
(2) To estimate the frequency and location of surface transportation 
system fire incidents. 
(3) To estimate through laboratory tests the size and quantity of carbon 
fibers released by surface transportation fires. 
(4) To estimate the vulnerability of the surface transportation system 
to airborne carbon fibers. 
(5) To estimate the national risk from carbon fibers released in surface 
transportation incidents. 
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CARBON FIBER COMPOSITE USAGE 
An estimate of the expected carbon fiber quantity and matrix composition 
in surface transportation was developed by DOT from a review of the existing 
literature, the Department of Commerce survey conducted in 1979 (presented in 
a preceding paper by Donald Parsons reference 2) and several independent 
inquiries to carbon fiber suppliers and users. This effort further established 
that the only prospective use of carbon fibers in the transportation system 
would be in automobiles, light trucks and heavy trucks. The DOT estimates 
place the7total carbon fiber usage in surface transportation in 1995 at less 
than 5X10 kg. The estimate DOT chose for its risk assessment was 2 kg in 
carsand light trucks and 15 kg in heavy trucks. Table 1 shows the actual DOT 
usage estimates and the expected matrix composition. 
TRANSPORTATION FIRES 
The exposure of carbon fiber composite materials to a severe fire is the 
principal mechanism for the release of carbon fibers. Table 2 shows a summary 
of surface transportation vehicle fires estimated by the U.S. Fire Administra- 
tion (USFA) and a projection of total vehicle fires estimated by the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA). As stated previously, nearly all carbon 
fiber materials used in surface transportation will be found in cars and 
trucks. Therefore, car and truck fires are of principal concern in a study of 
potential carbon fiber release incidents. 
The fire data inputs needed for the risk assessment consist of an estimate 
of the frequency and geographic location of the fire and portion of the vehicle 
involved. Fire frequency can be found in Table 2 but the above data sources 
have little information on geographic location. 
The Highway Safety Research Institute at the University of Michigan has 
collected information from fire department records on automobile fires in the 
state of Michigan for the two year period from 1976-1977. This data is 
collected by county and it was possible to establish a correlation between the 
annual automobile fires per county and county population. The correlation (a 
correlation coefficient of 0.97) indicated that the urban car is more 
susceptible to fire as most automobile fires occur in urban areas where the 
vehicle population density is highest. 
The other details of the automobile fire scenario which are important to 
fiber release are the severity of the fire and its location on the vehicle. 
The fire location on the vehicle was important to determine which of the 
composite materials were exposed to the fire. The vehicle fires were classi- 
fied by one of the following scenarios: engine small, engine severe, passenger 
compartment small, passenger compartment severe and total conflagration. 
Severe fires were defined as the only fires that will release carbon fibers. 
Since no carbon fibers are expected to be used in the passenger compartment, 
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only severe engine fires and total vehicle conflagration fires will release 
fibers. Roughly one-third of the car and truck fires fall into these two 
release scenarios. This estimate is based on an analysis of the passenger 
vehicle dollar loss statistics for fires and is published by the California 
State Fire Marshall. 
LABORATORY TESTS 
All the laboratory and field test data available for the release by fire 
of carbon fibers from composite samples were on aerospace-grade, epoxy based 
materials, usually with post-fire impact or explosion. It was felt that this 
data was not an accurate representation of the fiber release expected from 
automotive-grade composite. Automotive composites are expected to be based on 
a matrix of vinyl ester or polyester and glass fibers blended with carbon 
fibers. 
DOT developed a series of laboratory tests to measure carbon fiber 
release from automotive-type composites. The tests were designed to evaluate 
carbon fiber release under conditions which simulated automobile fires, namely 
high and low radiant heat flux with an 1800°C propane/air flame, fuel rich or 
fuel lean. The burning time was 10 minutes and there was no post-fire impact 
or explosion. Prior to the execution of the program by NASA-Ames and its 
contractor, Scientific Services, Inc., users and suppliers of the carbon 
fiber materials were asked to review and comment on the test program. 
The results of this test program are briefly summarized in Table 3. The 
quantities of carbon fiber released were found to be sensitive to the test 
condition but not to the matrix resin. Depending on the test conditions, the 
basic results from this test program were an average carbon fiber release over 
the range from 0.003 percent to 0.06 percent of the composite carbon fiber 
weight. Ninety-nine percent of all carbon fibers released were less than three 
millimeters in length. Fibers of this length in the quantities released from 
the test are unlikely to cause electrical failures in any individual incident. 
VULNERABILITY OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
Surface transportation systems have been designed to operate reliably and 
safely in an environment of dust, oil, salt spray and vandalism. These 
system requirements produce a system design which is not easily affected by a 
carbon fiber hazard. From the above analysis of the Michigan data, it was 
determined that most of the carbon fiber exposure will be in the vicinity of 
the urban roadway system. Since very little of this urban roadway system 
interfaces with the waterway transportation system, the vulnerability of water 
transportation was not evaluated beyond a brief qualitative determination that 
it would be relatively invulnerable to the few carbon fibers to which it would 
be exposed. The remaining modes bore the brunt of the exposure and were 
thoroughly evaluated. 
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The method used to estimate the vulnerability of a surface transportation 
system was to divide the system into subsystems and, if necessary, components 
to a point where the vulnerability of the subsystem or component could be 
estimated from vulnerability data published by NASA and DOD. The effects of 
the subsystem failure are then classified as safety, performance or convenience 
failures. A safety failure occurs when there is a significant loss of system 
safety; a performance failure occurs when there is a significant loss in system 
performance; and a convenience failure occurs when there is a significant loss 
in the perceived comfort or convenience by the passengers or crew. This 
analysis as applied to the passenger car is seen in Tab1 
g 
4. In the vulner- 
ability column, V indicates a vulnerability less than 10 fiber seconds/meter3; 
P means that the equipment is sealed against fiber penetration; and C means 
that the current and voltage ranges are insensitive to carbon fibers. For 
example, the alternator will burn out any carbon fibers which penetrate it, the 
voltage regulator is potted in plastic, but carbon fibers can interface with 
the operation of the radio. Table 4 shows that only radios may be vulnerable 
to carbon fibers. Tests have shown that an automobile radio has a vulnerabili- 
ty greater than lo8 fiber seconds/meter3. The passenger car, thus, is 
effectively not vulnerable. 
Similar analyses have shown that both the truck and the bus are also not 
vulnerable. Traffic signal systems are housed in sealed enclosures which will 
exclude carbon fibers so that they too are not vulnerable. The net result is 
that the highway system is not vulnerable to airborne carbon fibers. 
Electrified rail systems were analyzed by dividing them into carborne, 
wayside, electric substation and signal subsystems. The result of this 
analysis is shown in Table 5. These vulnerabilities, with the exception of 
the signal system, all represent system failures. Most of the failures are 
monetary and are likely to require no maintenance or repair, e.g., a flash- 
over at a third-rail insulator, The vulnerability of the vehicle is shown for 
both a single car and a six-car train. The vulnerability of the six-car train 
assumes that the traction motors must fail on more than three cars for the 
train to fail. This is a reasonable assumption since the performance of a 
train is not significantly affected until more than half its cars lose their 
traction motors. It is, in fact, common for transit systems to have failed 
cars in their trains. 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
A typical surface transportation release incident can be characterized as 
a release of 20 grams of single fibers, less than 3 mm long; most of the fibers 
fall out within a kilometer of the source, and the incident frequency is 
correlated with population. It is estimated that there will be 100,000 such 
incidents a year. Preliminary calculations show that the probability that 
there is any damage from an individual incident is very low. As discussed in 
reference 3, the case where there are a large number of incidents with a low 
probability of damage by an individual incident is best modeled analytically 
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by Poisson statistics. 
The national risk due to fibers released by surface transportation was 
computed by the NASA Langley Research Center contractor Arthur D. Little Inc. 
under a reimbursable agreement from DOT to NASA. A brief review of their 
method is as follows: 
The number of release incidents and number of carbon fibers released each 
year is estimated for each of 3,000 counties in the.U.S. 
The number of equipments, along with their associated vulnerabilities and 
failure costs, is tabulated for these counties. 
The losses for the individual counties are then calculated and summed to 
determine the national risk. 
The result of this calculation was a projected annual national dollar 
loss, associated with the use of carbon fibers in surface transportation, on 
the order of $6,000 per year. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The vulnerability of surface transportation to airborne carbon fibers is 
very low. The risk of failure is less than one a year at the carbon fiber 
hazard level predicted for the year 1995. Similarly, the national risk due to 
this hazard is very low. The annual dollar or loss estimate is on the order 
of $6,000 a year. Because of this small vulnerability and risk, the DOT 
carbon fiber program will conclude early in FY 80. 
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Year 
1990 
1995 
RESIN TYPE 
Polyester Graphite/Glass 
Hybird 
Vinyl ester 
TABLE 1 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CF USAGE ESTIMATES 
Average CF/Auto 
(KG) 
0.5 
Average CF/ 
Heavy Truck (KG) 
1.0 
2.0 15.0 
PROJECTED MATRIX COMPOSITION 
Graphite/Glass 
Hybird 
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TABLE 2 
TRANSPC)RTATION FIRES* (1977 - USFA) 
PASSENGER VEHICLES 
FREIGHT ROAD VEHICLES 
RAIL TRANS. VEHICLES 
WATER TRANS. VESSEL 
AIR TRANS. VEHICLE 
HEAVY EQUIPMENT 
SPECIAL VEHICLES 
OTHER MOBILE FROPERTY 
UNDETERMINED 
TOTAL 
NFPA EST.*Jc TOTAL 
*EST. BASED ON 26% SAMPLE OF U.S. POP. (8 STATES) 
**BASED ON DATA FROM 4% OF FIRE DEPTS. (IN 50 STATES) 
AVERAGE PERCENT RELEASED 
AVERAGE MEDIAN 
FIBER LENGTH 
325,000 
58,000 
2,800 
1,850 
550 
7,000 
2,700 
100 
62,000 
460,000 
490,000 
TABLE 3 
TEST RESULTS 
HIGH RADIANT, FUEL LEAN LOW RADIANT, FUEL RICH -_-_--- 
.003% .06% 
0.1 MM 0.9 MM 
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SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT VULNERABILITY 
ENGINE: 
IGNITION 
ALTERNATOR 
VOLTAGE REGULATOR 
BATTERY 
STARTER 
CHASSIS: 
HEATER 
WINDOW DEFOGGER 
WIPER/WASHER 
FUEL: 
PUMP 
EMISSION CONTROLS 
INJECTION 
LIGHTING: 
HEADLIGHT 
TAIL LIGHT 
BRAKE 
TURN 
INTERIOR 
ACCESSORIES: 
CLOCK 
P 
C 
P 
C 
C 
C 
C 
P 
P 
P 
P 
C 
C 
C 
C 
P 
P 
TABLE 4 
PASSENGER CAR ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
EFFECT 
PERFORMANCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
SAFETY 
SAFETY 
SAFETY 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
CONVENIENCE 
ENTERTAINMENT - RADIO V 
CB RADIO V 
DIGITAL INST. P 
V - POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE. 
P - PROTECTED FROM PENETRATION OF CARBON FIBER. 
C - CURRENT OR VOLTAGE‘IN A RANGE NOT SENSITIVE TO CARBON FIBER. 
TABLE 5 
- 
VULNERABILITY OF AN ELECTRIFIED RAIL SYSTEM 
VEHICLE 
SINGLE CAR 
6 CAR TRAIN 
WAYSIDE POWER 
SUBSTATION 
FIBER SEC/METER3 
1.5.x 105 
1.5 x 109 
1.8 x 106 
,3.5 x 108 
SIGNAL SYSTEM 6 x 109 
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